final evaluation of project pq12b21, improvement of living conditions of vulnerable palestine refugees in jerash camp

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executive summary

a. Shelter projects are a prime need for vulnerable refugees living in Jerash Camp. These refugees who fled to Gaza in 1948 and from Gaza in the war of 1967 do not enjoy the same rights as other Palestine refugees in Jordan, especially in terms of access to higher education and health care, and the right to work in certain professions in Jordan.

b. This Project for the "Improvement of Living conditions of vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Jerash Camp" continued a previous effort by the EU to reconstruct the shelters of the neediest households in Jerash Camp. It aimed to rebuild or repair and expand 80 shelters, introduce solar heating and pilot a rainwater harvesting system to reduce the cost of utilities, and develop a plan for camp improvement. All of these targeted efforts were well considered as areas of need, and advanced the achievements of UNRWA in meeting its strategic aims and mandate.¹

c. Funded at the end of 2012 and finished by mid-2016, this Project mostly met intended outcomes, and refurbished or rebuilt 80 shelters, tested solar water heaters and identified the limitations of rainwater harvesting, generated some employment for camp residents working in construction, and completed an intensive participatory process to design a Camp Urban Improvement Plan.

d. Beneficiaries of shelters said their new homes were a great improvement over the former conditions in which they lived. However, there are questions about the coherence and transparency of the selection process, which aimed to select the most "vulnerable" refugees with major shelter needs but without the resources to address them.² There were multiple processes and prioritized lists for ranking needs, but no clarity as to how beneficiaries were chosen or who is next in line when more funds are available.

e. There were also problems with quality assurance in the construction process that led to many of the same defects that were seen in the previous shelter project. Moreover, contractor bids were estimated to be at least 50 percent higher than market rates, reducing the amount of funds available for shelter construction. The construction schedule was lengthy and variable and documentation on that process and the monitoring and correction of defects by engineers was lacking. As a result, many defects were not discovered and corrected within the defects liability period.

f. While the Project aimed to use self-help in construction to more actively engage residents in the renovation of their homes, that framework needs to be redrafted to mitigate the risks with incentives and make optimal use of available skills. Only two beneficiaries accepted to do some painting and tiling themselves, although many camp residents could conduct such simple finishing work. Problems in obtaining supplies and receiving payment seem to have posed a deterrent effect. Contractors were asked to use 15 percent of Camp residents as their workforce, and most qualified builders learn on the job in projects such as these. A fair number of men in the Camp have construction skills that could be used in

² "Vulnerable" in this project refers to a ranking of abject or absolute poverty.
shelter renovation and other efforts, but that has not yet been organized in a way to maximize their employment or increase their skills for future livelihood opportunities.

g. In general, Project documentation and reporting were not organized in an accessible way and important information about the selection process and construction challenges were not documented. The design methodology and construction process need correction to assure maximum value for the investment made.

h. Elements of the projects were cut to save money, and the last six shelters were only repaired despite the aim of the project of helping with major reconstruction for the poorest families. At the end of the project, 40,000 euros was left over, but was returned to the donor because no proposal could be made in a timely way to use it. Had it not been for excessive contractor costs and the inadequate planning and documentation of the process, there would have been more than enough money for a quality construction project, with a livelihoods component that would have reduced vulnerability. Reducing vulnerability was not an expressed aim of the project, but it should have been.

i. A study conducted as to the feasibility of rainwater harvesting demonstrated that it was not viable at the household or even at the institutional level. Solar heating units for hot water were given to beneficiaries, but were too valuable for refugees to keep. Most of them were sold.

j. The Camp Urban Improvement Plan (UIP) involved the participation of hundreds of camp residents through an extensive number of focus groups that also included often marginalized people and the disabled. This comprehensive process outlined strategic objectives and activities within an organizational structure for the integrated and holistic improvement of the built environment, and identified prioritized recommendations to serve the greatest common good and attract funding.

k. The existence of a Camp Urban Improvement Plan enabled the Camp to qualify for funding from German donors for community infrastructure projects to upgrade the roads and manage storm water run-off, build a bus station as a node of public activity, pave and cover the market area, and relocate current garbage collection points as part of a major new solid waste disposal project.

