evaluation of the security risk management programme

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executive summary

a. In April 2015, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) commissioned the Security Risk Management Program Evaluation to an international evaluation team. The evaluation was requested by the Safety and Security Division (SSD) of UNRWA, at the headquarters in Amman.

b. This evaluation takes its point of departure in UNRWA’s mandatory requirement to ensure safety and security within the United Nations Security Management System. UNRWA has a duty of care towards all of its 30,000 staff members, of which approximately 300 are international staff and fall under the United Nations Security Management System umbrella. The remaining staff, mainly local area staff, does fall outside of the United Nations Security Management System umbrella. SSD has therefore since its inception in 2010 developed an Agency specific SRM system to address and serve the safety and security needs of UNRWA’s approximately 30,000 local area staff. Moving forward on security for 30,000 staff is a major achievement especially recognizing the difficult circumstances that UNRWA typically operates under with various level of conflict present in several of its field of operations.

c. The relevance and interest in this evaluation is particularly pertinent and timely due to the confluence of factors and drivers making UNRWA increasingly vulnerable to safety and security threats and risks. In times of deficit and austerity measures the need for efficiency and effectiveness are absolutely critical to continue with UNRWA’s services, while the Palestine refugees are facing one of their most critical times ever, in an increasingly unstable Near East.

d. This evaluation contributes to accountability and learning. It aims to attribute the Security Risk Management (SRM) programme contributions to the achievement of the overall Safety and Security mandate. The theory of change of UNRWA SRM programme aims to create an enabling environment for personnel to deliver services to beneficiaries by managing and anticipating operational risk in a cost effective and targeted way in order to increase the Agency’s ability to effectively and more safely provide services to UNRWA beneficiaries. This overall objective rests on important assumptions that SSD is engaged with other departments business processes, and hence ‘Security is mainstreamed’ for the continued promotion of a culture of security. This evaluation seeks to test the underlying assumptions for the creation of a favourable enabling environment leading to the overall goal of UNRWA, i.e., its ability to deliver services to beneficiaries effectively.

e. The evaluation will make recommendations to the Commissioner-General, Agency Security Focal Point / Director of Administrative Support and SSD in order to assess the current situation with reference to good practice and make recommendations for future improvements of the SRM program.

f. The SRM evaluation will determine as systemically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the SRM program. The evaluation will contribute to better accountability of the funds spent on implementation of the SRM program. Moreover, the evaluation will discuss lessons learned and will identify good practices in relation to Risk Management Systems outside of UNRWA that could be adapted to the UNRWA environment. Recommendations on the way forward will need to take into consideration good practices and the need to ensure minimum security standards but keep the resource constraint of UNRWA in mind.

g. The key findings of this evaluation are summarized here in short. The key findings emerging from this evaluation are presented here to further which are considered to have an effect on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the UNRWA’s SRM
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finding 1
UNRWA is highly decentralized and the operationalization of safety and security differs between the fields of operation. The determination of acceptable risk is not currently determined in a systematic manner by professional field security officers. Safety and security is not mainstreamed in programming.

finding 2
Decision-making is not guided by policy, Framework of Accountability, or instructions and training provided by Field Security Office or SSD headquarters. The UNRWA Safety and Security Policy is not considered official and does not have a formal recognition by staff in the fields of operation, nor is the Safety and Security Policy endorsed by UNRWA management team. The policy is only an internal document for safety and security staff.

finding 3
The safety and security work becomes inefficient when it is not mainstreamed in programming, or not targeting underlying safety and security causes and concerns, but instead is directed towards ‘band-aiding’ or ‘fire fighting’. The lack of coordination and communication is an obstacle to information sharing and learning. It affects efficiency negatively because prioritization and decisions are not undertaken on the basis of available knowledge.

Allocation of resources to offer training by SSD in combination with proactive and collaborative Field Security Offices have had a positive effect on efficiency of service delivery. Physical safety and security measures are a necessity but are often significant investments, while a well-established ‘Acceptance’ approach¹ can be the most cost effective SRM tool if it is applied holistically and sequentially through an understanding of attitudes, perceptions and priorities of beneficiaries.

finding 4
The mitigation of risk is influenced by many factors of which SSD and Field Security Offices can influence through capacity building, mainstreaming, workforce management, framework of accountability, Standard Operating Procedures, etc. Some of these output areas are more recognized than others by UNRWA staff for contributing to risk mitigation and fit for purpose. SSD-trainings on safety and security is highly appreciated, and often recognized as highly useful and contributing to staff being fit for purpose. However, the Job Creation Programme’s (JCP) guards in Gaza are by many UNRWA personnel considered not fit for the purpose. In general, the current organizational set-up, human sources and budget do not match what it takes to achieve the strategic objectives within the expected time frame.

finding 5
There is limited proactive analytical and strategic collaboration between SSD and Field Security Offices and programme and operational departments to engage security processes with business processes of other departments to promote a culture of security and mitigation of risk. SSD headquarters and Field Security Office teams do not yet carry out organizational and field operational Security Risk Assessments (SRAs) on programs, projects, activities, staff occupations

and or staff at most risk. Thus, there is currently no real operational link between SRAs and Security Information Management System (SIMS). SIMS is also not yet fully optimized, but it provides relevant information over time on trends and patterns on safety and security issues.

**finding 6**

The duty of care does not sufficiently rest on SRAs. The acceptable risk is not well established. It is not systematically documented what is the present existing risk UNRWA staff are facing. The scope and regularity of SRAs are today driven by the type of leadership and available resources at the field level rather than systematic procedures. It does not appear to be sufficient knowledge of the SRA process from the top.

**finding 7**

Staff of UNRWA does not feel supported in their capacity by UNRWA’s internal policies, guidance and organization during and after disputes with beneficiaries. UNRWA staff encourages the Agency to undertake a comprehensive review and develop measures to fill any gaps between safety / security and protection / legal aid.

**finding 8**

The outcome and impact of safety and security rests with the capacity and processes of each field operation. The role, responsibility and integration of SSD in decision-making processes differ also among the field operations. Consistency and sustainability of building good relationships between SSD teams and the area staff through regular contact, dialogue and training creates good safety and security results. Chief Area Officers have a significant role and influence on UNRWA’s relations with local authorities and community members. Coordination with local host authorities rests largely with the Chief Area Officers. Gaza field office illustrates a good example of well-developed coordination and communication enabling and empowering UNRWA personnel to make informed decisions.

**finding 9**

Earmarking funds for certain field offices reduces the flexibility for UNRWA and SSD to swiftly and flexibly cover unexpected costs due to rising needs during changing circumstances.

**finding 10**

Linking budgeting with SRAs for planning of programming is a model considered by other humanitarian organizations.

h. The **key recommendations** emerging from this evaluation are presented here to further strengthen the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the UNRWA’s SRM program:

**recommendation 1**

Formally adopt the UNRWA specific Framework of Accountability and Safety and Security Policy. The adoption of the Framework of Accountability should be accompanied by training of Field Directors and Deputies, and raise awareness of their roles and responsibilities. Once Framework of Accountability is adopted then share it widely and educate all staff through the SSD in the field and Chiefs of area offices.
recommendation 2
Mainstream security in programming. To integrate SSD and Field Security Office teams with managerial decision-making at the operation and programme level to improve alignment and use of SSD competence and protocols. To include SSD at an early design and planning phase with programme management teams to link a strategic safety and security lens with operational programming and service delivery. To integrate SSD more fully in headquarters decision-making & strategy.

recommendation 3
Ensure that UNRWA’s internal SRM system is context specific through SRAs and aligned with programme strategies, and carefully adapted and tailored to UNRWA’s specific needs and organizational conditions to guarantee the safety and security of area staff. Mainstream the SSD teams in the field approach to standardize plans, documents, procedures, and work plans through best practice. Apply lean approach to develop SSD work plan and resulting standard checklist.

recommendation 4
Adapt SIMS to provide critical information for analysis (SRAs) and development of Standard Operating Procedures. Ensure that SSD in the field uses SIMS all the time to create and communicate existing threats to staff. Ensure that Field Security Offices in the field cooperate and liaison closely with DSS to adapt SRAs to UNRWA’s context specific operational and programme environment. Prioritize the establishment of bottom-up (from the field/front-line staff) SRAs, which focus on specific threats apparent to their staff and beneficiaries. Make it a requirement for field management to take accountability in writing for area staff missions and operations.

recommendation 5
Review roles and responsibilities of guard management to identify gaps with needs and priorities. Assign guards at installations (access control) the responsibility to identify threats and support programme staff to pre-empt any assault or harassment. Psychosocial assistance or measures within workplaces can complement guard duties.
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<td>JCP</td>
<td>Job Creation Programme</td>
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<td>SIMS</td>
<td>Security Information Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-Bound</td>
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<td>SSD</td>
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introduction

1. In April 2015, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) commissioned the Security Risk Management Program Evaluation to an international evaluation team consisting of three team members. The evaluation was requested by the Safety and Security Division (SSD) of UNRWA at the headquarters in Amman. The evaluation was endorsed by the Department of Internal Oversight Services Advisory Committee on Internal Oversight and by the Advisory Commission in mid-November 2014, and included in the 2015 Department of Internal Oversight Services Work Plan.

2. The evaluation is considered relevant for the following reasons:
   - The Security Risk Management (SRM) programme has a significant potential to make the UNRWA service delivery more effective;
   - The SRM programme is now in the fourth implementation year and, while it consists of tested principles and procedures, the adaptation of the policies, procedures and systems to fit UNRWA’s operating reality, organizational structure and programme delivery is new;
   - Adjustments, revisions or corrections can be made to the programme in order to ensure the optimal implementation of the SRM programme within UNRWA.

3. This evaluation takes its point of departure in UNRWA’s mandatory requirement to ensure safety and security within the United Nations Security Management System. UNRWA has a duty of care towards all of its 30,000 staff members, of which approximately 300 are international staff and fall under the United Nations Security Management System umbrella. The remaining staff, mainly local area staff, does fall outside of the United Nations Security Management System umbrella. SSD has therefore since its inception in 2010 developed an Agency specific SRM system to address and serve the safety and security needs of UNRWA’s approximately 30,000 local area staff. UNRWA has therefore adopted its own SRM system tailored to the specific needs of the Agency. UNRWA SRM model is a composite model based on the lessons learned and best practice from the United Nations Security Management System, International Committee of the Red Cross and International Non-Governmental Organizations. The relevance and interest in this evaluation is particularly pertinent and timely due to the confluence of factors and drivers making UNRWA increasingly vulnerable to safety and security threats and risks. In times of deficit and austerity measures the need for robust efforts in resource mobilisation is absolutely critical to Palestine refugees are facing one of their most critical times ever, in an increasingly unstable Near East.

purpose, objectives and scope of the assignment

4. This evaluation will contribute to accountability and learning. It aims to attribute the SRM programme contributions to the achievement of the overall Safety and Security mandate during 2011-2014. The evaluation will cover all UNRWA headquarters and field offices if accessible. The evaluation will make recommendations to the Commissioner-General, Agency Security Focal Point / Director of Administrative Support and SSD in order to assess the current situation with reference to good practice and make recommendations for future improvements of the SRM program.

5. The SRM evaluation will determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact
and sustainability of the SRM program. The evaluation will contribute to better accountability of the funds spent on implementation of the SRM program. Moreover, the evaluation will discuss lessons learned and will identify good practices in relation to Risk Management Systems outside of UNRWA that could be adapted to the UNRWA environment. Recommendations on the way forward will need to take into consideration good practices and the need to ensure minimum security standards but keep the resource constraint of UNRWA in mind.

**methodology**

6. The evaluation has been guided by a Steering Committee composed of internal and external stakeholders. The Steering Committee has approved the background paper and the inception report. It will approve the evaluation report. It has received briefings by the consultants during the inception phase and on the preliminary results.

7. The evaluation rests on three major pillars of sources of information:
   - Documentation provided by the Evaluation Division to the consultants in the first instance. It was also supplemented along the evaluation process. See Annex A.
   - Key informant interviews and focus groups meetings with more than 200 UNRWA staff members. See Annex 4.
   - Survey questionnaire distributed to UNRWA staff members, including both local area and international staff in all five UNRWA fields of operation. Statistically significant sample sizes were granted. See Annex 7.

8. A more in-depth description of the methodology is outlined in the final inception report. See Annex 5, and for the survey questionnaire Annex 7.

9. The approach used for the evaluation is heavily steered by determining the perspectives of UNRWA’s front line staff through listening, learning and understanding. This demanded travel to Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank. Due to not being able to acquire visas to Syria the team held interviews with UNRWA staff there via video and telephones. The evaluation team met with staff in Education, Health, Relief and Social Services, and Protection in each field of operation at the country field offices, area offices and camps. The camps visited were selected on the basis of the criteria agreed upon with UNRWA’s Evaluation Division. This lead to a careful assessment of how, the SSR has succeeded and managed mainstreaming safety and security.

10. The voices of the staff members are samples from different geographical locations from the five fields of operations and the streams of service delivery and operational support. The evaluation team recognizes that findings, lessons learned, and recommendations are based on individuals with whom we have had the opportunity to meet and learn from, as well as individuals whom have email addresses and access to Internet to fill out the survey questionnaire. There are many staff members among the 30 000 UNRWA personnel who have not been able to be consulted and had the opportunity to voice their views on this assignment. We recognize that the refugee camps, installations, and area offices differ from location to location, and the sample of camps and interviews was adjusted to the available scope and time of the assignment. In particular, the usage of an online survey questionnaire implies that staff members without access to Internet, or who were not able to access Internet during the survey period were not included in the summary of the statistics.

11. Interacting and speaking to the guards, listening to the Chief Area Officers and Camp Service Officers as well as interviewees and focus groups were invaluable. Speaking to frontline staff allowed the team to gather evidence of how effectively UNRWA addresses security threats posed to them. Locally recruited personnel were our means of verification of changes in the security environment; they informed the
team about perceived and real changes and of security concerns and needs.

12. The evaluation team has made significant efforts to balance views and reflections among UNRWA frontline staff, UNRWA managerial level, and Popular Services Committees (used interchangeably with Refugee Services Committees). The conversations with the Popular Services Committees proved to be difficult. The topics discussed cover issues well beyond the SRM areas of interest and it was difficult to interfere without being perceived as ‘steering’ the conversation. The Popular Services Committees are important in the communities and they constitute relevant source of information. The Popular Services Committees are an important component to UNRWA’s ‘Acceptance’ approach.

13. The team listened to a multitude of frontline voices and managers from each field operations. The nature of issues and threats varies and can escalate during times of emergencies. UNRWA staff experience different concerns and anxiety between location and duty stations, whilst one location may be deemed stable another might be perceived as experiencing insecurities. Dynamics of underlying or direct drivers range from frustration and desperation due to an incapacity to provide for oneself and one’s family (and the sense of hopelessness), to continual conflict between Israel and Palestinian armed groups, to advances made by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Syria, this making the working environment in the camps vulnerable to exogenous and endogenous political, social and economic pressures and military actions. Whilst most of the UNRWA staff consider the operational context to be normal, as opposed to an emergency setting, as was highlighted above these words take on different meanings than they would for other workers who perform similar services as a government employee or for another UN organization.

14. An essential component of this evaluation is the Theory of Change of the SRM Program. This component is largely an implicit model produced by SSD HQ. Many of the field security officers had not yet by the time of the evaluation seen the model, but they could identify and understand the logic and the elements of it. The Theory of Change model consists of many critical elements that in combination contribute to change. The evaluation approach to this assignment takes its point of departure to test the underlying assumptions of the Theory of Change to analyse and understand whether integrated elements effectively have influenced and contributed to intended positive effects. However, the newness of the Theory of Change model for UNRWA safety and security is a methodological challenge to the evaluation exercise while assessing the five evaluation domains because there are elements that are not well established or understood yet by stakeholders.

15. The Background Paper states that there was no baseline data collection available at the beginning of the SRM program. It has subsequent implications in analysing, validating and verifying changes. However, a broader methodological challenge is the ability to identify, assess, measure, validate and verify changes triggered and produced by the SRM program. The SRM programme is initiated, developed and managed by the Safety and Security Division at the headquarters. SSD has developed and launched safety and security products which are part of the SRM programme’s Theory of Change. SSD however, has no direct control over the implementation of these products at the field operational level. Instead the implementation of the SSD products are controlled and influenced by priorities at the field operational level and the capacity of the SSD Field Operation. From an evaluation perspective, this is problematic since the means of verification of progress and results attributed to the SRM programme are considered to be validated by the frontline

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staff in the five field operations. In other words, the evaluation team has sought to identify, assess, validate and verify whether SSD products have had any impact on the perception of actual safety and security of frontline staff’s professional day-to-day duties. The UNRWA SRM is guided by the Agency commitment to the safety and security of its staff and the recognition that UNRWA has a Duty of Care towards its staff, SSD’s mission is to provide leadership, advice and operational support on security and risk management with the aim to manage risks and therein improve personnel safety, secure assets and protect premises in order to support sustainable programme delivery. SSD does however have some significant limitations to control and influence its level of effectiveness, impact and sustainability due to the organizational structure and the lack of security being considered mainstreamed.

16. UNRWA seeks changes at institutional level through adoption and endorsement of policies, strategies, frameworks, and guidelines, and or through organisational and management development, as well as through influencing organisational culture, attitudes and behaviour among staff. These are all internal elements for which UNRWA has ability to control and influence to promote an improved enabling environment for UNRWA services to be delivered effectively. However, these aspects need to be treated and analysed from the perspective of internal drivers and barriers for change, and as this evaluation will outline SSD does not have full control over influencing internal systems, processes and results. The evaluation team recognizes the importance for this evaluation to emphasize throughout the report for which elements and aspects SSD can control and influence, and which other internal actors are responsible for making SSD’s mandate feasible and achievable.