l. The selection of shelters for this evaluation serves as an indicator of issues for further examination to determine scope and cause. When large assets – shelters -- are being conferred every assurance must be made to develop a justified list of beneficiaries and adhere to it. If the selection process is not transparent and thought to be based on connections, or too much is paid for shelters, it undermines confidence in UNRWA management. For future shelter projects, the list of needy should be revised, along with a shelter assessment with clear prioritization and no confusion or surprises.

m. This project aimed to give more than shelters and infrastructure, by offering the opportunity to work, develop skills, earn some income, and take pride in contributing to the construction of one's home. In piecing together beneficiary and contractor accounts, as well
as observations from Project staff, there is the nagging realization that beneficiary participation was less than optimal in the shelter project.

n. There are several issues that require further analysis, such as the livelihoods profile of Camp residents, improving their skills base, and options for livelihood within the Camp. When asked about their priority needs, Jerash Camp residents replied “shelters”. However, if Camp residents have income they can afford to upgrade their own shelters.

o. There are many ways UNRWA staff can maximize the input of residents to transform their camp to meet evolving needs. The UIP helped to lay the foundation for more promising efforts that should be maximized in the coming years, and more shelter projects are planned. However, the tendency seen in this Project to try to save money, to look for ways to cut planned staff positions and elements mid-project, and to rely on a reduced number of expert managers, affected the quality of the outcome, leading to waste. More efficient contracting, the use of skilled Camplabour, and proper planning and oversight for quality workmanship from the outset will be more cost effective, with improved results.

findings and recommendations:

finding 1

The selection process for shelters should have included the most vulnerable refugees, but it was not transparent, and was compromised and confusing.

recommendation 1.a

The Shelters’ List needs to be verified, revised, and updated, scrubbed of inaccurate data, with a revised shelter assessment by an independent Consultant Engineer.

recommendation 1.b

It should be used by the next shelter project as the priority list, not compromised by personal input from staff and notables, or confused by the introduction of alternative lists midway through the process. Selections should be justified in a file that is clearly marked.

finding 2

For the overall Camp Urban Improvement Plan, more clarity is needed on use of Camp space.

recommendation 2

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3 SDC plans to construct shelters for 100 disabled persons. UNRWA hopes to have another project for 108 shelters.
UNRWA should undertake a fresh survey of empty lots, collapsed or condemned shelters, abandoned shelters, shelters being rented out and for sale, and update the list of Shelters and other buildings in need of repairs and renovation in a more strategic manner.

finding 3

This Project could have reduced vulnerability – poverty -- by emphasizing the role of camp workers.

recommendation 3.a

UNRWA should use shelter projects to apprentice Camp residents in quality construction techniques to qualify them for further work.

recommendation 3.b

Likewise, many shelters just need upgrades that residents can do on their own or with the help of Camp labour, if a small fund is made available for supplies.

finding 4

Some dissatisfaction stemmed from design and quality control issues that beneficiaries did not challenge.

recommendation 4.a

Acceptance of the design of the shelter should be a consultative process and not coerced under threat of exclusion.

recommendation 4.b

Contracts should be conveyed in terms beneficiaries can understand.

recommendation 4.c

A formal grievance procedure is needed to allow for proper complaints and redress for all stages of the process.

finding 5

Contractor costs were more than 50 percent above market rates and low quality work coupled with costly supplies lead to poor value for money.

recommendation 5.a

The quality of work could be improved if the selection of contractors were based on a submission of both technical and financial proposals.

recommendation 5.b
The selection of contractors based on the lowest price is not necessarily the most cost-effective approach.

*recommendation 5.c*

Bids should be for groups of shelters in the same vicinity.

*finding 6*

UNRWA's desire to have uniform rules for shelters in all their fields does not serve the best needs of the beneficiaries, leading to dissatisfaction.

*recommendation 6*

The Guidelines should be seen as a guide that indicates practice in the field, to serve the aim of satisfying the needs of the beneficiary. Appropriate interventions should be adapted to the particular needs of the setting, which can vary between camps.

*finding 7*

There was inadequate professional input and oversight of construction.

*recommendation 7.a*

During construction, there should be one Site Engineer per ten shelters built.

*recommendation 7.b*

At least one Site Engineer should have been available in the defects liability period to assure faults were repaired.