17. A traditional evaluation based on the five evaluation domains is not as applicable to the evaluation of the SRM programme because the programme is not designed, planned, implemented and monitored in relation to SMART objectives and indicators. The evaluation team disagrees that “the Results-Based Monitoring data base contains indicator information mandated by UNRWA with respect to the SRM program.” This evaluation has not been able to link the five evaluation domains with indicators for the results chain because there have not been any indicators to measure change for frontline staff. This evaluation would have benefitted largely from SMART indicators and a results matrix, as well as a baseline for the selected indicators measuring the progress towards the strategic objectives. The SRM programme was designed and developed in a step-by-step process, and there is no coherent results matrix for which there is a baseline.

regional context

18. The Commissioner-General writes in the foreword to the Medium Term Strategy 2016-2021 that “the current collective predicament of Palestine refugees is so dire as to be existential in nature. The situation is incredibly bleak in the region, the pressures are immense on Palestinians and on Palestine refugees, the threats to their future and the unsustainability of their situation has become increasingly visible.” The external pressure in the Middle East region has contributed to a general deterioration of safety and security in the five field operations. Threats and risks to UNRWA personnel, premises and assets are getting greater. Area staff is the backbone of the UNRWA and they work at great personal risk. Several staff members have in the past years been killed, detained or missing. The lost and missing UNRWA local area staff members, UNRWA’s installations and assets, and refugee housing buildings being vandalized, misused and damaged, raise significant concerns about how to best guarantee safety and security for its 30,000 local area personnel.

19. While funding shortfalls require austerity measures with consequences for programs such as psycho-social programme for children, school feeding program, and cash subsidy programme risk to be cancelled.
Funding shortfalls of services represent serious challenges to safety and security of UNRWA operations. Human development and protection crisis with increasing levels of food insecurity and poverty raise psychological and psychosocial stress and vulnerability, and trigger frustration. Demonstrations and protests against reduction in services outside UNRWA offices and installations are becoming more frequent. Significant unrest, incursions into the UNRWA compound and the closure of various installations is a reality.

20. All twelve Palestine refugee camps in Syria have been deeply affected by the conflict. Close to 300,000 Palestine refugees are displaced within Syria; over 50,000 refugee homes have been destroyed or damaged. More than 40,000 Palestine refugees from Syria have fled to Lebanon. Palestine refugees from Syria fall under the mandate of UNRWA and have no access to public health, education or relief services in Lebanon. The influx of Palestine refugees puts enormous strain on UNRWA operations and poses a major challenge for the Agency.

21. Following the military escalation in Gaza, on 8 July 2014, UNRWA declared an emergency in all five areas of the Gaza Strip. The hostilities between Israel and Gaza (8 July-26 August 2014) caused unprecedented damage and destruction in Gaza. There are an estimated 7,000 Explosive Remnants of War buried in the rubble. The presence of thousands of Explosive Remnants of Wars threatens the lives and physical integrity of the population, impedes urgent humanitarian response and reconstruction efforts, and inhibits economic activity and the return of internally displaced persons.

**UNRWA context**

22. UNRWA is unique in the sense that it provides direct services through staff that are mainly Palestine refugees themselves. Not working through implementing partners and having staff that is well known in the communities provides a significantly different framework for staff and communities. The association of staff with the quality of services is more immediate in the case of UNRWA and inter-linkages between service delivery and staff safety therefore different from other UN Agencies.

23. The expectations on UNRWA as an employer and provider for health, education, social services, protection and emergency assistance is at times insurmountable given its available financial and human resources, and the growing complexity in the environment in which UNRWA operates. For the few who earn an employment opportunity with UNRWA it is often a highly desirable and a lifelong employment, and can at times be looked at by others with great envy because there are so few employment opportunities in the camps for Palestine refugees. For instance, more than 27,000 applicants applied for some 200 teaching jobs for the coming academic year 2015-2016 in the Gaza Strip, where unemployment has now reached nearly 44 per cent, making it one of the world’s most unstable economies. This is an indication of how dire the situation is in many camps in the five field operations. UNRWA is both the blessing and the curse for many Palestine refugees. UNRWA stands strong when it can meet and accommodate beneficiaries’ expectations, but it is vulnerable when it cannot provide its core activities to beneficiaries.

**intervention description**

24. The United Nations Security Management System is in many ways the benchmark for UNRWA internal SRM system. The United Nations Security Management System is a UN system-wide approach to security that encompasses policies, guidelines, processes and security personnel aimed at managing security risk to the UN system in order to enable UN activities worldwide to take place under the best security conditions feasible. UNRWA is part of the United Nations Security Management System. However, the United Nations Security Management System Security Policy Manual does not cover UNRWA’s 30,000 locally recruited personnel, who operate in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan and
Syria, and do not receive services or fall under the responsibility of United Nations Department for Safety and Security. It does however cover United Nations system staff members, including UNRWA international staff. Through historical practice, UNRWA locally recruited personnel hold a unique status within the UN family as they are not currently governed by United Nations Security Management System decisions, advisories, and other practical management modalities but by UNRWA’s internal security and operational risk management system.

25. The SSD mission is to: “provide leadership, advice and operational support on security and risk management with the aim to manage risks and therein improve staff safety, secure assets and protect premises in order to support sustainable programme delivery”.

26. SSD has designed a SRM programme with a number of different components and activities to operationalize the mission. The programme is partly framed by a theory of change with underlying assumptions leading to desired results. SSD has developed nine strategic objectives to guide the programme from 2011 until 2015 to mainstream security and risk management within UNRWA’s operations. The SRM approach is illustrated by the theory of change for the Security Risk Management Program which includes a number of critical elements and assumptions. Two fundamental assumptions are the reliance on the ‘Acceptance’ approach, and the adaptation of United Nations Security Management System to a UNRWA internal SRM system. The SRM process is designed to be an evolving and learning process, which allows the SRM system to rapidly adapt to local environmental, security and programmatic changes from the bottom up or top down. The ‘Acceptance’ approach aims at reducing a threat by gaining and maintaining the social and political consent or ‘Acceptance’ by stakeholders of an UNRWA’s work in a given context.

27. The SRM programme operates both at the headquarters and the field operation level. The field level is responsible for implementing the program with the overall guidance coming from headquarters. Field Security Offices are organized and managed under the field office organizational structure, and they do not report to SSD HQ, but to the (Deputy) Director of Operations who reports to the Field Director. Many activities focus on capacity building of UNRWA staff in safety and security, and workforce management of UNRWA guards and Job Creation Programme (JCP) guards. The programme also includes technical guidance, development of systems, processes, plans, and operational Standard Operating Procedures, as well as maintenance of security equipment.
28. Gender issues and human rights consideration were reflected upon in the evaluation process by actively seeking the views and opinions from female UNRWA personnel. The evaluation team consciously aimed to ensure a balance between women and men in focus groups meetings.

29. The evaluation team met with UNRWA’s gender officers in each field operation but Syria. It allowed us to learn and understand about challenges and ways forward to address cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights. In the conversations, an issue that we considered especially interesting and important was whether women working for UNRWA have equal opportunities to work in a safe and secure environment. This issue was incorporated in the survey questionnaire. Our methodological approach to gender was to continuously probe whether there is a difference between women and men in their responses to questions, and whether their answers differ dependent on their field location. The evaluation team has carefully analysed the survey questions from a gender perspective by applying different denominators and assess whether the survey results differ depending on the denominator. This helps us to verify and validate our findings from the field studies and interviews, and it helps to identify regional differences and particularities. Disaggregation of the data per gender and location illustrates the importance of analysing and understanding the differences between women and men in their responses to the survey questions. The responses from women often differ to some extent from men, and it is too simplistic to conclude and state that UNRWA personnel is one homogenous group.

30. The current situation for Palestine refugees is fragile and their particular needs stem from the vulnerabilities of their predicaments. Palestine refugees need protection to safeguard and promote their rights. The protection provided by the hosts in each field operation is not sufficient, which lends itself to the lack of law and order, and functioning civilian authority in camps. UNRWA’s protection mandate is therefore important implemented by Protection Officers, Operations Support Officers and Legal Officers, who have shared important reflections on human rights and protection considerations. UNRWA’s role to promote respect for the rights of the Palestine refugees through monitoring, reporting and interventions is particularly challenging in relation to UNRWA’s responsibility for the safety of its staff who undertake such activities. Frontline delivery of services brings its own security needs. A relevant concern is to strike a balance between maintaining services and staff safety in environments that are highly dangerous for the staff. How does UNRWA continue to operate in highly volatile and dangerous environments without comprising safety and security of the personnel? The humanitarian impact of UNRWA’s operations seems to have been well-supported and established among UNRWA’s personnel.

31. This concern and question need also to be viewed in the light of UNRWA’s neutrality for which it has a legal framework for operations that requires neutrality of staff, third parties, facilities and beneficiaries. There are many Agency processes and mechanisms for implementation and enforcement of its rules, regulations and policies relating to UN neutrality. It is important to recognize that UNRWA’s safety and security work takes the issue of neutrality very seriously since staff safety and security rests largely on both the presence and ‘Acceptance’ approach which make the Agency continuously vulnerable and exposed to the socio-political development in the camps.
relevance

32. This section aims to describe the relevance of the SRM programme in relation to UNRWA’s vision, while it addresses the following evaluation questions:

- Does the SRM programme identify risks to staff? Does the SRM programme provide a methodology to address these risks?
- Is the SRM programme supportive of effective programme implementation?
- Does the SRM programme fit the fluid regional security context and does it consider the differences between fields?

A decentralized decision-making system

33. The decentralized model of UNRWA with five relatively autonomous fields of operations enables the senior management of programs and operations in relation to safety and security to make swift decisions. It is a highly flexible system with a high degree of independence. Many heads of installations for programs and Chiefs of area offices make safety and security decisions without consulting the SSD team for the field operations; instead they consult when there is a need with Directors or deputy Directors of the field operation. The decentralized, flexible and pragmatic model works well for adapting to the local context and challenges, but it is weaker in upholding an Agency-wide SRM system underpinned by principles and standards. Given that the organizational set-up and structure as well as organizational processes are fairly similar across the five fields of operations a framework of accountability for safety and security will strengthen an Agency-wide approach. Similarly, an Agency-adopted SRM checklist for following up responsibilities, activities, and completion rate of items will strengthen Agency-wide SRM system. Gaza field office has initiated a SRM checklist and the initial application has so far had positive effects on a coherent implementation of SRM interventions.

34. The Agency vision is an integrated part of the not yet endorsed UNRWA Safety and Security Policy, as well as of the UNRWA Security Management Framework. The Agency vision states to: “empower staff to make decisions about safety and security within the workplace.” UNRWA’s SRM approach is largely built around enabling staff to deliver UNRWA services effectively. The high level of local autonomy or decentralization with devolved decision-making indirectly lends itself to a high level of empowerment of staff to make decisions about safety and security. The devolved decision-making is attributed to the necessity to act swiftly rather than purposefully devolved authority to make decisions. UNRWA’s system is flexible and pragmatic, and relies on smooth and swift communication among Chief Area Officers, Field Directors and the Commissioner-General to make decisions on critical safety and security issues. Both the management system and organizational culture is built on trust and individual working relationships between managers.

35. Decision-making is not guided by policy, Framework of Accountability, or instructions and training provided by SSD and Field Security Offices. The UNRWA Safety and Security Policy is not considered official and does not have a formal recognition by staff in the fields of operation, nor is the Safety and Security Policy endorsed by UNRWA management team. The policy is only an internal document for safety and security staff. The current status of the Policy lends itself to personal interpretation and solutions to safety and security threats and risks under normal operation and emergency. This ambiguity raises issues about who, when and how determines the level of acceptable risk in relation to the humanitarian impact of delivering services. There is no cohesive
Agency security management system guiding decision-making on safety and security. Some staff does however not feel adequately and professionally prepared to make these decisions. The weakness of the current UNRWA Security Management Framework is its significant dependence on individuals rather than a system.

36. For some at a managerial level it is puzzling that the UNRWA Safety and Security Policy is not yet adopted since it is believed to strengthen UNRWA Security Management Framework. Others do however find the current set-up without an endorsed Policy and Framework of Accountability satisfactory. They consider their local decentralized systems provide them with necessary and sufficient flexibility and information to make decisions. The Framework of Accountability is merely a SSD product rather than a policy for capacity building, awareness raising and an instrument to be held accountable for.

37. Decisions can affect safety and security issues of different seriousness, urgency and magnitude. Daily or regular safety and security issues within the workplace are largely managed by heads of installations. School principals and heads of clinics make safety and security decisions on a daily basis in many fields of operations without necessarily consulting with the local Field Security Office. During our field interviews, the evaluation team has heard about examples when heads of installations made decisions on safety and security without consulting Chief Area Officers or Field Directors, but instead made her or his own decision and subsequently reported to the chief of program, the Chief Area Officer or Camp Service Officer. Serious matters with consequences such as closure of installations, or service delivery under dangerous circumstances become a decision often made by chiefs of area offices and heads of UNRWA services (education, health and relief and social services) in consultation with deputy director of operations, and if needed the director of operations. Chiefs of offices and programs do rarely seek advice from Field Security Offices, Field Legal Office, and/or Senior Protection Coordinator before taking measures.

**mainstreaming of safety and security in programming**

38. The mainstreaming of safety and security in programming is currently weak. It is neither strategically nor organizationally mainstreamed. The design, planning, implementation and monitoring of programs do not consider safety and security in dialogue with SSD. There are no systematic procedures or routines for organizational and field operational risk assessments of programs, projects, activities, staff occupations and or staff at most risk. It is known that people’s perception of access, quality, inclusiveness, and equity of UNRWA services affect their attitude and behaviour both positively and negatively. There does not seem to be any structured and consistent collaboration between SSD and the programme departments to proactively reduce, mitigate or manage potential safety and security risks to UNRWA personnel, premises and assets due to changes in programme service delivery. Any changes in programme delivery is by some beneficiaries perceived as another step away from caring, respecting and protecting Palestinian basic rights to education, health and relief and sanitation services. Any real or potential reduction of access or quality of services affects the attitude of the beneficiaries since it has a strong symbolic impact on them. While the MTS carefully outlines how the strategic outcomes are relevant and will be achieved efficiently in relation to the beneficiaries, the strategic outcomes are not analyzed in relation to the potential safety and security threats and risks to UNRWA personnel, premises and assets that can come along with changes in programme service delivery, or an escalation of violence and conflict in region. Programming are currently weak at incorporating safety and security dimensions in the early design and planning phase, as well as during the implementation.

39. In times of rising tensions, violence and armed conflict in the region
programming does not seem to reflect on how safety and security through the ‘Acceptance’ approach will contribute to stabilizing or reducing any potential threats and risks. Although it is referred to as a capstone for the UNRWA SRM system the ‘Acceptance’ approach is not referred to in the MTS and in relation to the achievement of the strategic outcomes. It is reality that UNRWA’s financial situation affects its ability to deliver services and to meet the expectations of beneficiaries. It impacts the perception and attitude among beneficiaries toward UNRWA, and thus the support from and acceptance among the beneficiaries whom UNRWA serves which at times have a negative effect on safety and security. The financial vulnerability and its impact on programming, acceptance, and safety and security is currently not sufficiently recognized in programme strategies or MTS. The MTS states that “Security of its staff is crucial to UNRWA presence and mandate delivery”; and that “UNRWA acknowledges as a starting premise that the organization and its front line staff will be confronted by significant levels of risk”, and hence UNRWA will focus on four targeted initiatives. These initiatives do not clearly make room for a structured and systematic mainstreaming of safety and security in programming. In the relationship between safety and security, and protection the focus in the MTS and in UNRWA in general is on the beneficiary. This is understandable, but staff safety is currently not recognized as a formal responsibility of the heads of programs. It does not mean that they do not care. They do, but safety and security problem solving become more often reactive rather than proactively integrated in the design and planning process. SSD is not regularly and actively partaking in management meetings to discuss the role of safety and security for different safety and security scenarios. Safety and security is largely considered a cross-cutting issue that can be managed by programme staff. However, the heads of programs and installations do not have the professional leadership to be responsible for undertaking safety and security work to achieve the implementation of the four targeted initiatives.

40. It is noticeable how rarely the ‘Acceptance’ approach as a risk management philosophy is brought up, discussed and analysed in the conversations about safety and security. It is much more common that protection is discussed as the solution to the safety and security concerns. It is a lesson learned that the ‘Acceptance’ approach has to be revisited and defined what it means to UNRWA as an organization, UNRWA personnel and its beneficiaries in a context of socio-political turmoil in the Middle East region compounded with financial austerity measures of UNRWA affecting the scope of UNRWA’s service delivery. It has historically been an assumption that the legitimacy of UNRWA rests on the acceptance among beneficiaries in the five fields of operations of UNRWA’s delivered services. Like any strategic assumption it has to be continuously evaluated, tested and revised in order for it to still be valid. There is currently very limited discussion about the validity of the ‘Acceptance’ approach, and it has to be carefully analysed and assessed in order to proactively and pre-emptively respond to safety and security threats and risks. The ‘Acceptance’ approach risks to be drawn into people’s expectations about what UNRWA is and can offer, which goes beyond service delivery, and ties with protection of rights of the Palestine refugees. This is a very complex issue, which by many staff members is thought of as being linked to law and order in the refugee camps. Hence, the ‘Acceptance’ approach has to be understood in relation to the dynamic relationship between UNRWA, staff and beneficiaries, and the changing context in the five fields of operations takes places. The UN principle of neutrality is intimately linked with both the protection of rights of the Palestine refugees, law and order, as well as the ‘Acceptance’ approach.

41. The regional socio-political and security dynamic in the Middle East and UNRWA’s fragile financial capacity make

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3 Whereas protection focuses on beneficiaries and safety and security relates to staff.
UNRWA’s safety and security system vulnerable to relying on the ‘Acceptance’ approach. The ‘Acceptance’ approach assumes that UNRWA can deliver on the expectations of beneficiaries, and there is no guarantee UNRWA can do so. Hence, service delivery is not any longer a guarantee for safety and security of personnel, premises and assets. There is currently no context-specific strategic planning to adapt the ‘Acceptance’ approach to the shifting premises and local context to enable a safe working environment for staff. This links with the expressed expectations and needs among UNRWA staff to be supported and protected by UNRWA in their professional capacity. The general day-to-day situation in the camps is underpinned by stress and frustration among beneficiaries, and Agency decisions on changes in service delivery can trigger reactions which UNRWA staff has to face in their professional capacity and be in the forms of assaults, harassments and attacks. The UNRWA staff becomes a target for the frustration and disappointment among beneficiaries. UNRWA staff does not feel they have the full backing of UNRWA as an Agency in these situations. Instead, UNRWA staff tries to manage these situations by themselves. This creates also a reputational risk for the legitimacy of UNRWA to protect and support its staff. UNRWA’s document “Guidance on work-related threats or violence against UNRWA personnel and related responsibilities of the Agency and personnel” which aims to promote an Agency-wide approach to prevention and response to threats or attacks against Agency staff, taking into account field specificities is a relevant guidance to improve the situation. It aimed to supplement an old version of the Agency’s Policy on Security Mainstreaming and Tool for incorporating Minimum Standards on Protection in UNRWA Programming and Service Delivery. The documents and tools are currently not actively referred to in the safety and security discussion. Some staff with institutional memory makes references to them, and emphasize that the documents should be revisited. The MTS makes reference to protection mainstreaming in and through UNRWA service delivery, and states that “in all contexts, UNRWA will work to ensure that its assistance and service delivery is carried out in accordance with internationally agreed standards and its own minimum protection standards. UNRWA will regularly measure its level of compliance with these minimum standards and take necessary corrective action.” As the focus is on beneficiaries it is very important not to forget about systems and procedures for staff. Currently, UNRWA staff is taking on a disproportionate safety and security responsibility in relation to the training and tools which are available to them for managing the issues and threats facing them in the different fields of operation.

4. On the basis of the United Nations Security Management System, SSD has adjusted and developed models, tools and methods to identify, assess, prioritize and follow up identified risks to staff, which are not sufficiently institutionalized and integrated with the fields of operation. SSD and Field Security Offices are not actively partaking in the design and planning phases, or systematically and regularly partaking in the follow up of the implementation. As mentioned, instead they too often play a reactive role of ‘band-aiding’ rather than analytically, strategically and proactively prepare the organization and programs for different risk scenarios which reflect UNRWA’s financial capacity and regional dynamic. An unanticipated negative effect of the SRM programme is the underestimation of the challenges to achieve desired outcomes and impact. The SRM programme has not been led by a clear, concise and coherent strategy. The operational context and available resources have affected the continuity and quality of the implementation of SRM interventions. Too often is the focus on hard security rather than soft security measures. With the systematic introduction of Security Risk Assessments (SRAs) and full functioning

4 LEG/460 UNRWA’s Guidance on work-related threats or violence against UNRWA personnel and related responsibilities of the Agency and personnel, item 2.

5 UNRWA, Medium Term Strategy (MTS), 2016-2021, v5 3
Security Information Management System (SIMS), the SRM interventions are likely to be effective and efficient. SRAs provide understanding of threats and risks, and are important for identifying, assessing and prioritizing adequate risk mitigation measures. It can reduce the hard security expenses and allow for budgetary long-term savings. It assumes that SSD is consulted and integrated in the programme design and implementation phases, as well as regularly consulted on security issues rather than bypassed.

43. The SRM programme has not systematically been able to carry on and complete capacity training of safety and security for management and staff to make decisions about safety and security within the workplace. Budget cuts in the past year have caused cancellations of continued trainings at headquarters level. Implemented workshops have been greatly appreciated across the five fields of operations.

44. Figure 1 presents the enrolment among UNRWA respondents for both gender and location. Female and male respondents in Gaza constitute the FO with the greatest number of enrolment in some kind of training programme related to safety and security. Gaza field office has a training unit which does not exist in the other fields, where instead training is either offered through SSD headquarters in collaboration with the SSD FO teams, or through other UN organizations. For instance, in Lebanon, Lebanon field office collaborates with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. SSD headquarters has in the past years offered regular training in Hazardous Environment Awareness Training, Guard Force Training, Emergency Response Training, Explosive Remnants of War training, and SRM workshop. Depending on the fields of operations UNRWA personnel has a different view on the relevance and quality of the training. UNRWA personnel stated that non-UNRWA trainings offered through other UN organizations were often less relevant and did not train them sufficiently to be fit for the purpose.

Figure 1: Percentage (%) of the total female, respectively male respondents for each location.

45. Given the context in which UNRWA operates the continuation and consistency of service delivery is remarkable. UNRWA staff comes across as incredibly committed to deliver services despite personal risks during times of war, armed conflict and on-going underlying tensions in the communities. From teachers to guards, or doctors to drivers, these individuals live within communities under continual anxiety - what they consider ‘normal’ many of us would consider deeply stressful. Small things can trigger frustrated parents taking out their anger on teachers, or a doctor, often with limited means, being violently blamed for things outside of his or her control. Front
line support staff like guards, finance staff, cash and food distributors, truck drivers carrying sought after goods report more pressing concerns about their persons, including kidnapping or violent confrontations.

46. The regional political and security dynamic puts pressure on the camps and its local context, and it expresses itself differently between the fields of operation. UNRWA is well adapted through its decentralized structure to the regional differences and local context specifics. The safety and security personnel at the Field Security Office in each field operation is however not uniquely adapted to the local security context. Mainstreaming of safety and security in programming does not show any variations in terms of adaptation to the local context, simply because there is no mainstreaming of safety and security in programming. Gaza field office is an exemption, and Field Security Office is well integrated with operations and has a close collaboration with Chief Area Officers which link with different heads of programs and installations. In Syria, the Field Security Office is not even fully staffed. The Field Security Office has lacked a P3 security staff since January 2015. It affects the leadership of security risk management in a context that operates under emergency. It is not clear to the evaluation team what the consequences of a non-fully staffed Field Security Office are since the team could only hold a limited number of interviews. It is our general understanding that the Chief Areas Officers were operating under significant stress and pressure from the on-going conflict in Syria. The Field Security Office-set up in Syria does not reflect the safety and security needs to respect the Agency’s duty of care towards its staff members. The ‘Guidance on work-related threats or violence against UNRWA personnel and related responsibilities of the Agency and personnel’ is not referred to at all in the Syria context.

47. This is particularly important since many UNRWA staff members do not feel supported in their capacity as UNRWA staff by UNRWA’s internal policies, guidance and organization during and after disputes with beneficiaries. Figure 2 illustrates the response rate to how confident UNRWA personnel feel in UNRWA’s ability to provide a swift and adequate response to assist them in case of an emergency. One striking result is how well Gaza comes out in the survey. UNRWA staff in Gaza has greater confidence than its counterparts in the other fields of operations in UNRWA’s ability to provide a swift and adequate response to assist them in case of an emergency. This is true for both female and male respondents in Gaza. The other fields of operations fare almost half or less than Gaza in the level of confidence among their personnel’s attitude towards UNRWA’s ability to provide a swift and adequate response to assist in case of an emergency.
48. The Field Security Office in Gaza has in recent years undergone an organizational transformation under competent leadership with a strategic working relationship with the senior management team of the field office. The Field Security Office in Gaza operates under a very high level of inclusivity and transparency. Our conversations with frontline staff and Chief Area Officers attest to a healthy and regular communication between them and the Field Security Office in Gaza. The positive responses are remarkably positive given the serious tests Gaza field office has faced in recent years. It indicates that organizational, leadership and programmatic changes were successful in past years.

**key findings:**

**finding 1**

UNRWA is highly decentralized and the operationalization of safety and security differs between the fields of operation. The determination of acceptable risk is not currently determined in a systematic manner by professional field security officers. Safety and security is not mainstreamed in programming.

**finding 2**

Decision-making is not guided by policy, Framework of Accountability, or instructions and training provided by the Field Security Office or SSD headquarters. The UNRWA Safety and Security Policy is not considered official and does not have a formal recognition by staff in the fields of operation, nor is the Safety and Security Policy endorsed by UNRWA management team. The policy is only an internal document for safety and security staff.

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![Figure 2: Percentage (%) of the total female, respectively male respondents for each location](image-url)
### Recommendations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Formally adopt UNRWA specific Framework of Accountability to formalize</td>
<td>Commissioner-General</td>
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<td>responsibility of specific roles and function in relation to provision</td>
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<td>of professional support in safety and security as well as reporting thereof.</td>
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<td>Formally adopt UNRWA Security Policy to formalize the scope of the policy</td>
<td>Commissioner-General</td>
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<td>objectives.</td>
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<td>Integrate field safety and security teams with managerial decision-making</td>
<td>Director of UNRWA Affairs + Chief</td>
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<td>at the operation and programme level.</td>
<td>Area Officer</td>
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<td>Make it a requirement for field management to take accountability in writing</td>
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<td>for area staff missions and operations</td>
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<td>Introduce a strong focus on analytical and strategic skills to develop risk</td>
<td>Chief Area Officer and Camp</td>
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<td>scenarios for which the Agency can prepare and plan for to sustain the</td>
<td>Service Officer</td>
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<td>‘Acceptance’ approach.</td>
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<td>UNRWA’s internal SRM system should be carefully adapted and tailored to</td>
<td>Safety and Security Division</td>
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<td>UNRWA’s specific needs and organizational conditions to guarantee the safety</td>
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<td>and security of area staff.</td>
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<td>Reconcile and inform area staff concerns about rule of law and duty of</td>
<td>Director of UNRWA Affairs + Safety</td>
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<td>UNRWA.</td>
<td>and Security Division headquarters</td>
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efficiency

49. This section aims to discuss how economically resources and inputs are converted to results. The following evaluation questions are assessed and analysed in this section:

- Were inputs (resources and time) used in the best possible way?
- Could the intervention have been done better, more cheaply or more quickly, when compared to alternatives?
- How does type of resource allocation to the SRM programme affect the efficiency of delivery?

**Strategy and programming have real effects on efficiency**

50. UNRWA’s external environment affects efficiency. Each field of UNRWA operation is affected by different contextual factors, drivers and actors. It makes comparison of efficiency between different fields of operations irrelevant. It is however relevant to examine how the organization is set-up in order to work efficiently, and how they prioritize available resources (read time and competence) to achieve the SRM objectives. Our finding is that the Field Security Offices spend unacceptable amount of time on ‘band-aiding’ or ‘fire fighting’ safety and security issues. Linked to this is that the Field Security Offices do not devote sufficient time and capabilities on analysis, strategy and planning taking context specifics into consideration. Checklists, guidance tools, and manuals should be applied in a context specific manner which requires careful analysis and thinking. SRM checklist and work plan deliverables are good examples of establishing an overview, priorities, milestones of the achievement of SRM strategic objectives to mainstream security and risk management into how UNRWA does business. These instruments need however to be used with the consideration of available internal resources. The SSD work plan suggests 68 sub-categories of the strategic objectives to be completed by the fields to create their specific work plans. They are too many and not in proportion to available financial and human resources. In addition, SSD’s nine strategic objectives are not specifically formulated which makes it difficult to monitor progress and follow up with measures to achieve objectives. This leaves room for inefficiency of the usage of available resources and capabilities. Nine strategic objectives are a large number of objectives to guide operations. Not to say the organizational implication of achieving nine strategic objectives. The objectives are broadly formulated. For instance, the objective to ‘Develop and implement required components of UNRWA Security Risk Management System’ is too broad, and ‘SRM Implementation’ or ‘Increase UNRWA Acceptance in field’ are too unspecific. The organizational set-up, human sources and budget do not match what it takes to achieve the strategic objectives within the expected time frame. Similar work plans for the Field Security Offices in Lebanon and Syria have not been shared with the evaluation team. It is unclear whether similar work plans exist. Instead of a work plan Gaza field office uses an adjusted SRM checklist to follow up responsibilities, activities, and completion rate of. This careful planning, monitoring and follow up strengthen efficiency, and pre-empts distractions to be drawn into ‘band-aiding’. It is not to say that Gaza field office is not drawn into ‘fire fighting’, but the main point is that their safety and security work is guided by priorities that are considered achievable with available resources.

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6 The evaluation questions are presented in the Background Paper (ToR) of this assignment.

7 In West Bank field office however, the FSO SSO visits all 250 installations to discuss planning.

8 SSD Strategic Objectives for 2013/2015 ‘Mainstreaming Safety and Security into how UNRWA does business’ has 68 listed sub-categories.
51. The ‘Acceptance’ approach is a cost effective model which builds on the trust and support from beneficiaries. As mentioned above, it can’t be assumed for granted. The regional context and UNRWA’s financial capacity makes the shift from ‘band-aiding’ towards strategy a necessity in order to continue to rely on the acceptance of the beneficiaries. To achieve this there is a need to shift the approach within UNRWA towards being smarter, thinking holistically and sequencing the responses to address threats and risks. Safety and security measures can only buy a certain level of safety and security. It is in some cases needed for meeting minimum standards and requirements for safety and security. However, security measures are costly. Procurement and maintenance of armed vehicles, personal protective equipment, telecommunication equipment, surveillance cameras, and fire extinguishers are examples of costly investments which are all necessary and often basic to fit the purpose. On the expense list is also permanent guards as well as JCP guards. These physical safety and security measures to protect and support staff safety are basic in threatening environments typical of UNRWA operations. The SRM is too focused on guards, JCP staff and surveillance cameras rather than mainstreaming safety and security into the design and planning of the programs. The evaluation team finds that resources and time are often steered towards physical security rather than strategic entry points for mainstreaming safety and security into programming. It has the adverse effect that resources and time is often discussed in terms of quantity rather than quality. There are examples of SSD interventions with high quality which also have positive effects on efficiency such as training workshops. UNRWA’s internal training programs are highly appreciated and are often regarded by participants as effective in terms of preparing them for managing situations with safety and security concerns.

52. The Field Security Office staff is professional and well experienced, and has safety and security backgrounds. In general, their background is more security focused with experiences from the military and policing. Concepts like ‘do-no-harm’ and ‘conflict sensitivity’ which link local conflict analysis with the impact of the Agency operations on the adjacent community are not well established among the Field Security Office personnel. A shift from ‘band-aiding’ towards more analytical and strategic security risk mitigation requires both a broader and deeper competence in political, social and economic factors, and not solely traditional safety and security measures. Thus, an analytical and strategic understanding of how the ‘Acceptance’ approach can support programming and vice versa is will likely to have real effects on efficiency. However, an introduction and strengthening of mainstreaming of safety and security in programming is needed, which consequently can minimize inefficiencies in service delivery due to threats in the operational environment.

coordination and communication has a real effect on efficiency

53. The level of coordination, communication and logistics among UNRWA actors and external safety and security stakeholders in UNRWA’s environment differ between the fields of operation. The decision-making on safety and security during the emergency in all five areas of the Gaza Strip in July 2014 was effective in order to keep the service delivery running. The internal and external collaboration between the Field Security Office in Gaza and others enabled programme staff to continue their work in health clinics and other workplaces, and also to continue the provision of water and supplies. It is also our understanding that Syria field office has managed to continue to deliver services to beneficiaries both inside and outside the camps during very difficult circumstances. The role of the Field Security Office in Syria for coordination and communication with programming on safety and security issues needs further examination. It is not clear to what extent the Field Security Office is incorporated in supporting decision-making on safety and security. Management of Syria field office
has an influential role in assessing and making decisions. It is not clear to what extent the front line staff is empowered to make decisions. Coordination and communication are important tools to empower staff to make appropriate and swift decisions in order to avoid bureaucratic and hierarchical decision-making. It makes the system efficient. It is a concern to what extent information flow transparently between operations and the Field Security Offices, and the role of the Field Security Office in providing support to the programs and heads of installations. In some cases, the Field Security Offices’ full capacity is not used because they have simply not been informed about threats, risks and incidents, or information has not been shared within the Field Security Offices. The evaluation team have met with heads of installation and programs that find the Field Security Offices at times too slow and inattentive in their response to the safety and security concerns and issues, instead they manage their safety and security concerns by themselves without engaging their Field Security Office. It is inefficient use of available resources and capabilities. Channels for coordination and communication will be critical for mainstreaming safety and security in programming. There are today no such formalized channels but instead person-driven within UNRWA.

54. The Field Security Office in Gaza is located next door to DSS which has the benefit of on-going and continuous coordination and communication. The proximity of offices has a positive effect on efficiency through regular consultation between the offices which allow for continuous information and knowledge sharing. The Gaza field office benefits from the close collaboration through smooth and swift decision-making on safety and security underpinned by SRAs and updated information which is a fundamental starting point for managing crisis under emergencies. The evaluation team has not observed any similar infrastructural set-ups for the other fields of operation, but given that in some locations DSS and the Field Security Office is within same office facilities there are opportunities to explore for enhanced coordination, communication and collaboration to improve efficiency.

**resource allocation**

55. Mainstreaming safety and security in programming is the most cost effective investment to create an enabling environment for personnel to deliver services to beneficiaries. As pointed out above mainstreaming requires a greater emphasis on continuous analysis and strategic planning to be fed into the design, planning and monitoring of the programming. It will require certain level of allocation of SSD and the Field Security Offices’ resources towards analysis, strategy and planning. A starting premise is risk assessment processes which SSD and Field Security Offices can facilitate with the different programs in the five fields of operations in order to mainstream risk mitigation with programming. If the programs are made responsible to mainstream safety and security in the project cycle they are also responsible to draw on the expertise and professional leadership of SSD and Field Security Offices. However, it will be the responsibility of SSD to provide adequate and sustainable resources and practices to manage risk to personnel employed by UNRWA, and their recognized dependents, premises and assets. In addition, coordination and communication, as stated above, has in combination with training offered by SSD in safety and security had a positive effect on service delivery. The evaluation team interviewed heads of installations that stated they have been able to carry on with their work thanks to training in which they participated and the smooth coordination and communication they had with the Field Security Office. In other cases, interviewees stated they carried on with their work thanks to their own personal experience without any collaboration with the local Field Security Office.

56. The current and future uncertain fiscal situation for UNRWA has changed the conditions dramatically for how SSD and Field Security Offices can contribute to create an enabling environment for personnel to
deliver services to beneficiaries. It is not an option for SSD to continue to work towards its nine strategic objectives. There is still a need for SSD to be recognized as a formal actor and with its role and responsibility. Endorsing the Safety and Security Policy, and the Framework of Accountability will bring clarity, and clarity has a positive effect on efficiency. It will serve SSD, Field Security Offices and the programs to establish close and regular dialogue and collaboration to shift away from ‘band-aiding’ towards strategic, coherent and consistent mainstreaming of safety and security in programming. SSD will be a strategic thought leader with a small team of experts on safety and security situated at the UNRWA headquarters who travel regularly to the fields of operations to support, advise and coach the senior management teams and programme management. 