*recommendation 7.c*

In order to take control of the construction process, UNRWA needs to implement a more efficient process of oversight, including JFO Management monitoring of the Project Team.

*finding 8*

The extent of contractor overcharging and lack of quality work suggests a more systemic problem within UNRWA management.

*recommendation 8.a*

A construction audit is needed to examine the cost differentials discovered by the Evaluation Engineer and devise a more efficient use of scarce resources.

*recommendation 8.b*
The UNRWA Procurement and Logistics Office suggested the use of a Consultant Engineer to assess tenders. The Procurement process should assure that costs in the tenders match the price-for-quality of those of a validated independent supplier or not accept the bids.

finding 9

Alternative frameworks exist for conducting more cost-efficient and quality construction projects.

recommendation 9.a

An examination should be made of the DPA shelter construction process, as well as self-help efforts (many built onto the core DPA one-room shelter) to assess how their tendering and construction process leads to lower costs.

recommendation 9.b

Assess how residents manage to fund the expansion of their shelter.

finding 10

Many shelters need repair, which could be done at a lower cost through the self-help of owner upgrades.

recommendation 10.a

Self-help should be redefined to indicate real construction by Camp residents (not only finishing), done at lower cost, with UNRWA oversight.

recommendation 10.b

Social workers can advise shelter owners on how to clean and maintain their homes, and provide light and ventilation to assure maintenance.

finding 11

UNRWA tries to cut costs, but in the process cuts effectiveness, efficiency and quality, with the ultimate cost to the detriment of UNRWA’s reputation. Ad-hoc cutting of proposed staff altered the Project scope, reduced the potential use of Camp residents in the construction process, and resulted in fewer vulnerable households receiving a new shelter.

recommendation 11.a

Savings can be made through more controls on the contracting process.

recommendation 11.a

More efficient consultations on the coherence of the Project.

finding 12
Poor documentation, inadequate communication, and lack of institutional memory for improved shelter projects means the same mistakes are likely to recur unless concerted action is taken by UNRWA management.

**recommendation 12.a**

In line with the objectives in its Strategic Plans, UNRWA Management should undertake a functional review to assess where current systems are failing to provide adequate checks and oversight on the contracting, design, and construction process, and devise remedies.

**recommendation 12.a**

Better documentation and reporting procedures are needed to assure projects can be tracked and evaluated for optimal results.
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**abbreviations and acronyms**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOQ</td>
<td>Bill of Quantity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDO</td>
<td>Camp Development Officer</td>
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<td>CFICIP</td>
<td>Chief, Field Infrastructure &amp; Camp Improvement Programme</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Camp Improvement Committee</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Camp Improvement Plan</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Camp Services Committee</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Camp Services Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Palestinian Affairs</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FECSO</td>
<td>Field Engineering and Construction Services Officer</td>
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<td>FRSO</td>
<td>Field Relief Services Officer</td>
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<td>GiZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICIP</td>
<td>Infrastructure Development and Camp Improvement Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFO</td>
<td>UNRWA Jordan Field Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHS</td>
<td>Rainwater Harvesting System</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinians</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIP</td>
<td>Urban Improvement Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Water closet/bathroom</td>
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<td>WPC</td>
<td>Women's Programme Center</td>
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**background and rationale for the evaluation**

1. Of the approximately five million refugees registered with UNRWA, the largest number -- nearly two million -- reside in Jordan.

2. This evaluation aims to assess an intervention by UNRWA that focused on improving shelters for the most vulnerable residents of Jerash Camp. "Gaza Camp" in Jerash houses 1948 refugees displaced from Gaza in 1967. It was established as an emergency Camp in 1968 to accommodate 11,500 refugees who fled to Gaza in 1948 and then were displaced from Gaza in 1967, as well as Gaza residents who were displaced for the first time by war in 1967. Currently there are 26,785 refugees in Jerash Camp registered with UNRWA, with about 14,000 of them living within the official borders of the Camp.

3. This EU-funded Project used needs-based criteria to identify 80 of the most vulnerable households whose shelters needed to be upgraded or rebuilt. It was designed to address the multiple needs of a human settlement, including solar energy to heat water, rainwater harvesting, short-term livelihoods in the construction phase, and self-help construction to add the improvements favored by the household, allow them to participate, and to save money.