57. Figure 3 builds on the case when an incident is reported from area staff to Chief Area Officer, and the role and responsibility of Field Security Office to support the Chief Area Officer and area staff, whilst liaising with the Director of the field operation. It illustrates the technical support and reporting lines for safety and security for which the Chief Area Officer is security focal point for area staff (incl. programme officers and the technical departments) and liaising with the Field Security Office. Whereas mainstreaming safety and security in programming at an early design and planning phase is recommended to be conducted between the Field Security Office and area staff in order to draw on knowledge of the local circumstances. Both technical departments and SSD at headquarters shall provide thought leadership on technical issues. The purpose is that this approach should be field specific with a technical quality assurance from the headquarters. This allows for SSD as a ‘thought leader’ and quality assurer on safety and security, who can provide knowledge, leadership and advise on risk mitigation. Effectiveness, impact and sustainability attributed to ‘Leadership’ are often ignored in contrast to implemented activities and intervention. When SSD and the Field Security Office in Gaza participated in consultations with programs about safety and security it was widely appreciated. It is important to recognize the roles and responsibilities of SSD and the Field Security Office beyond their individual interventions such as training workshops, Standard Operating Procedures and workforce management, but also for their potential and existing active presence in the field to promote a culture of security and capacity for mitigation of risk through its leadership role on safety and security. Currently, there is an untapped potential of Field Security Offices together with programme heads to identify, assess and prioritize safety and security local threats and risks. SRAs is a critical element to support senior and middle management teams to adapt and mainstream SRM interventions with field operations, sequencing, timing and prioritization of these interventions with the implementation of programs.
key findings:

finding 3
The safety and security work becomes inefficient when it is not mainstreamed in programming, or not targeting underlying safety and security causes and concerns, but instead is directed towards ‘band-aiding’ or ‘fire fighting’. The lack of coordination and communication is an obstacle to information sharing and learning. It affects efficiency negatively because prioritization and decisions are not undertaken on the basis of available knowledge.

finding 4
Allocation of resources to offer training by SSD in combination with proactive and collaborative Field Security Offices have had a positive effect on efficiency of service delivery. Physical safety and security measures are a necessity but are often significant investments, while a well-established ‘Acceptance’ approach can be the most cost effective SRM tool if it is applied holistically and sequentially through an understanding of attitudes, perceptions and priorities of beneficiaries.

recommendations:

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<th>Sequencing</th>
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<td>Standardise Command and Control.</td>
<td>See diagram below</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Include SSD headquarters and SSD in the fields at an early design and planning phase with programme management teams to link a strategic safety and security lens with operational programming and service delivery. It will lead to tailored security risk mitigation measures, and hence strengthen efficiency.</td>
<td>Technical departments at headquarters and SSD to initiate the mainstreaming process, followed up by SSD and technical programs in the fields of operation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream SSDF approach to standardise plans, documents, procedures and work plan through best practice.</td>
<td>SSD headquarters, and followed up by SSD in the fields of operation.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
58. This section relates to the extent to which the SRM programme has achieved (or is likely to achieve) its objectives, taking into account the perspectives of its beneficiaries. It assesses the contribution made (or expected to be made) to the achievement of the objectives. The following evaluation questions are assessed and analysed in this section:

- Have / will interventions led / lead to mitigation of risk?
- Have / will security processes been/be integrated into business processes of other departments?
- Have / will interventions led / lead to human resources with security responsibility fit for purpose, and other staff having relevant knowledge and skills?
- Have / will the interventions led/lead to a change in attitude towards security?

59. There are no indicators for safety and security for the five fields of operations to which the evaluation team can refer to evaluate progress on mitigation of risks. We can refer to proxy-indicators referring to SSD and Field Security Office outputs such as mainstreaming of safety and security in programming (engaging with other departments’ business processes), capacity building, workforce management, framework of accountability, Standard Operating Procedures, liaison with United Nations Security Management System, and SIMS. As mentioned above, some of these output areas have not yet been addressed or delivered on, while some areas have progressed such as training of guards, SSD staff (incl. staff in the field), operation management in the field and SIMS. Both training and SIMS are not yet completed due to financial constraints. There are also differences among Field Security Offices in how far they have achieved the nine SSD strategic objectives. SSD and the SRM programme have in the past years produced a number of guiding documents for the operationalization, but there is no evident hierarchy or prioritization among them. Without a clear understanding, prioritization and application of the strategic objectives, tools and methods the good intentions and efforts to produce safety and security risks to be in vain.

60. Field Security Offices undertake a number of activities which are not reflected in the output areas, but contribute indirectly to risk mitigation through ‘band-aiding’ and ‘fire-fighting’. Although difficult to assess attribution SSD’s interventions in terms of advisory, coaching and mentoring senior management and programme management on safety and security is important contribution to risk mitigation. The actual existence of and access to professional safety and security experts has positive effects on risk mitigation. However, most significantly very little has been achieved in mainstreaming of safety and security in programming. The evaluation team assessed this aspect by asking programme staff, Chief Area Officers and Field Security Offices whether there was a coordination and communication channel for regular and structured analysis and strategy. The answer was overwhelmingly no. The operations in Gaza were however different. Coordination and communication is systematic and structured between the Field Security Office and operation, which allow for mainstreaming of safety and security in programming. SSD at headquarters cannot however hold anyone accountable for not delivering on all the above mentioned output areas. Field Security Offices fall under the field operations, and priorities are set locally. It highlights the importance of context specific assessment, analysis and strategic planning in order to monitor and

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9 The evaluation questions are presented in the Background Paper (ToR) of this assignment.
follow up progress on prioritized output and outcome areas. The effectiveness of mainstreaming safety and security in programming is an underachieved output area. It is an organizational structural issue rather a technical issue whether there is sufficient capacity and capability. Mainstreaming of safety and security must partly be guided through policy and framework of accountability, but also through leadership commitment to mutually engage SSD and Field Security Offices with programme and operational departments and units.

61. The design of the SRM programme is based on the assumption that SSD headquarters has sufficient buy-in from the programme departments and operational management at both headquarters and field. It is not the case. SSD and Field Security Offices can only through internal communication and advocacy influence the uptake of the different output areas of the SRM programme among the technical programs in the fields of operations and their departments at the headquarters. SSD has however during the duration of the SRM programme put significant efforts to advocate for its role and mission. The establishment of the SSD has been a project by itself, whilst mitigating risks. SSD and Field Security Offices’ ability to influence other UNRWA departments can be supported and strengthened by policy and framework of accountability for safety and security to create an enabling environment for personnel to deliver services to beneficiaries. However, a robust and cohesive Agency security management system needs leadership in order to manage the implementation of the SRM program. Recognizing UNRWA’s decentralized structure and decision-making, the achievement of effective risk mitigation at the field level is more likely to be realised through local ownership by field offices and Field Security Offices of context specific objectives and priorities rather than through headquarters. Thus, the evaluation team makes the assumption that it is better to work on safety and security through the existing organizational field structure rather than from the headquarters to the field. In order to optimize the effectiveness of risk mitigation UNRWA needs clear leadership at the headquarters and field level to support Field Security Offices and operational departments on capacity building, mainstreaming of safety and security in programming and other output areas. The Field Security Office’s and SSD’s role at the headquarters level is to provide ‘thought leadership’ on risk mitigation to enable proactive and continuous analytical capacity and contribution to coordinate and
communicate internally to prepare the Agency for different security risk scenarios, both normal operations and emergencies.

**fit for purpose**

62. The mitigation of risks is largely managed instantaneously by the frontline staff where threats, assaults and harassments occur. Heads of programs and installations, and chiefs of area offices give generally a solid impression in terms of their knowledge, skills, and attitude towards safety and security. Some staff attributes these to participation in different training workshops and regular contact with SSD and Field Security Offices. The evaluation team have met with several area officers and other key staff whom claim that their life experience and age have made them fit for purpose to manage risks under normal operations and emergencies, while they also found for instance SSD-training in Hazardous Environment Awareness Training and Emergency Response Training very useful and applicable to change their attitude and improve their skills and knowledge to be fit for purpose.

63. Below diagrams illustrate however there is a significant need to familiarize UNRWA personnel with instructions, guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures. It is only in Gaza where the familiarity with instructions, guidelines, and Standard Operating Procedures exceed 50 percent for ‘very much’, ‘largely’, and ‘satisfactorily’ for both women and men. In the other fields of operations the categories ‘not at all’ and ‘moderately’ familiar with instructions, guidelines, and Standard Operating Procedures constitute approximately half of the female and male respondents. This is significant and an indication for the need for training, learning and awareness raising. At several installations in the five fields of operations the stress level is very high among beneficiaries, and sometimes they cannot control themselves causing a potential risk for the programme staff. There are examples when these installations would benefit from guards having the ability to identify and support these beneficiaries and thereby pre-empt any assault or harassment. Psychosocial assistance or measures in highly stressful environments and workplaces can potentially complement more traditional guard duties. The guard management is an area that can have significant effects on effectiveness.

64. Certain security measures are vividly discussed and debated. For instance, the JCP guards in Gaza are by many UNRWA personnel considered not fit for the purpose. The current JCP-model with JCP guards creates both frustration and anxiety among other permanent guards and programme staff. The UNRWA JCP guards are hired only...
for a three-month period as part of the UNRWA Job Creation Programme. The short-term contracts discourage any investments in proper training in JCP guards. The JCP guards are risking turning good intentions into a costly arrangement making it difficult for UNRWA to uphold safety and security culture underpinned by commitment, professional integrity and knowledge. Furthermore, programme staff at UNRWA installations often considers permanent guards at installations are sub-optimized (underperforming) in their roles and responsibilities. Program staff both at schools and health clinics would like to see guards being more engaged within the workplace in mitigating safety and security concerns. Today, programme staff often considers guards taking on a solely stationary function at the entrance of the installation (access control), and not actively or dynamically involved in mitigating potential risks. The JCP guards are an issue that needs careful consideration and thought. A lesson learned is that JCP guards cannot be assumed to complement or replace regular guards. Guard management is complex in a volatile and violent context. Training, Standard Operating Procedures, guidance and instructions might not always be sufficient when armed groups or individuals decide to attack installations, but these instruments can together contribute to a higher level of preparedness for protection of UNRWA installations and premises. It becomes therefore even more difficult to include temporary workers (JCP guards) in this complex environment that requires and expects commitment and professional readiness.

**attitudes towards security**

Financial austerity implies time to time suspension of services and closure of facilities which creates security risks. These risks need to be carefully assessed and analysed, which require both short- and long-term consideration, as well as making sure that decision-making processes are transparent and ensures accountability. The duty of care is not informed by SRAs. The acceptable risk is not well established. It is not systematically documented what is the present existing risk UNRWA staff are facing, and without this reference point created by a SRA it makes it hard to prioritise the decisions. There are not yet any organizational and field operational SRAs on programs, projects, activities, staff occupations and or staff at most risk. The best practice for usage of SRAs is underpinned by a detailed analysis of location, time and threat. To use SRAs effectively requires trust in the process and that requires a ‘buy-in’ from the Directors and Deputies to use the system and expand their knowledge. It does not appear to be sufficient knowledge of the SRA process from the top, which is proven by the lack of them. The scope and regularity of SRAs are driven by the type of leadership and available resources at the field level rather than systematic procedures. The director leadership is very important to create the time and authority to have the Field Security Office do the SRA, then to create the time to discuss it and finally to make the decisions and attach a timeframe to implement those decisions. Management decisions should not be based on the threat but on the risk - likelihood and impact - (i.e. our vulnerability to a threat). UNRWA should prioritise the establishment of bottom-up (from the field/front-line staff) SRAs which focus on specific threats apparent to their staff and beneficiaries.

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10 UNRWA can use SRAs conducted by DSS, but they are limited to the UN international personnel. DSS have the responsibility to write SRAs to cover all the five locations, however they tend to be generic i.e. one SRA per field of operation and often the UNRWA camps are not specifically mentioned. DSS does not conduct SRAs for UNRWA’s operations.
66. Furthermore, Field Security Offices find the undertaking of SRAs resource-intensive while the existing resources are considered insufficient. There is recognition that SRAs are critical to the implementation of programs. SSD’s strategic plan was to link SRAs with the SIMS. SIMS does exist but it is not yet fully optimized. The application of SIMS varies across the field locations. Information provides trends and patterns over time rather than exact data. The system depends on reporting and inputting data into the system. It is not clear what the margin of error is in terms of unreported incidents and the correctness of the reported data. A full functioning, user-friendly and applied SIMS will be highly relevant, and provide critical information for SRAs and management, development of standard operating procedures, and a critical complement to the support provided by the United Nations Security Management System to establish effective mitigation of risk. SIMS requires proper understanding among Agency staff in the field of what it does, and must provide a visual analysis with forecasting included up front. The development of a second generation of SIMS is underway and expected to be launched by 2015/2016.

Figure 6 shows that Gaza field office stands out. It is consistent with the results on other survey questions and interviews with staff. In Gaza the largest share of UNRWA staff members know of SIMS and whom to call and report in case of an incident or emergency. Contrary to these results both female and male UNRWA personnel in Gaza are least likely to report an incident affecting her/himself or other people during the time she/he has worked in UNRWA. It exemplifies the challenge to ensure that all necessary steps in building a system and culture of safety and security requires continuous work which makes a SRM programme highly relevant.
67. Both female and male respondents’ operation in Gaza indicate a far greater preparedness than peers in the fields of operation. It can be read both for ‘largely’ and ‘not at all’ columns. Similarly, Gaza field office fares well in comparison with peers on familiarity with Standard Operating Procedures, as well as instructions or guidelines for safety and security. These responses can be viewed as proxy-indicators, and it clearly signals that the SRM programme has still a way to go obtain at least 50 per cent among both women and men in all five operational locations around preparedness and familiarity around Standard Operating Procedures, guidelines and instructions. Combined with capacity building interventions such as training Standard Operating Procedures, SIMS and other interventions have yet not sufficiently affected the attitudes and culture. An important general lesson of this evaluation is that investment in building good relationships between SSD teams and area staff through consistent and regular contact, dialogue and training pays off in terms of the impact and sustainability of safety and security results. Field Security Offices help UNRWA personnel to understand and apply risk mitigation measures under normal operations and emergencies. When SSD has a well-established working relationship with
heads of installations, programs and chiefs of area offices the SRM interventions have greater impact on safety and security. It allows Field Security Offices to both access and raise interest and knowledge of safety and security among front-line personnel.

68. One of the questions in the survey questionnaire is ‘what is your personal level of confidence on how UNRWA is making decisions about safety and security?’ Gaza field office fared better than its peers in the other fields of operations on this question. It would be too easy and simplistic to conclude that Gaza field office has had a better financial situation than the other field offices to explain the variations in the results. The answer is probably more likely to be found in the consistency and sustainability of building good relationships between SSD Gaza field office and the area staff through regular contact, dialogue and training. It is worth directing attention to the very low respond rate of women in Gaza, four per cent, who say that they do not have ‘at all’ any confidence in how UNRWA is making decisions about safety and security. This stands out in comparison with the other field offices.

69. A lesson learned for the planning, managing and evaluating SRM interventions is the importance to distinguish between objectives and activities. SSD strategic objectives must be SMART in order to be useful for follow-up, accountability and learning. It is currently difficult to distinguish between SRM interventions and SSD’s strategic objectives, which hamper the guidance for what resources need to be garnered and mobilized, and how best to use the resources as efficiently as possible in order to achieve the objectives. The strategic objectives must be broken down to more specific, measurable and realistic objectives aligned with organizational, strategic and tactical/technical needs to provide leadership, advice and operational support on security and risk management with the aim to manage risks and therein improve staff safety, secure assets and protect premises in order to support sustainable programme delivery.

**key findings:**

**finding 5**

The mitigation of risk is influenced by many factors of which SSD and Field Security Offices can influence through capacity building, mainstreaming, workforce management, framework of accountability, Standard Operating Procedures, etc. Some of these output areas are more recognized than others by UNRWA staff for contributing to risk mitigation and fit for purpose. SSD-trainings on safety and security is highly appreciated, and often recognized as highly useful and contributing to staff being fit for purpose. However, the JCP guards in Gaza are by many UNRWA personnel considered not fit for the purpose. In general, the current organizational set-up, human sources and budget do not match what it takes to achieve the strategic objectives within the expected time frame.

**finding 6**

There is limited proactive analytical and strategic collaboration between SSD and Field Security Offices and programme and operational departments to engage security processes with business processes of other departments to promote a culture of security and mitigation of risk. SSD headquarters and Field Security Office teams do not yet carry out organizational and field operational SRAs on programs, projects, activities, staff occupations and or staff at most risk. Thus, there is currently no real operational link between SRAs and SIMS. SIMS is also not yet fully optimized, but it provides relevant information over time on trends and patterns on safety and security issues.

**finding 7**

The duty of care does not sufficiently rest on SRAs. The acceptable risk is not well established. It is not systematically documented what is the present existing risk UNRWA staff are facing. The scope and regularity of SRAs are today driven by the type of leadership and available resources at
the field level rather than systematic procedures. It does not appear to be sufficient knowledge of the SRA process from the top.

**recommendations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Ownership[1]</th>
<th>Sequencing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Strong Education and Learning Focus on Chief Area Officer as security focal point | SSD headquarters plan and produce  
- SSD field: implement  
- Chief Area Officer support | 1          |
| Make SSD's strategic objectives clear, specific and manageable.                | SSD:                                                                        | 2          |
| Set objectives in relation to available or potential organizational capacity. The objectives must be realistic in relation to the human resources and existing system and processes. | SSD: + SSD field  
Chief Area Officer educate staff on reporting | 3          |
| Adapt SIMS to provide critical information for analysis (SRAs) and development of standard operating procedures. | SSD: + SSD field  
Chief Area Officer educate staff on reporting | 3          |
| Management decisions should not be based on the threat but on the risk (likelihood and impact) i.e. our vulnerability to a threat. UNRWA should prioritise the establishment of bottom-up (from the field/front-line staff) SRAs which focus on specific threats apparent to their staff and beneficiaries. | SSD: + SSD field  
Chief Area Officer educate staff on reporting | 3          |
| SSDF to use SIMS all the time to create and communicate existing threats to staff. | SSD: + SSD field  
Chief Area Officer educate staff on reporting | 3          |
| Continue to raise awareness and understanding among UNRWA personnel of using SIMS. SIMS needs support of the Chief Area Officers.  
SIMS must provide a visual analysis with forecasting included up front. | SSD headquarters: for best practice and education  
SSD field must adopt as a priority  
Chief Area Officer implement | 4          |
| Review roles and responsibilities of guard management to identify gaps with needs and priorities. | SSD and HR | 5          |
| Assign guards at installations (access control) the responsibility to identify threats and support programme staff to pre-empt any assault or harassment. Psychosocial assistance or measures within workplaces can complement guard duties. | SSD and HR | 6          |
| Use SRAs for each location.  
Connect Residual Risks from UNRWA SRAs and Program Criticality to UNRWA field offices Acceptable Risk and Acceptance Model. | HR and SSD  
SSD headquarters guidelines  
SSD field implement and present  
Director of UNRWA Affairs for application | 7          |
impact

70. This section assesses positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by an intervention directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. The following evaluation questions are assessed and analysed in this section:\(^{11}\):
- Does staff perceive UNRWA to address their security concerns?
- Does the programme lead to more robust security-inclusive decision-making?
- What unanticipated positive or negative effects did the programme have and why did they arise?

staff security concerns

71. It is a serious issue that interviewed UNRWA staff does not feel safe and supported in their capacity as UNRWA staff by UNRWA’s internal policies, guidance and organization during and after disputes with beneficiaries. They express their reluctance to personally request the police to intervene and make an official complaint to the local law enforcement authorities. There are two main underlying reasons to their reluctance. First, they consider it is UNRWA’s duty and responsibility to file a complaint on behalf of the personnel when threats or attacks are committed against them during performance of their duties and/or result of their work by beneficiaries and individuals.\(^{12}\) They argue that the incident is work-related and therefore it is UNRWA’s responsibility. Second, the Palestinian custom to resolve disputes is traditionally not by resorting to an official and formal law enforcement authority such as the police and or the court, but through local Mukhtars and society notables. The outcome of cases of threats and/or attacks against staff seem often to be dependent on either the willingness of the staff member to pursue the case through legal procedures, or the role and ability of the Chief Area Officer to mediate and facilitate between the staff member and the assailant.

72. Safety and security in the camps with regards to law enforcement challenging because it depends on the host government’s willingness, commitment and ability to intervene. In cases when the host government is not responding to requests or intervening in and settling conflicts or assaults it leaves a legal vacuum that has to be filled by Popular Services Committees (security committees), UNRWA, Fatah, Hamas, or other local camp authorities depending on the host government. This legal vacuum risks to be politicized. The current law enforcement system and procedures in the camps do not seem unified and coordinated, and lend itself to a degree of arbitrariness and personal bias or subjectivity, or in worst case corruption. Chief Area Officers have a significant role and influence on UNRWA’s relations with local authorities and community members. Coordination with local host authorities rests largely with the Chief Area Officers. It is his or her judgment that influences the level and type of support Agency staff is provided. Neither host governments and their law enforcement procedures, nor UNRWA’s Guidance on work-related threats or violence against UNRWA personnel and related responsibilities of the Agency and personnel do not seem to safeguard against informal reconciliation processes although it is stated that “the informal reconciliation process should be particularly discouraged by the field office if there have been serious acts of physical violence or threats and/or damage to or destruction of the Agency’s property”.\(^{13}\)

\(^{11}\) The evaluation questions are presented in the Background Paper (ToR) of this assignment.

\(^{12}\) How this support would look like in practice has not been discussed, as local law would still require a complaint on a personal basis.

\(^{13}\) LEG/460 UNRWA’s Guidance on work-related threats or
73. UNRWA recognizes the important role of the informal justice system (atweh, sulha or tribal justice) in dispute resolution amongst the Palestinian population in all fields of operation. A flexible and pragmatic system can work well as long as rules and principles are clear to everyone who is affected by them, and UNRWA’s reputation and mandate is not undermined or questioned by its beneficiaries. This is particularly important since UNRWA is driven by the incorporation of the ‘Acceptance’ approach as a risk management philosophy. UNRWA staff encourages the Agency to undertake a comprehensive review and measures to fill any gaps between safety / security and with protection / legal aid.

inclusion of security in decision-making

74. The purpose of SRM is ‘to manage risks and therein improve staff safety, secure assets and protect facilities in order to support sustainable programme delivery.’ SSD and Field Security Offices are largely tasked and responsible to work towards this purpose. However, the role and contribution of SSD and Field Security Offices differ between the fields of operations and during what type of situation it operates (under normal operations or emergency). Regardless of the type of situation, location or type of operational programme the internal SRM system is currently not Agency-wide systematic and coherent. The system is decentralized and devolved. The outcome and impact of safety and security output areas rest with the capacity and processes of each field operation. Similarly, at the field level, the integration of SSD in decision-making process differs among the field operations. The determination of acceptable risk is not currently determined in a systematic manner by professional field security officers. The involvement of Field Security Offices depends on how well the Field Security Office has established itself with the management team of the field operation, and if they consider they need additional information or a professional safety and security lens in making decisions. Gaza field office stands out as an example where the Field Security Office is routinely consulted and integrated in making decisions on safety and security. Safety and security seems to be largely viewed by most stakeholders as an issue addressed through guards and surveillance cameras. This is particularly concerning since UNRWA rests on the ‘Acceptance’ approach which requires continuous analysis, assessments, dialogue, communication, networking, and tailored interventions along with consistent and sustainable service delivery of the core programs. Thus, if the professional Field Security Offices or SSD headquarters are not engaged and consulted, and lack formal access to management teams to discuss and suggest measures on safety and security issues the role of SSD and the Field Security Office is curtailed and reduces their potential value to the Agency and its stakeholders. It affects SSDs ability to deliver adequate and sustainable resources to manage risk to personnel and their eligible dependents, premises and assets. Similarly, the marginalized role and influence of SSD within UNRWA makes it difficult for SSD to reach out to the fields of operations with policies and procedures. Furthermore, the current decentralized decision-making combined with a limited role of SSD and Field Security Offices risks to weakening accountability and learning from following up and evaluating safety and security decisions. SSD’s products and functionalities will be of high relevance if SSD is better aligned with the managerial decision-making and reporting processes at the field operations, otherwise SSD risks to be marginalized in its role to provide leadership, advice and operational support on security and risk management.

75. In Gaza for instance the Field Security Offices are well integrated into UNRWA’s business processes of other departments.
Heads of programs in areas have been trained and have a good understanding of safety and security. Communication on safety and security between Chief Area Officers and programs run smoothly. Capacity building through training and visibility through personal interaction contribute to a sense of presence of the Field Security Office in the field which integrates them into programming and local decision-making. The evaluation team has learned from interviewees that UNRWA is personality driven organization. It is built to interaction and relations between people. The Field Security Office in Gaza has capitalized on this and built strong and effective relationships with Chief Area Officers whom facilitate Field Security Office's role in accessing and communicating with relevant stakeholders in the field. The collaboration between the Field Security Office in Gaza and SSD headquarters proved that investment in safety and security and professional leadership bring results. Gaza field office stands out consistently in the questionnaire survey results in comparison with its peers in the other fields of operation. Gaza field office and the Field Security Office team in Gaza have the capacity, processes and results to inspire other fields of operation. The main lessons learned from Gaza field office are that its strength in coordination and communication have enabled and empowered UNRWA personnel to make informed decisions. Gaza field office is a good example of having established processes and procedures for planning, implementing and following up of SRM activities to mainstreaming security and risk management.

**Unanticipated positive or negative effects**

76. One can argue that the lack of implementing or the discontinuation of some SRM interventions have or had negative effects. For instance, the lack of adopting a safety and security policy and a framework of accountability seems to have created obstacles in advocating for mainstreaming safety and security in programming and ensure inclusion of security in business processes of other departments. The subsequent result is un-clarity, inefficiency and more of ‘band-aiding’ and ‘fire fighting’ of SSD and Field Security Office resources instead of using them for more proactive, analytical and strategic interventions. Furthermore, it interferes with the increasing need to closely liaison and collaborate with Chief Area Officers to learn and understand the local socio-political dynamic inside and outside the camps to feed into context specific SRM activities. As mentioned earlier, a negative effect of the assumption that SSD had a buy-in from the senior management created a standstill in the development and implementation of SRM-interventions that aimed at integration safety and security with other departments. The highly ambitious SRM agenda has also had the negative effect that the scope and size of departments, programs and locations make it a great challenge to assure that the good intentions of the SRM interventions have desired effects throughout the organization and among front-line staff. The SSD strategic objectives are resource intensive and require both human resources and competence. The ambitious agenda has been vulnerable to the organizational capacity of SSD and Field Security Offices. In addition, as the regional dynamic is increasingly challenging and threatening to UNRWA’s staff the need for adjusting operations to shifts and changes from normal operation and to emergency, as well as staying in a grey zone between the two poles requires flexibility, rapidness and clear principles guiding decision-making on safety and security.

77. An unanticipated positive effect has been that after almost 60 years’ safety and security has in the past three years made significant strides towards being formally and organizationally recognized as a cross-cutting theme which should be considered in programming and shape the organizational culture in order to improve enabling environment for service delivery. SSD and Field Security Offices seem to have raised the profile and visibility on safety and security that was not there before 2011.
key findings:

finding 8
UNRWA staff does not feel supported in their capacity as UNRWA staff by UNRWA’s internal policies, guidance and organization during and after disputes with beneficiaries. UNRWA staff encourages the Agency to undertake a comprehensive review and measures to fill any gaps between safety / security and protection / legal aid.

finding 9
The outcome and impact of safety and security rests with the capacity and processes of each field operation. The role, responsibility and integration of SSD in decision-making processes differ also among the field operations. Consistency and sustainability of building good relationships between SSD teams and the area staff through regular contact, dialogue and training creates good safety and security results. Chief Area Officers have a significant role and influence on UNRWA’s relations with local authorities and community members. Coordination with local host authorities rests largely with the Chief Area Officers. Gaza field office illustrates a good example of well-developed coordination and communication enabling and empowering UNRWA personnel to make informed decisions.

recommendations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Ownership[1]</th>
<th>Sequencing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrate SSD more fully in headquarters decision-making &amp; strategy. Every field office does it differently.</td>
<td>Commissioner-General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lean approach to SSD field work plan and resulting standard checklist.</td>
<td>SSD headquarters leadership SSD field to adopt and comply</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment in Syria of Field Security Offices.</td>
<td>Human Resources and Director of UNRWA Affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that UNRWA’s internal SRM system is coherently and consistently aligned with the SRM strategy.</td>
<td>SSD headquarters and SSD field</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce SRAs. Prioritise the establishment of bottom-up (from the field/front-line staff) SRAs, which focus on specific threats apparent to their staff and beneficiaries. Management decisions should not be based on the threat but on the risk (likelihood and impact) i.e. our vulnerability to a threat.</td>
<td>SSD headquarters and SSD field</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and identify gaps between safety / security and protection / legal aid.</td>
<td>SSD headquarters Department of Legal Affairs Protection Division</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
sustainability

78. This section describes the continuation of [intended or unintended] benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed and funding has been withdrawn. The following evaluation questions are assessed and analysed in this section:

- Have the various UNRWA departments started to put protocols in place and maintain them to ensure that security is sustainably integrated in their business processes?
- Are recurrent costs of the SRM programme (Staff, Training and Learning System, SIMS, GIS) covered?
- How are other agencies performing on raising resources for security of their staff?

sustainable integration of security in business processes

79. SSD has in the past years worked on establishing different security processes and procedures. Most notably is SIMS. As mentioned earlier, SIMS is to different degrees understood and applied in the five fields of operation. As this evaluation was conducted the second generation of SIMS was being developed. In many fields of operation, staff members were not sure how to use it for reporting incidents. SIMS was not yet a tool for integrating feedback into security planning and design in different business processes of other technical departments. It does have potential to be a great depository of information for SRAs and planning along with the project cycle. The consequence of the absence of SRAs is that the operational risk management process and critical decisions on programme criticality, acceptable risk and risk appetite, as well as actions for risk mitigation, funding and implementation is not served by robust and validated information and analysis. Instead, in the absence of SRAs the field management end up making decisions on threats without having validated processes for analysing the potential likelihood and impact, and identifying a risk level for which risk measures will be put in place. It is an accountability issue when the field management gives a verbal “ok, I will accept the risk” without signing a SRA or Concept of Operations promptly. Without SRAs or Concept of Operation, or the involvement of SSD in the decision-making process there is limited oversight and accountability for how decisions are made. Given that all five fields of operations are in highly volatile environments, and some are in extremely vulnerable areas with on-going conflict it should be a requirement for taking accountability in writing for area staff missions and operations. There are however good examples. For instance, SSD Lebanon field office conducted a SRA in order to allow Senior Management to assess the threats, determine the vulnerabilities and determine the risk inherent within Nahr el Bared Camp, North Lebanon Area as a result of these measures. The SRA was approved by the Director / Front Office for UNRWA Lebanon field office. The SRA has a well-articulated narrative with an associated risk analysis matrix of Nahr el Bared Camp. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross places the security accountability firmly in the lap of the Country Delegate with no support of any security professional. Many NGOs also do not have the personnel nor the resources to use a SRM system. In some high risk countries, the NGOs use donor funds to share their own security professional but seldom do they use SRM. It is very common to use the United Nations Security Management System country SRAs when they are shared through the country security cell. In the absence to SRAs the alternatives are often the following five scenarios:

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16 The evaluation questions are presented in the Background Paper (ToR) of this assignment.

- Rely on experience and intuition of staff who are living in the community
- Historical evidence directs Front Office
- ‘Acceptance’ approach to reduce likelihood
- Use Contingency Plans and Standard Operating Procedures to reduce impact
- Decentralised clear accountability of decision making authority

80. SSD has produced UNRWA Safety and Security Policy and UNRWA Framework of Accountability, and associated with these protocols is the Security Policy Manual which includes inter alia, UNRWA Safety and Security Training Policy, which sets out the goals and parameters for UNRWA Agency-wide security training. It identifies roles and responsibilities in the development and delivery of training materials, methodologies, and learning programs. SSD has also produced an Operations Manual that contains a variety of Standard Operating Procedures that offer guidance on reacting to security incidents. These Standard Operating Procedures are designed to be comprehensive enough to be used with minimal customisation, or can be used as the basis for field offices to construct their own customised documents. SSD states that adherence to the Standard Operating Procedures alone does not guarantee a successful resolution to a security incident, and as such UNRWA staff may need to adapt Standard Operating Procedures in order to arrive at the best course of action. The Operations Manual also contains guidelines which provide general guidance on a variety of topics that for one reason or another are not classified as Standard Operating Procedures. For example, the Guard Force Guidelines are contained here, as well as guidance on establishing a Crisis Management Team before a major incident occurs. The Operations Manual also includes plans, i.e. generic copies of documents such as the Evacuation Plan and Mass Casualty Plan. While these documents themselves are restricted, sanitised copies are included here so that staff is familiar with the broad outlines of what will happen in the event of a major crisis. There is also a UNRWA’s Policy on Security Mainstreaming to better serve area staff by creating Agency enhancement mechanisms toward improving their collective safety and security. There is also SSD’s Professional Development Plan (PDP) to ensure that members of SSD have the knowledge, the skills and attitudes to successfully perform their current duties and responsibilities being prepared for future challenges and opportunities. SSD has also developed Framework of Minimum Standards. There is no lack of guiding documents that will support a sustainable integration of security in business processes of other departments. The main issue is that most of the documents are draft versions and not formally adopted by the Agency which creates an uncertainty in adherence by UNRWA staff and departments to these documents. Instead SSD has had to work intensively to communicate and advocate for its mission to ensure that the Agency is aware of, understands and applies these key documents for safety and security. Despite that SSD has worked without an adopted policy it is widely recognized within the Agency that safety and security is far more visible and practiced today than prior to 2012. There is however much more potential for greater effects if there would be a more recognized platform for SSD to act from.

81. SSD has in the recent years been affected by austerity measures. SSD had to suspend some SRM interventions, and particularly the roll out and implementation of the capacity building program. Planned trainings had to be cancelled. It has affected the roll out of individual field SRM plans. It is an internal decision within UNRWA to prioritize the available funding from donors. Decisions have to be made on which priorities should guide the allocation of funds for regular and project budgets between departments and divisions within the administrative support services and between field and headquarters. Project funding and emergency appeals have covered safety and security expenditures for

recurrant costs of the srm programme
evaluation of the security risk management programme

Syria field office and Gaza field office. Earmarking funds for certain FOs is however discouraged since it reduces the flexibility for UNRWA and SSD to swiftly and flexibly cover unexpected costs due to rising needs during changing circumstances. The current project funding from USAID of SSD in Gaza field office can only be spent in Gaza, whilst there is urging safety and security needs and financial shortfalls in other FOs. It illustrates the adverse effects of earmarked project funds. Discussions with donors about safety and security spending are vital to enable operating environment for service deliver during times of increased volatility and violence in the region. SSD should align its budget with the existing budget cycle, and estimate upfront the security cost in percentage for each project/program. Planning and budgeting for SSD and Field Security Offices role, responsibilities and interventions in mainstreaming safety and security in programming have to be based on historical data on safety and security incidents, current threats and potential risks for the programme period. This is all part of a robust analysis, SRAs and inclusion of security processes in the decision-making on programming. It aims to make budgeting fully congruent with design and planning for programming on the basis of SRAs rather than adjusting SRM interventions to either ‘fire fighting’ or ad hoc expenses which are not prioritized on the basis of a SRA. Norwegian Refugee Council is launching an initiative in 2016 to link budgeting with the incorporation of SRA in programming. The shift was partly undertaken to avoid cumbersome budgeting processes and long non-prioritized ‘wish lists’, as well as a the rapidly changing operational environment that made the programme management interested in exploring new budgeting models in order to reduce costs while improving safety and security. Instead they are working towards including programming in the SRA processes to making budgeting easier and align it with safety and security priorities such capacity building and training (Hazardous Environment Awareness Training) and budget lines. Furthermore, justification of expenses is context specific since its builds on SRAs that are more implicated in the program. The Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI wrote in its Good Practice Review in 2010, that the major humanitarian donors are prepared to fund appropriate and justified safety- and security-related expenditures. Some donors have specific security management and coordination posts, which can provide useful guidance particularly during programme planning and the initial budgeting stages. Security-related funding requests usually to be accompanied by a detailed security plan that includes a context analysis and risk assessment. In order to avoid significant revisions to project budgets once contracts have been signed, risk assessments may describe possible future scenarios – and future needs – should security deteriorates. There are no uniform budgeting formulae or common expenditure definitions for inputs and activities designed to enhance operational security. Agencies and donors also vary in how they budget for security-related costs. Some include security funding in overhead costs or core support services, while others include it as a separate line item or as a fixed percentage of programme costs.¹⁸

**key findings:**

**finding 9**

Earmarking funds for certain FOs reduces the flexibility for UNRWA and SSD to swiftly and flexibly cover unexpected costs due to rising needs during changing circumstances.

**finding 10**

Linking budgeting with SRAs for planning of programming is a model considered by other humanitarian organizations.

**recommendations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Ownership[1]</th>
<th>Sequencing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourage earmarking funds, but have discussions with donors about safety and security spending.</td>
<td>Commissioner-General and SSD headquarters</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Align SSD’s budget with UNRWA’s existing budget cycle, and estimate upfront the security cost in percentage for each project/program</td>
<td>SSD headquarters</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>
annexes

annex 1 – management response

The comprehensive evaluation highlights areas where considerable progress has been achieved in the Agency’s management of the safety and security of staff and addresses important areas where further adjustments and improvements are required. UNRWA Management is committed to adopt and implement a more cohesive Agency security management system guiding decision-making on safety and security. This is a priority. The Commissioner-General has specifically underlined the need to strengthen security arrangements for UNRWA area staff, notably in response to the high number of fatalities and casualties resulting from conflicts in Gaza and Syria in recent years.

Until approximately four years ago, the UNRWA Security function was committed mainly to meeting the Agency’s responsibilities to its international staff through the UNDSS modalities. Four years ago the Agency established an Areas Staff security project aimed at mainstreaming security risk management as a feature of programme delivery for its Area Staff colleagues. The evaluation at hand was requested by the former Chief, Security and Safety Division as a means of validating the projects direction and progress.

The review is of considerable interest as a means of validating work completed by the Agency towards the goal of a fully functioning Area Staff security and risk management function. To that extent, the evaluation has served a very valuable purpose, validating as it has, much of the work completed. The evaluation also addresses key areas where change is needed. One of the key observations is the need to strengthen the system and to mainstream safety and security into the design and planning of the programmes.

The evaluation of the Security Risk Management Programme has been overtaken to an extent by some ongoing initiatives to strengthen the security system:

- The creation of a Director, Security and Risk Management. This post will report directly to the CG/DCG (rather than as previously a P5 reporting via DAS). This will have the effect of raising the profile of security and securing direct access to the key Agency decision makers. The post is currently under recruitment.

- The adoption of Organisation Directive No33. A main feature of this OD is the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Safety and Security. Chaired by the Deputy Commissioner-General and including representation from all Fields and Departments this is intended to provide the discussion and decision making forum for the Agency to consider security policy and priorities.

- The establishment of an “Advisory Group on Safety and Security”. This is a temporary body that will provide the forum for the Commissioner-General and the Deputy Commissioner-General to interact directly with a wide cross-section of area staff colleagues, to listen to their concerns and to seek guidance from them on areas they consider being priorities to guide the Area Staff security framework.

- The work completed by the Area Staff Security Project team and the object of this evaluation remains valid in most respects and will form the basis of the security framework going forward. It may however require some adjustment and direction as a result of priorities informed by the three actions noted above.
**recommendation 1:**
- Formally adopt the:
  - a UNRWA specific Framework of Accountability; *(Partially agreed)*
  - Safety and Security Policy. *(Agreed)*
- The adoption of the Framework of Accountability should be accompanied by training of Field Directors and Deputies, and raise awareness of their roles and responsibilities. *(Partially agreed)*
- Once Framework of Accountability is adopted then share it widely and educate all staff through the SSD in the field and Chiefs of area offices. *(Partially agreed)*

The Framework of Accountability requires review and updating prior to adoption, which Management is looking into.

The Advisory Committee on Safety and Security (ACSS) has been established to establish Agency security and safety policy. This committee met for the first time in January and reviewed a number of draft policies. Three policies are currently under review and will be adopted shortly. More are to follow.

Once adopted, the Framework will be shared widely within the Agency. It is important to note that at the Field level, decision-making is currently guided by the existing policy, framework of accountability and control structure, and based on the input and advice provided by the Field Security Office and SSD at HQ.

**recommendation 2:**
- Mainstream security in programming. To integrate SSD and Field Security Office teams with managerial decision-making at the operation and programme level to improve alignment and use of SSD competence and protocols. *(Agreed)*
- To include SSD at an early design and planning phase with programme management teams to link a strategic safety and security lens with operational programming and service delivery. *(Agreed)*
- To integrate SSD more fully in headquarters decision-making & strategy. *(Agreed)*

UNRWA Management is conscious of the need to improve mainstreaming of security in programming to the extent feasible. The new Director of Security and Risk Management will be looking in to these issues, and the evaluation will be a helpful tool in this regard. This will be complemented with efforts to strengthen relations between SSD teams and the area staff through regular contact, dialogue and training.

There are two submissions to CMSD on hold pending recruitment of the new Director, the results of the Advisor Group on Safety and Security (AGSS) consultations and decisions of the ACSS. The submissions deal respectively with the HQ and Field security and safety staffing structures, and the guard force structures. Inevitably where there are additional staff posts being considered, this needs to be done keeping in mind resource constraints and funding sources.

This is clearly the intention of the initiatives outlined previously. It will require appropriate resources to be put in place.

The creation of a Director of Security and Risk Management reporting directly to the Deputy Commissioner-General demonstrates this commitment.

**recommendation 3:**
- Ensure that UNRWA’s internal SRM system is context specific through SRAs and aligned with programme strategies, and carefully adapted and tailored to UNRWA’s specific needs and organizational conditions to guarantee the safety and security of area staff.
Mainstream the SSD teams in the field approach to standardize plans, documents, procedures, and work plans through best practice. (Agreed)

- Apply lean approach to develop SSD work plan and resulting standard checklist. (Partially agreed)

This is a logical progression from the commitments being made.

As above

The intention is to fully resource a security framework appropriate for the prevailing security environment encountered by our Area Staff colleagues in the different Fields of operation.

**recommendation 4:**

- Adapt SIMS to provide critical information for analysis (SRAs) and development of Standard Operating Procedures. (Agreed)
- Ensure that SSD in the field uses SIMS all the time to create and communicate existing threats to staff. (Agreed)
- Ensure that Field Security Offices in the field cooperate and liaise closely with DSS to adapt SRAs to UNRWA’s context specific operational and programme environment. (Agreed)
- Prioritize the establishment of bottom-up (from the field/front-line staff) SRAs, which focus on specific threats apparent to their staff and beneficiaries. (Agreed)
- Make it a requirement for field management to take accountability in writing for area staff missions and operations. (Partially agreed)

Work to apply geographical information as an overlay to existing SIMS information is ongoing. This will at nuance to the threat/risk assessments and should guide tailored risk mitigation measures.

It is acknowledged that the data set gathered in SIMS is incomplete as a result of inconsistent reporting. The method of entering the information will be improved. An adequate amount of resources need to be made available to the SIMS. Moreover, there are plans to centralize SIMS.

This is current practice but will require appropriate staff resources to really make the SRA system effective and dynamic.

This is a logical progression from the commitments being made. It will require sufficient resources, including considerable effort to train the front line managers who will be responsible for developing appropriate SRAs.

Currently, Concept of Operations and SRAs have been adopted by the Field offices for various programmes and scenarios as they unfold. Having appropriate and up to date SRAs in place for each could become a very cumbersome task for Field Management to be accountable for. Hence, while the principle of accountability is agreed, the practical implementation requires additional thought and policy direction.

**recommendation 5:**

- Review roles and responsibilities of guard management to identify gaps with needs and priorities. (Agreed)
- Assign guards at installations (access control) the responsibility to identify threats and support programme staff to pre-empt any assault or harassment. (Agreed)
- Psychosocial assistance or measures within work places can complement guard duties. (Partially agreed)

As noted previously there is a submission related to a generic guard force organizational structure with CMSD but on hold pending recruitment of the new Director. The proposed structure has been consulted widely and has the support and agreement of field offices. The quantification of how many guards, their organization and the coverage provided to the different UNRWA facilities must inevitably be defined by the respective Fields according to their threat/risk environment and within the resources allocated. Final agreement of the
submission to CMSD will be helpful in this respect.

It is believed that this recommendation will be satisfied once the CMSD submission is agreed.

The sentiment is agreed. We agree that installations would benefit from staff having the ability to identify and support stressed beneficiaries and pre-empt any assault or harassment. Psychosocial assistance or measures in highly stressful environments and workplaces can potentially complement more traditional guard duties.
CONSULTANCY - TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. **UNRWA** is a United Nations agency established by the General Assembly in 1949 and is mandated to provide assistance and protection to a population of some 5 million registered Palestine refugees. Its mission is to help Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip to achieve their full potential in human development, pending a just solution to their plight. UNRWA’s services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and emergency assistance. UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions. UNRWA is the largest UN operation in the Middle East with more than 30,000 staff.

**SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME EVALUATION**

**TEAM LEADER**

**BACKGROUND**

*Security Risk Management Programme*

2. The primary responsibility for the security of the United Nations and humanitarian personnel lies firstly with each and every Member State on whose territory these personnel are serving. The United Nations has a duty as an employer to help the Host Government to fulfill these obligations in circumstances where United Nations personnel are working in areas which are subject to conditions of insecurity. UNRWA supports the UN vision to establish and maintain operations in insecure and unstable environments, by adopting the operating principle of “how to stay” as opposed to “when to leave.” To enable that principle, the UNSMS requires all organizations within the United Nations to maintain a robust and cohesive internal security management system and adhere to three principles: determination of acceptable risk; provision of adequate and sustainable resources to manage the risk to personnel and their eligible dependents, premises and assets; and development and implementation of security policies and procedures. Within the UNSMS context and accountabilities UNRWA has a unique challenge to provide safety and security to an estimated 30,000 personnel across the region.

3. UNRWA has a duty of care towards all its personnel and is committed to their safety and security. UNRWA is acutely aware of the reality that the beneficiaries in the greatest need of Education, Health, Relief and Social Services, and Protection are often located in fields and areas that present the greatest safety and security risks to staff. In response to this challenge, UNRWA adopted the SRM programme which draws on the core business activities, best practices and lessons learned from the UNSMS and security management approaches of International Non-Governmental Organizations. UNRWA is part of the UN Inter Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), however, practice has been that UNRWA only applies IASMN endorsed policies and operational decisions to its international personnel, secondees and expatriate consultants.
The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) as the coordinator of the IASMN does not provide support or services to UNRWA's 30,000 locally recruited personnel, who fall under the remit of the UNRWA SRM programme implemented by SSD.

4. A central organizational objective was to establish an internal Security and Risk Management (SRM) system that enables UNRWA to fulfill its mandate while addressing and improving the safety and security needs of its personnel. In so doing UNRWA intends to deliver on its organizational accountability within the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS). The SRM programme was initiated in late 2011 by UNRWA Safety and Security Division (SSD) to mainstream safety and security into how UNRWA does business.

5. The existing programme timeline was for SSD to complete the introduction of the SRM Programme to the UNRWA Fields Offices by the end of 2013; however, internalization and optimization of the approach are an on-going process in the 2014/15 biennium. The value of conducting an evaluation after four years of implementation of the programme is that adjustments, revisions and/or corrections can be made to the programme in order to ensure the optimal implementation of the SRM system.

THE EVALUATION

6. The evaluation will contribute to accountability and learning. It aims to attribute the SRM Programme contributions to the achievement of the overall Safety and Security mandate. The evaluation will make recommendations to the Commissioner-General, Agency Security Focal Point/ Director of Administrative Support and SSD in order to assess the current situation with reference to good practice and make recommendations for future improvements of the SRM programme.

7. The SRM evaluation will determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the SRM programme. Moreover, the evaluation will discuss lessons learned and will identify good practices in relation to Risk Management Systems outside of UNRWA that could be adapted to the UNRWA environment.

SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

8. The scope of the evaluation is to review and provide advice to SSD with particular focus on the overall SRM programme and the relevant components identified in the Theory of Change. The evaluation will cover all UNRWA headquarters and field offices if accessible for the time period 2011-2014.

ORGANIZATION

9. The Team Leader will lead the evaluation activities and directly manage the work of a Security Expert and an Arabic Speaker Community Development Specialist. The Evaluation Team Leader will report to the Evaluation Division of UNRWA which will provide guidance and quality assurance to the process.

10. The methodology of this evaluation is outlined in the background paper of this evaluation which will be made available to the evaluation team together with other relevant background documents.

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11. The Team Leader, with support from the Security Expert, will present preliminary results and the final report.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS

12. UNRWA expects three deliverables from the Team Leader:

- A draft report including findings and recommendations
- A presentation workshop providing UNRWA staff the opportunity to better understand the findings and recommendations of the evaluation team, in a participatory forum
- A comprehensive evaluation report (max. 40 pages) providing an analytical review of the data collected. The report will follow the outline given by UNRWA Evaluation Division

ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

- Advanced university degree;
- Team Leader/ Evaluator in at least 5 evaluation processes, preferably in the MENA region;
- At least 10 years’ international development experience; preferably 3 years in the MENA region;
- Familiarity with UN processes and standards and knowledge of UNEG standards;
- Proven team leadership skills;
- Proven reporting skills for international development organizations;
- Fluency in English, Arabic fluency is a plus.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

13. The team leader is expected to work for 40 consultant days. The earliest starting date for the assignment will be mid-March 2015. Remuneration for this consultancy will depend on the qualifications and experience of the consultant and it will be a lump sum at the completion of service, subject to approval by the Evaluation Division.

14. Due to the nature of the consultancy, applicants are expected to be able to travel to the five field offices (Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank) where UNRWA operates. All travel to the field offices outside of Jordan are subject to security assessments.

APPLICATION PROCESS

15. Applicants should submit a cover letter and CV or UN Personal History Form demonstrating clearly the knowledge and experience required to meet the consultancy requirements to Manuela Buccarelli (m.bucciarelli@unrwa.org) clearly indicating “Evaluation Team Leader- Safety and Security Evaluation” in the subject line of the message. CVs should contain the contact details of a minimum of three references. The cover letter should also state the expected daily rate. The deadline for the submission of applications is 2 March 2015 (late applications will not be considered).

UNRWA is an equal opportunity employer and welcomes applications from both women and men. UNRWA encourages applications from qualified and experienced female candidates. Only those applicants short-listed for interview will be contacted. UNRWA has a non-smoking environment.
16. **UNRWA** is a United Nations agency established by the General Assembly in 1949 and is mandated to provide assistance and protection to a population of some 5 million registered Palestine refugees. Its mission is to help Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip to achieve their full potential in human development, pending a just solution to their plight. UNRWA’s services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and emergency assistance. UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions. UNRWA is the largest UN operation in the Middle East with more than 30,000 staff.

**SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME EVALUATION**

**SECURITY EXPERT**

**BACKGROUND**

**Security Risk Management Programme**

17. The primary responsibility for the security of the United Nations and humanitarian personnel lies firstly with each and every Member State on whose territory these personnel are serving. The United Nations has a duty as an employer to help the Host Government to fulfill these obligations in circumstances where United Nations personnel are working in areas which are subject to conditions of insecurity. UNRWA supports the UN vision to establish and maintain operations in insecure and unstable environments, by adopting the operating principle of “how to stay” as opposed to “when to leave.” To enable that principle, the UNSMS requires all organizations within the United Nations to maintain a robust and cohesive internal security management system and adhere to three principles: determination of acceptable risk; provision of adequate and sustainable resources to manage the risk to personnel and their eligible dependents, premises and assets; and development and implementation of security policies and procedures. Within the UNSMS context and accountabilities UNRWA has a unique challenge to provide safety and security to an estimated 30,000 personnel across the region.

18. UNRWA has a duty of care towards all its personnel and is committed to their safety and security. UNRWA is acutely aware of the reality that the beneficiaries in the greatest need of Education, Health, Relief and Social Services, and Protection are often located in fields and areas that present the greatest safety and security risks to staff. In response to this challenge, UNRWA adopted the SRM programme which draws on the core business activities, best practices and lessons learned from the UNSMS and security management approaches of International Non-Governmental Organizations. UNRWA is part of the UN Inter Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), however, practice has been that UNRWA only applies IASMN endorsed policies and operational decisions to its international personnel, secondees and expatriate consultants. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) as the coordinator of the IASMN
does not provide support or services to UNRWA’s 30,000 locally recruited personnel, who fall under the remit of the UNRWA SRM programme implemented by SSD.

19. A central organizational objective was to establish an internal Security and Risk Management (SRM) system that enables UNRWA to fulfill its mandate while addressing and improving the safety and security needs of its personnel. In so doing UNRWA intends to deliver on its organizational accountability within the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS)\textsuperscript{20}. The SRM programme was initiated in late 2011 by UNRWA Safety and Security Division (SSD) to mainstream safety and security into how UNRWA does business.

20. The existing programme timeline was for SSD to complete the introduction of the SRM Programme to the UNRWA Fields Offices by the end of 2013; however, internalization and optimization of the approach are an on-going process in the 2014/15 biennium. The value of conducting an evaluation after four years of implementation of the programme is that adjustments, revisions and/or corrections can be made to the programme in order to ensure the optimal implementation of the SRM system.

THE EVALUATION

21. The evaluation will contribute to accountability and learning. It aims to attribute the SRM Programme contributions to the achievement of the overall Safety and Security mandate. The evaluation will make recommendations to the Commissioner-General, Agency Security Focal Point/ Director of Administrative Support and SSD in order to assess the current situation with reference to good practice and make recommendations for future improvements of the SRM programme.

22. The SRM evaluation will determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the SRM programme. Moreover, the evaluation will discuss lessons learned and will identify good practices in relation to Risk Management Systems outside of UNRWA that could be adapted to the UNRWA environment.

SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

23. The scope of the evaluation is to review and provide advice to SSD with particular focus on the overall SRM programme and the relevant components identified in the Theory of Change. The evaluation will cover all UNRWA headquarters and field offices if accessible for the time period 2011-2014.

ORGANIZATION

24. The Security Expert will assist the Evaluation Team Leader to carry out the relevant tasks of the evaluation. He/She will provide technical inputs on safety and security matters. The Team Leader will be responsible to coordinate the work of the evaluation team and will directly manage the work of the Security Expert. The team will be complemented by an Arabic Speaker Community Development Specialist. The Evaluation Division of UNRWA will manage the process and provide quality assurance.

25. The methodology of this evaluation is outlined in the background paper of this evaluation which will be made available to the evaluation team with other relevant background documents.

\textsuperscript{20}UNRWA, 2012, UNRWA Safety and Security Policy.
The Team Leader, with support from the Security Expert, will present preliminary results and the final report.

**EXPECTED OUTPUTS**

UNRWA expects the following deliverables from the Security Expert:

- Provide technical inputs on Safety and Security related matters,
- Review of good practices on security and contrast them with the UNRWA approach
- Contribute to information gathering instrument development
- Gather information related to security management in UNRWA;
- Analysis the information collected and contribute to findings and recommendation development;
- Assist the Evaluation Team Leader in drafting the report and to present findings.

**ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE**

- Advanced university degree;
- At least 10-15 years’ relevant experience in Safety and Security;
- Prior experience in a UN organization;
- Fluency in English.

**DESIRABLE**

- Experience in programme management and Evaluation
- Experience in Gender issues in Safety and Security programmes is a plus.

**CONDITIONS OF SERVICE**

The consultant is expected to work for 25 consultant days. The earliest starting date for the assignment will be mid-March 2015. Remuneration for this consultancy will depend on the qualifications and experience of the consultant and it will be a lump sum at the submission of technical inputs, subject to approval by the Evaluation Team Leader and the Evaluation Division.

Due to the nature of the consultancy, applicants are expected to be able to travel to the five field offices (Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank) where UNRWA operates. All travel to the field offices outside of Jordan are subject to security assessments.

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**SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME EVALUATION**

**ARABIC SPEAKER COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST**

**BACKGROUND**

**Security Risk Management Programme**

32. The primary responsibility for the security of the United Nations and humanitarian personnel lies firstly with each and every Member State on whose territory these personnel are serving. The United Nations has a duty as an employer to help the Host Government to fulfill these obligations in circumstances where United Nations personnel are working in areas which are subject to conditions of insecurity. UNRWA supports the UN vision to establish and maintain operations in insecure and unstable environments, by adopting the operating principle of “how to stay” as opposed to “when to leave.” To enable that principle, the UNSMS requires all organizations within the United Nations to maintain a robust and cohesive internal security management system and adhere to three principles: determination of acceptable risk; provision of adequate and sustainable resources to manage the risk to personnel and their eligible dependents, premises and assets; and development and implementation of security policies and procedures. Within the UNSMS context and accountabilities UNRWA has a unique challenge to provide safety and security to an estimated 30,000 personnel across the region.

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THE EVALUATION

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37. The SRM evaluation will determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the SRM programme. Moreover, the evaluation will discuss lessons learned and will identify good practices in relation to Risk Management Systems outside of UNRWA that could be adapted to the UNRWA environment.

SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

38. The scope of the evaluation is to review and provide advice to SSD with particular focus on the overall SRM programme and the relevant components identified in the Theory of Change. The evaluation will cover all UNRWA headquarters and Field Offices if accessible for the time period 2011-2014.

ORGANIZATION

39. The Community Development Specialist will assist the Evaluation Team Leader to carry out relevant tasks of the evaluation. He / She will provide translation services and assist the Team Leader and the Security Expert in the data collection phase. The Team Leader will be responsible to coordinate the work of the evaluation team and will directly manage the work of the Community Specialist. The Evaluation Division of UNRWA will manage the process and provide quality assurance.

40. The methodology of this evaluation is outlined in the background paper of this evaluation which will be made available to the evaluation team with other relevant background documents.

\textsuperscript{21}UNRWA, 2012, UNRWA Safety and Security Policy.
41. The Team Leader, with support from the Security Expert and the Community Specialist, will present preliminary results and the final report.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS

42. UNRWA expects the following tasks from the Community Development Specialist:

- Provide verbal and written translation services from English to Arabic and from Arabic to English.
- Facilitate interviews during data collection phase in each of the five UNRWA fields of operations.
- Assist the Evaluation Team Leader in data collection instruments and other relevant tasks.

ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

- Undergraduate university degree;
- At least 3-5 relevant experience in community engagement and development; experience in Safety and Security is a plus;
- Prior experience in a UN organization would be an asset;
- Fluency in Levantine Arabic and in English is required.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

43. The Consultant is expected to work for 30 consultant days. The earliest starting date for the assignment will be mid-March 2015. Remuneration for this consultancy will be a lump sum at the submission of relevant inputs, subject to approval by the Evaluation Team Leader and the Evaluation Division.

44. Due to the nature of the consultancy, applicants are expected to be able to travel to the five field offices (Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank) where UNRWA operates. All travel to the field offices outside of Jordan are subject to security assessments.

APPLICATION PROCESS

45. Applicants should submit a cover letter and CV or UN Personal History Form demonstrating clearly the knowledge and experience required to meet the consultancy requirements to Manuela Bucciarelli (m.bucciarelli@unrwa.org) clearly indicating “Arabic Speaker Community Development Specialist - Safety and Security Evaluation” in the subject line of the message. CVs should contain the contact details of a minimum of three references. The cover letter should also state the expected daily rate. The deadline for the submission of applications is 2 March 2015 (late applications will not be considered).

UNRWA is an equal opportunity employer and welcomes applications from both women and men. UNRWA encourages applications from qualified and experienced female candidates. Only those applicants short-listed for interview will be contacted. UNRWA has a non-smoking environment.
annex 3 - bibliography

**UNRWA documents:**


UNRWA., “Constructing the Security and Risk Management System”. 2013


UNRWA, SSD., “Action Taken in Support of LEG/460”.


UNRWA, SSD., Safety and Security 2014 “Who is Who” (Chart), 2014


UNRWA, SSD., “Syria Field Office and Operational Risk Management: Initial Review and Recommendations”.


evaluation of the security risk management programme

UNRWA, SSD., "Work Plan for DSS Proposed Mitigation Measures HQA".
UNRWA., "UNRWA Regional Staff Safety Coordination SOP".
UNRWA., "Security and Risk Management Framework of Minimum Standards Treatment Plan".

**external documents:**


Brugger, P., "ICRC Field Security Concept", ICRC.


### Annex 4 – List of Interviewees

#### Headquarters Amman

**Individual Meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdallah Hammad</td>
<td>Security Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Salameh</td>
<td>Security Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Pontefract</td>
<td>Director of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanan Shahin</td>
<td>Administrative Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Gonzalez</td>
<td>Program Manager - SSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Londen</td>
<td>Director of Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lex Takkenberg *</td>
<td>Chief, Ethics Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Gibb</td>
<td>Chief Safety and Security Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megan Reichert</td>
<td>Projects associate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moussa Qubbeia and Team</td>
<td>Head of Administration and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neil Ashcroft</td>
<td>Director of Administrative Support Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niels Bolt</td>
<td>Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Krahenuhuil*</td>
<td>Commissioner-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raad Abualsindus</td>
<td>Deputy Chief SSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralica Kostadinova</td>
<td>Communication Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rob Hurt</td>
<td>Director Department of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Stryk</td>
<td>Chief, Evaluation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saadia Imad</td>
<td>HR Coordinator, Staff Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacklaine Hedary</td>
<td>Chief of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sana Jelasi</td>
<td>Gender Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wael Rabah</td>
<td>Senior Security and Safety Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Focus Group Discussion

- Guards
- Drivers

#### Jordan Field Office

**Individual Meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bassam Khnouf</td>
<td>Chief of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Richards</td>
<td>Protection Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davide Marzano</td>
<td>Head, Legal Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddy Khawaja</td>
<td>Field Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faten Al-Dawoud</td>
<td>Chief Eng &amp; Construction Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firas Shilleh</td>
<td>Area Admin Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa Wheidi</td>
<td>Acting Area Relief &amp; Social Services Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kholoud Homsi</td>
<td>Chief of Relief and Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nada Hamdan</td>
<td>Gender Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nidal Ahmad</td>
<td>Chief Area Office - South Amman Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Andi</td>
<td>Safety and Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Davies</td>
<td>Director of UNRWA Affairs, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saber Abd Kareem</td>
<td>Area Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fouad Naseddin</td>
<td>Area Health Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samir Zabanah</td>
<td>Senior Medical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sven Berthelsen</td>
<td>Deputy Director of UNRWA Affairs (operations) &amp; Field Security Focal point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp Services Officer, South Amman Camp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Focus Group Discussions

- Camp Improvement Committee, South Amman Camp
- Camp Services Committee, Jerash Camp
- Clinic staff, Jerash Camp
- Community Walk in Jerash Camp
- Group of Refugees, South Amman Camp
- Group of sanitation workers, Jerash Camp
Health Staff, South Amman Camp
One chief medical officer, Jerash Camp
One headmaster and a group of teachers, Jerash Camp
Relief staff and Social Workers, South Amman Camp
Sanitation foreman, Jerash Camp
Social workers, Jerash Camp

### West Bank Field Office - Headquarters Jerusalem

#### Individual Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Axel Auerbach</td>
<td>Head Field Procurement &amp; Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baktior Babaev</td>
<td>Emergency Program Support Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damien Lilly*</td>
<td>Senior Protection Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Richards</td>
<td>Operations Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Pollock</td>
<td>Field Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Wahid Jubran</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Education Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felipe Sanchez</td>
<td>Director UNRWA Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Dykstra</td>
<td>External Relations and Project Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance Bartholomeusz</td>
<td>Department of Legal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubna Madyeh</td>
<td>Chief Relief &amp; Social Services Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natalie Grove</td>
<td>Emergency Coordinator &amp; Food Security Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Fraser</td>
<td>Head Field Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umaiyeh Khammash</td>
<td>Chief Field Health Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valentin Bandak</td>
<td>Safety and Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volteire Kharoufeh</td>
<td>Micro Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yousef Hushiye</td>
<td>Chief Area Officer Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Focus Group Discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Programme Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admin, Finance Staff, Jerusalem area office</td>
<td>Education, Health and Relief and Social Services Officer, Jerusalem area office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education staff, West Bank field office</td>
<td>FECSO, Jerusalem area office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field office Staff, West Bank field office</td>
<td>General staff, Jerusalem area office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General staff, Jerusalem area office</td>
<td>Guards area office, Jerusalem area office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards, West Bank field office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Lebanon Field Office

#### Individual Meeting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Marks</td>
<td>Deputy Directors UNRWA Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthias Schmale</td>
<td>Director of UNRWA Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heads of Relief and Social Services, Education and Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation Support Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heads of Administration, Finance, Human Resources and Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of Legal Office, Procurement and Logistics Department and Engineering Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Area Officer Beddawi Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp Service Officer, Nahr el Bared</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### Focus Group Discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Programme Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area Program officers (Education, Health and Relief and Social Services), Beddawi Camp</td>
<td>Camp Service Officer, Admin staff and Finance staff, Beddawi Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Service Officer, Wavel Camp, Bekaa</td>
<td>Education Staff, Beddawi Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Service Officer, Wavel Camp, Bekaa</td>
<td>Education Staff, Nahr el Bared Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Service Officer, Wavel Camp, Bekaa</td>
<td>Education, Wavel Camp, Bekaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Service Officer, Wavel Camp, Bekaa</td>
<td>Guards &amp; staff union, Beddawi Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Service Officer, Wavel Camp, Bekaa</td>
<td>Guards, Nahr el Bared Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Service Officer, Wavel Camp, Bekaa</td>
<td>Guards, Wavel Camp, Bekaa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Evaluation of the Security Risk Management Programme

| Health staff, Beddawi Camp |
| Health Staff, Nahr el Bared Camp |
| Health staff, Wavel Camp, Bekaa |
| Refugee Service Committee, Nahr el Bared Camp |
| Refugee Service Committee, Beddawi Camp |
| Refugee Service Committee, Wavel Camp, Bekaa |
| Relief and Social Services staff, Beddawi Camp |
| Relief and Social Services staff, Nahr el Bared Camp |
| Relief and Social Services staff, Wavel Camp, Bekaa |

### Syria Field Office (VCT and Phone Calls from Lebanon Field Office)

#### Individual Meetings

| Dejan Potpara | Deputy Directors UNRWA Affairs |
| Michael Kingsley-Nyinah | Director of UNRWA Affairs |
| Sameh Hefnawy | Security Officer |
| Zuhair Zora | Security Officer |
| Program Chiefs (Relief and Social Services, Education, Health, TVET, ICIP/Engineering) |
| Chief Area Officers (North, Central, South, Damascus) |
| Head, Human Resources |
| Senior Humanitarian Response Officer |
| Area Support Officer |
| Humanitarian Response Officer |

Area staff - representative sample

### Gaza Field Office

#### Individual Meetings

| Ansa Masaud | CCMU |
| Brian Baker | Field Security Officer |
| David de Bold | DDUO |
| Farid Abu-Athra, Asem Abu-Shawish, Ghada Al-Jadba | Chiefs of Education, Health, and Relief and Social Services |
| Ghada Yasin, Jonathan Porter, Rebecca Britnell | Legal Officer, Head of Field HR Office, Head of Legal Office |
| Jan Nadolski | United Nations Department for Safety and Security FSCO |
| Josh Jacobsen | Safety and Security Officer |
| Khalil El-Halabi | Chief Area Office, Deputy Chief Area Office-North Area |
| Imad Okal | |
| Lumi Young | Gender Officer |
| Majed El-Bayed, Mu'men Shahin | Chief Area Office, Deputy Chief Area Office-Gaza Area |
| Nicholas Maligieri, Kathleen Gibson | Operations Support Officer/Protection |
| Rafiq Abed, CICIP | Chief of ICIP |
| Yousef Mousa, Ismail Mansour | Chief Area Office, Deputy Chief Area Office-Rafah |

### Focus Group Discussions

Area Education Officer, Area Relief and Social Services Officer, Area Health Officer - Rafah Area Office
Area Relief and Social Services Officers (3), Social Workers (4), North Area
Education-5 Deputy School Principals from East, West, and South Gaza
Education-4 Deputy School Principals from South, East, and West Gaza
Guards- field office
Guards-Rafah area office
Head Guard- Rafah area office
Health Staff, field office
Health Staff- Rafah area office
Logistics (Distribution Centre Staff), North Area
Relief and Social Services Staff - Rafah area office
In summary this inception report reflects six key issues to the implementation of the evaluation that is further elaborated below:

- Relevance of the evaluation questions
- Focus on the drivers and barriers to the SRM programme by field location
- Two-prong approach for some locations to maximise input and range of interviews
- Reduce time spent with Popular Services Committees
- Walk & talk approach for camp visits
- Prioritise time with field directors, deputies and the field security officers

The evaluation team believes that taking these six key issues into consideration will allow for reliable findings, conclusions and recommendations, while also ensuring that time available is used in the most efficient manner.

The finalization of this third draft of the inception report is done after the first field visit to Jordan and the West Bank. During this field visit the evaluation team met with stakeholders at the UNRWA headquarters in Amman and Jerusalem and at the Jordan and West Bank field offices. The evaluation team also met with Jerusalem area office staff and visited South Amman area office and Camp and Jerash Camp in Jordan. The stakeholders during this first field study ranged from frontline staff to directors at the headquarters. The evaluation team considers itself being in a good position to consolidate the information gathered so far, assess and revise the work plans for the second field visit to Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. The second field visit will also include a two camp visits in the West Bank and meeting with the security team and Commissioner-General in Jerusalem.

The evaluation team recognizes the Safety and Security Division (SSD) as the key client and stakeholder of this evaluation. The evaluation team also recognizes however that the Steering Committee and its members have ownership of the evaluation. This ownership makes them accountable for how the evaluation can be to utmost use for the organization. The evaluation team wants to ensure its work and results are of relevance to the key client and owners of this evaluation. It subsequently requires a common understanding and agreement among the SC members and the key client on how this evaluation will be used. This understanding and agreement will translate into important guidance for the evaluation process, predominantly articulated through the evaluation questions.

With this agreement in mind, the evaluation team has revisited the evaluation questions in light of its first field visit and has concerns about the relevance of the evaluation questions. While SSD has in the past years worked on formalizing a security management framework for UNRWA which has largely encompassed the management at the headquarters and field operations, the evaluation questions seek information from the front line staff about the SRM program. The
imbalance between at what level there is a need for seeking further information and understanding about barriers and supporting factors for the role out of the SRM program, and the target groups for interviews at the frontline level might imply that we do not gain the full picture of drivers and barriers for the implementation of the SRM program. Instead, we might risk to repeatedly hear and learn that the SRM, as it was intended at the outset and in its evolution, never reached the frontline. We recognize it is important to continue to validate and verify this observation from the first field study, which now can be tested as an assumption, in the following field visits. However, we do not want to end up with a one-sided perspective on the SRM programme because we have not sufficiently learned and understood the organizational structure, capacity and processes of UNRWA to support effective programme implementation by identifying risks and addressing security concerns to staff.

6. The evaluation approach might therefore have to be reconsidered to accommodate our needs, interests and priorities for this evaluation assignment. As this evaluation aims to provide input to key decision makers of UNRWA on the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, impact and cost-efficiency of SSD and its SRM program, we have to emphasize a two-pronged approach. It means the evaluation team will work on two fronts for parts of the second field visit to listen and learn from the frontline staff about the SRM program, and how they generally solve or address their security concerns. This approach will be further explained below.

7. The evaluation team still considers the evaluation questions relevant in order to obtain an independent and impartial assessment of where the SRM programme stands today. Regardless of our conclusion it is important to understand the underlying contextual and organizational structural dynamic that shaped the outcome of the SRM program. To gain this understanding we need to spend time with SSD’s different stakeholders at different levels, and in particular at the managerial level which we perceive as the change agents for organizational reforms. As this evaluation does not start with a traditional results matrix with set objectives, indicators and a baseline in a stable development context, instead the evaluation team reckons the SRM programme has gradually evolved since its inception in 2011 in a highly dynamic and fragile context. This is important to acknowledge since it impacts the organizational development process and its ability to systematically and consistently implement a change agenda. This does not mean an organization cannot work consistently and systematically in a volatile environment, it is rather even more important, but the results of the organizational efforts might not come as easily.

8. Interaction with the frontline staff will provide us with evidence on how efficiently UNRWA addresses security threats posed to staff while their experiences will also help identifying the obstacles linked to programme implementation in a complex and fragile environment. The locally recruited personnel in the five fields of operations, field and area offices, and refugee camps, will be the means of verification of changes in the security environment. It will be their voice that will inform us about perceived and real changes, or security concerns and needs.

9. The evaluation team seeks to understand whether the Agency has an effective, efficient and flexible safety and security system that can operationally address and meet the specific context, programmatic and operational needs of the Agency and its locally recruited personnel.

10. The evaluation team will seek information through an online survey in Arabic from UNRWA’s frontline staff. An online survey will be distributed through UNRWA’s internal IT-system directly to UNRWA frontline staff with email addresses. The evaluation team will use a sampling method of at least 50 respondents for each field operation. The collected data will be aggregated and translated into English. The compiled data will allow the evaluation team to disaggregate the data for gender, profession and professional location. If there is a need UNRWA will distribute and collect hands-out of the questionnaire to frontline staff. The collected questionnaires will be compiled and merged with the online survey.

11. The questionnaire for the online survey alternatively hands-out is attached in Annex 3.
The evaluation also uses a semi-structured interviews with UNRWA’s field management and middle managers.

The five evaluation criteria are well understood and in line with OECD’s Quality Standards for Evaluation and the UNEG Norms and Standards. Similarly, the Theory of Change for the Security Risk Management Program provides the evaluation team with an overview of the intervention logic. It helps us understand underlying assumptions for successful and effective delivery of UNRWA services, from a security risk management perspective.

**Reflection on Evaluation Questions**

The evaluation questions were left unchanged. However, we have analysed the evaluation questions for each criteria from different perspectives, and translated our analysis into additional sub-questions. We believe that by breaking up the evaluation questions we are able to capture many more perspectives and consider both questions as a whole as well as the details of evaluation questions. We have deliberately chosen not to apply indicators or develop indicators since we do not believe it will make fairness to backward-reengineer a result matrix. Instead, we expect to be able to identify progress markers around explicit or implicit objectives that will help us measure changes or progress, but also inform us whether or not change at the individual, organizational and environmental level has taken place.

The attached evaluation matrix includes sub-questions for each evaluation question.

**Refined Evaluation Methodology**

The data collection will depend on interviews and focus groups meetings with UNRWA staff and external key stakeholders. Documentation is made available by UNRWA, and the documentation will be carefully reviewed in relation to the evaluation questions and associated sub-questions.

The first field visit to the headquarters in Amman and Jerusalem built on the initial introductory conversation with the members of the Steering Committee (SC), and the inception meeting on May 13. The members of the SC provided critical feedback on the discussion paper – our approach – by evaluation team. SC members also provided critical feedback on the first version of the inception report, which this updated version aims to reflect. The elaboration and contextualization of the evaluation questions helped us frame our understanding of the evaluation questions, and thus draft the sub-questions.

These sub-questions are not interview guide questions but guidance for our analysis of collected data. It will continuously remind us of what information we need to seek and which perspectives we need to consider in order to answer the evaluation questions.

As outlined in our discussion paper our approach to this assignment, Security Risk Management Program Evaluation, builds on understanding the four pillars to UNRWA Security Management Framework:

- Safety & Security Policy
- Framework of Accountability
- Security Information Management System
- Security Risk Management

Each pillar is an operationalization of UNRWA’s strategy, structure, systems, processes, competencies, capabilities and capacities contributing to the mitigation of risk and to a culture of security, thus leading to an improved environment which allows UNRWA services to be delivered effectively. Consequently, it is important for us to deepen our understanding of the SRM program,
As pointed out at the inception meeting it is also important that this evaluation reflects on UNRWA as a whole and seeks understanding about what needs to be done from an organizational perspective to enhance, integrate and embed security risk management with the organizational business processes. It also raises the importance to reflect on the organizational responsibility and ownership for ensuring that these processes are relevant and effective from a security risk management perspective. In particular, the evaluation needs to explore barriers and drivers for mainstreaming security into programming. This takes us to the importance of identifying an appropriate level of analysis of the SRM programme to ensure the study provides relevant recommendations to the users of this report.

21. Our approach to data collection rests largely on speaking, listening and learning from UNRWA international staff, international complementary personnel and UNRWA locally recruited personnel (UNRWA Area staff and area complementary personnel). We are interested in listening, learning and understanding whether security advisers have provided the technical security inputs and advice which allow UNRWA managers at all levels to make informed decisions for managing security risks.

22. Our approach will not allow us to go into the details of assessing the quality of procedures, or templates but it will seek to understand how well the current system and structure match the expectations and needs among people working for UNRWA. We recognise the importance of interviewing people not only from the five different fields of operations but also from the different streams of service delivery. Given that there are nineteen camps in the West Bank, eight camps in Gaza, nine camps in Syria, twelve camps in Lebanon, and ten camps in Jordan, the evaluation team recognizes the importance to strike a balance between efficiency and credibility to establish reliable findings, conclusions and recommendations. We acknowledge local differences at the field operation level and should be able to state with confidence and credibility our views and opinions about the SRM programme for each field operation. We should also be able to aggregate any commonalities and trends to an overall UNRWA level, but we do not think that we can or should go into a more detailed analysis leading to conclusions and recommendations at the area or camp level for each Field. At these levels we validate and verify information, as well as enrich the evaluation with inspiring ideas and solutions to daily problems facing the frontline staff.

23. The composition of interviewees and focus groups at the area and camp level is important to make best use of the available time to the evaluation team. It has proved very useful to listen to the Chief Area Officers and the Camp Service Officers. These are important sources of information at the community level and we would therefore make sure that sufficient time (at least an hour) is allocated to these conversations. Similarly, chiefs of field operations (education, health and relief and social services) provide important reflections on their workplaces and the communities, which they serve. It would be useful to take advantage of meetings with the programme chiefs to visit the installations (health, education and relief and social services) in order to understand where they are located and get a sense of their quality. As part of the time available to meet with these chiefs we suggest a walk and talk approach, i.e. the local supervisors guide the evaluation team around the installation while we have the chance to ask questions. It should preferably be rather small groups. After the tour we would spend 20-30 minutes to discuss the SRM program. Similarly, it could be useful to have more interactive conversations with the guards at the field office and installations. The walk and talk approach could allow us a 20-30 minutes’ conversation.

24. The conversations so far with the Refugee Service Committees have proved to be difficult. The topics discussed cover often issues well beyond the SRM areas of interest and it is difficult to intervene and interfere without being perceived as ‘steering’ the conversation to too great an extent. The Refugee Service Committees are important in the communities and relevant source of information. We must either brief them more lengthily about the purpose of the conversation, or allow us to meet with just one Popular Services Committee meeting per field operation. We recognize that RCSs are an important component to UNRWA’s acceptance approach and can
provide the evaluation team with valuable information about community safety and security.

25. We will choose the refugee camps according to the following criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp #1</th>
<th>Camp #2</th>
<th>Camp #3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low number of incidents as derived from SIMS</td>
<td>Medium number of incidents as derived from SIMS</td>
<td>High number of reported incidents as derived from SIMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive cooperation with Refugee Service Committee according to Chief Area Officer and Camp Service Officer</td>
<td>Medium cooperation with Refugee Service Committee according to Chief Area Officer and Camp Service Officer</td>
<td>Limited cooperation with Refugee Service Committee according to Chief Area Officer and Camp Service Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High protection according to Operations Support Officer reports</td>
<td>Medium protection according to Operations Support Officer reports</td>
<td>Low protection according to Operations Support Officer reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low number of resident refugees</td>
<td>Medium number of resident refugees</td>
<td>High number of resident refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low number of installations</td>
<td>Medium number of installations</td>
<td>High number of installations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low number of frontline UNRWA staff</td>
<td>Medium number of frontline UNRWA staff</td>
<td>High number of frontline UNRWA staff</td>
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</table>

Table D1: Criteria for field visit/refugee camps selection

26. The first field study identified a pattern among the frontline staff as well as with operational field staff. Many people describe similar threats and risks, and an immediate response to these threats and risks is often the need for protection. However, the acceptance approach is a capstone for UNRWA SRM system and is often taken for granted as long as UNRWA can guarantee service provision. As we know, the provisions fluctuate in terms of quantity and quality depending on a number of factors, e.g. financial austerity or conflict in the region, etc. Additionally, there is the regular day-to-day situation with people that, like in any society, may cause social frictions. Regardless of these factors, the analysis of acceptance approach raises different types of questions. We want to understand what the concerns are at a deeper level, who is causing these concerns? What drives a particular person to assault or harass UNRWA staff? In what way does a person assault or harass UNRWA staff? Is there a constant atmosphere of fear and tension? How does living in such an environment impact UNRWA staff? How many incidents occur? How many are persons take part in assaults? Are these people willing to work with UNRWA staff on changing their attitudes and behaviour towards UNRWA staff and UNRWA as a whole? We are essentially trying to understand the underlying causes and identify the symptoms expressed through frustration, aggression, and violence. Frontline staff provide us a picture of their lives and how they manage to deal with these issues. Similarly, the Chief Area Officer, Camp Service Officer and programme officers help us understand how there is, at some level, a more structured approach to deal with these issues as opposed to individual abilities to do so.

27. The first draft of the Inception Report the Resident Coordinator (RC) and Host Governments (HG) were identified as key informants. It was pointed out in the inception meeting that these actors would have limited inputs on the key issues of this evaluation. The evaluation team agrees with this feedback and have therefore taken them out of the suggested interview list.

28. At the field operation level, we have found it useful to speak with field directors and their deputies. It is a conversation that must be allocated sufficient time (60 minutes). Similarly, the field security officer is very important for us to listen and learn from, as this function acts as an intermediary between headquarters and the field. These conversations also need to be allocated sufficient time (60 minutes). We also found very useful to speak with the legal, protection and gender units, and would therefore like to emphasise the inclusion of these units.

29. The evaluation matrix illustrates and suggests who will be interviewed and attend the focus groups discussions, and the work plan indicates the approximate time spent in each regional office.

30. In the case of Syria, videoconference meetings will be arranged for the key staff at the Syria
field office and the evaluation team.

31. Our approach is collaborative. We believe our findings and recommendations are made more relevant and useful when our partners are part of the working process. We welcome a process-oriented approach when we work in collaboration with SDD and welcome the Evaluation Division’s guidance in regards to the underlying expectations, needs and interests of this evaluation.

32. While doing this evaluation our analysis also needs to reflect what functions properly in other locations. Thus, we are interested in learning and understanding how other organizations like the Red Crescent implement its Security Risk Management Framework. It will allow us to consider and identify potential gaps and weaknesses in relation to other lessons learned by other organisations.

33. Human rights and gender perspective will be considered both with regard to data sources and methodology of analysis. It is important for the assignment to ensure a broad representation of gender and age. It will be considered when analysing the data to ensure we understand who states what. References will, to the greatest extent possible, be made about differences between gender and other relevant sub-groups. The assignment will pay close attention to any form of discrimination against gender, age, political, religion. Any forms of violation will also be documented and reported.

34. Data collection tools to be used are (e.g. survey instruments, interview guides) and techniques including mixed methods capable of triangulation and preferably inclusive of qualitative and quantitative data, disaggregated data (including by gender, profession and geographical location). Please refer to Appendix 3.

35. Our process for analysis of data is highly reflective and collaborative, and organized in accordance with the OECD’s Quality Standards for Evaluation and the UNEG Norms and Standards. Draft are circulated internally within the evaluation team to incorporate viewpoints from different team members.
### Annex 6 – Work Plan

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicklas Svensson</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HQ Amman &amp; Field visit to Jordan; Field visit to West Bank</td>
<td>Finalizing inception report</td>
<td>Field visit to Lebanon (vидеоконференція з особами в Сирії)</td>
<td>Field visit to Gaza, also West Bank</td>
<td>Compilation of data, start drafting report</td>
<td>Reflection, internal circulation of draft, and drafting period</td>
<td>Submission of first draft to the Evaluation Division</td>
<td>Stakeholders to provide comments on the draft report</td>
<td>Holiday</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jonathan Crawford</td>
<td>Security Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hanna Nakhleh</td>
<td>Community Engagement Specialist</td>
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*Table E1: Work Plan of the Evaluation*
annex 7 – survey questionnaire

36. The interviews and available documentation were supplemented by a survey questionnaire – UNRWA Safety and Security Survey – which was distributed to all UNRWA staff in the five field operations of operation to be filled out between July 7-16, 2015. 1698 respondents of 2014 completed the survey, while 316 partially completed the survey. 64 per cent of the respondents were men and 36% were women. 24 per cent of the respondents work in Gaza, 22 per cent in Jordan, 20 per cent in Lebanon, 11 per cent in Syria and 23 per cent in the West Bank. 81 per cent of all respondents were area staff. 65 per cent were managerial and 35 per cent were non-managerial. 50 per cent represented the area office and camps/installations. 80 per cent of the respondents live outside the camp from where they work. The survey questionnaire enabled the evaluation team to validate and verify anecdotal information.

37. Staff members taking the survey were asked to answer an open question on the three predominant threats they face on duty. Of the 2014 respondents, 900 completed the question and a random sample of 210 answers was studied. The proportions of the respondents by gender and location in the 210 answers sample were kept equal to the proportions observed over the 900 answers received.

38. The first eight survey questions focused on the profile of the respondent (gender, age, location, duty, position).
### Survey questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How often do you experience incidents?</td>
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<tr>
<td>In case of an incident or emergency do you know whom to call and report?</td>
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<tr>
<td>In reporting an incident, are you most likely to report by using:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have you reported an incident affecting you or other people during the time you have worked in UNRWA?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is it clear to you when you should report an incident?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you aware of SIMS – Security Information Management System?</td>
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<tr>
<td>After a critical incident, does UNRWA provide any stress management support to help the victims to recover?</td>
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<tr>
<td>If you have been involved personally in a safety or security incident did Safety and Security Division (SSD) contact you?</td>
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<tr>
<td>(If yes in Q16) How well did UNRWA assist you after an incident to deal with the police and local authorities?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you familiar with any UNRWA contingency plan for yours and your colleagues’ safety &amp; security?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent do you consider UNRWA systems and procedures suitable to respond to an emergency?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How confident do you personally feel in UNRWA’s ability to provide a swift and adequate response to assist you in case of an emergency?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is your personal level of confidence on how UNRWA is making decisions about safety and security?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you familiar with any instructions or guidelines for your safety and security in case of emergency?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you familiar with any standard operating procedures for safety and security (SOPs)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you feel prepared to comply with UNRWA’s safety and security measures in case of an emergency?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you know what are your safety and security responsibilities in case of emergency?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>During your time in UNRWA, have you attended any of the following safety and security training?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Which of the training(s) you attended did you find useful?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you know who is responsible for safety and security in your operational area?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you feel pressured by UNRWA to carry on with your work in case of emergency and violent conflict?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you think women have equal opportunities to work in a safe and secure environment?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are there any specific threats towards women in your duty station?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you familiar with the Safety and Security Division in your field office?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you familiar with UNRWA’s operation room in your field office?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the three biggest security threats (anything that can harm you) that you face, working for UNRWA?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Tab F1: Survey questions
Evaluation of the security risk management programme

Annex 8 – Survey on security at UNRWA – q 34 –

The three most salient threats faced by staff

Threats for UNRWA staff in general

39. Staff members taking the survey were asked to answer an open question on the three predominant threats they face on duty. Of the 2014 respondents, 900 completed the question and we studied a random sample of 210 answers. The proportions of the respondents by gender and location in the 210 answers sample were kept equal to the proportions observed over the 900 answers received.

40. Threats identified varied significantly with respondents’ duty station but one security concern that staff broadly shared across countries arose from direct interactions with the beneficiaries themselves. Reports of threats, assault, harassment and unrest in camps or workplace (i.e. schools, clinics, other UNRWA installations) were the most frequently mentioned threats across all UNRWA locations. Beneficiaries appeared to threaten staff for additional services or when services and supplies availability decreased. In a similar manner, staff reported to be vulnerable to unpredictable physical assaults and verbal harassment in the camps. Unrest was another major threat that UNRWA staff faced while working with beneficiaries. Yet those four threats being the more widely shared are not necessarily the more prevalent in each location specifically.

41. In Jordan, respondents were indeed concerned about threats and assaults but also pointed out that their workplace were unsecure, with too little control at the entrance, unclear emergency exits and plans. Jordan staff also appeared to be particularly concerned with job security within the UNRWA system.

42. In Gaza, the main issue identified was conflict-related security threats (a concern shared mainly with Syria and Lebanon). Unrest similarly ranked among the highly reported threats. Harassment also appeared to be more prevalent there than in other locations.

43. In Lebanon, conflict and armed groups were emphasized as a major threat, often to level similar to those experienced in Gaza. Many reports related great vulnerability against explosions and attacks on UNRWA buildings. Moreover, according to the responses, assaults and harassment on UNRWA staff also appeared to be a more frequent and widespread matter in Lebanon than in any other countries.

44. In Syria, kidnapping came by far on top of the threats by staff working there. It is also noticeable that it is not a threat shared with any other country. Quite unsurprisingly, Syria staff gave the most reports of their primary threat coming from the raging conflict, armed groups, terrorism and explosions.

45. In the West Bank, location specific threats were connected to Israeli checkpoints and to the behaviour of the Israeli army. It appears that the Israeli army denies the principle of neutrality endorsed by UNRWA neutrality in their interaction with staff and act accordingly. Similarly, unique to the West Bank, staff reported assaults carried by Israeli Settlers. Assaults from beneficiaries also appeared to be widespread with respondents from the West Bank mentioning it the more frequently after Lebanon staff.

46. The above summary of answers only takes into account the most distinguishable trends. However, less frequent threats of theft, traffic risks and lack of security-related communications were also mentioned. In conflict areas transportation/movement was declared to be dangerous too. Similarly, in unrest and conflict areas the lack of UN recognition (i.e. failure to recognize its neutrality and pacific nature) on the part of fighting parties as well as of the local population was perceived as a factor of vulnerability.
Table 1: Threats per Field of Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of operation</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>West bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary threat identified</td>
<td>Conflict (explosions, armed groups, terrorism, unrest)</td>
<td>Assault and threats from beneficiaries</td>
<td>Conflict (explosions, armed groups, terrorism)</td>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>Israeli presence (checkpoint, army, settlers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary threat identified</td>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>Unsecure workplace</td>
<td>Assault and threats from beneficiaries</td>
<td>Conflict (explosions, armed groups, terrorism)</td>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field of operation that reported the most of a particular type of threat. Eg. Gaza reported the most issues</td>
<td>Unrest (Pre-eminence in conflict issues)</td>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>Assaults and threats from beneficiaries</td>
<td>Kidnapping;</td>
<td>Israeli presence</td>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
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