4. There was also an Urban Improvement Plan to address community infrastructure needs, which used participatory consultations to develop community priorities and identify future projects for the improvement of core Camp facilities, including roads and solid waste management.

5. Although UNRWA does not have a definition of vulnerability, it does rank refugees in terms of poverty. Vulnerability can stem from limited education, lack of marketable skills, illness, physical disability, age, and other factors. Some vulnerability can be mitigated or removed with appropriate interventions. In the case of this shelter project, vulnerability was also linked to living conditions and the quality of the shelter, which serves as the base for family life.

6. Towards that end, this evaluation seeks to:
   - conduct an overall independent assessment of Project performance, paying particular attention to the management, cost effectiveness, and results of the Project.
   - assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the self-help component and the aim to employ Camp contractors and residents in shelter rehabilitation work to enhance livelihoods.
   - determine the reasons for the observed performance and results, and draw lessons for future design and implementation of similar projects.
methodology

7. The evaluation team reviewed Project documents as well as documentation from the previous EU shelter project, 2007-2011. The aim was to assess the selection process, the construction process and quality, and the participatory nature and validation of the priorities of the Urban Improvement Plan.4

8. The Engineer on the Evaluation Team served as the Design, Construction and Cost Specialist and focused on UNRWA ICIP policy, guidelines, procedures, relevant technical instructions, shelter designs, tenders, contracts, and other key reference documents. He reviewed and analyzed design and cost estimates of various shelter reconstruction and rehabilitation work, and made a comparison of unit costs based on the design of construction/rehabilitation and alternative approaches to determine the value for money.

9. The Urban Planner conducted a Camp Walk to observe the topology and use of urban space. She also visited the market, schools, clinic, club, some shelters, garbage collection areas, and the proposed alternative sites for the bus stop. She met with those involved in the UIP participatory process and visited Camp facilities to assess the projects proposed (and now funded), met with the Leuven intern who had participated in the design process, the former Camp Development Committee head, and attended key informant meetings with various individuals and focus groups along with the Team Leader.

10. Although the Team only had four days in Jerash Camp, they saw more than half of the eighty shelters, conducted interviews with key stakeholders, spoke with focus groups who were beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, met with various Camp committees and with participants in the Urban Improvement Plan Focus Groups, and walked through the Camp facilities provided by UNRWA, including the schools, clinic, Women’s Center, Rehabilitation Center, Youth Center, as well as the market, the garbage collection areas, and the boundaries of the Camp.

11. This enabled the team to examine all the issues raised for the Camp Improvement Plan, compare shelters that received assistance from UNRWA versus other interventions, and see the challenges posed to providing solar energy and rainwater harvesting.

challenges and limitations

12. As the Project Team had been disbanded, the Evaluation Team was told they were not available. However, after some insistence, the Team met with the former Project Manager and received some additional answers via email. The Team Leader met with the former head of Camp Improvement Programme, Khattab Boshnak, and sent emails to gain more information about the shelter selection process. The Team Leader and Urban Planner

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4 See Documents in the Appendices for full list of documents consulted, including the project agreement, progress and financial reports, Mid-Term Review, UNRWA Mid-Term Strategy 2010-2015, Jordan Field Office 2014-15 Field Implementation Plan, UNRWA Mid-Term Strategy 2016-2021 and Jordan Field Office Strategic Plan 2016-2021.
spoke by Skype with the Urban Development Planner Dina Dabbash and sent further questions by email.  

13. Following UNRWA’s proposal, the Engineer visited 15 shelters to study deviations from the plans, learn about the design and construction process, and observe the benefits and quality defects in the system. In the process, he identified a representative number of issues for UNRWA to examine further. The Project had suggested making a random selection of shelters, but an informed selection process is better, to assure coverage of different sectors and shelter types. However, when a limited number of shelters are inspected, Agency staff tend to challenge findings, suggesting that they were isolated occurrences and not representative. The fact that so many defects were found repeatedly in a relatively small sample suggests the problems are not uncommon.

14. The Team Leader included in the field methodology visits to another 28 shelters to observe all the six categories of construction and all four sectors of the Camp to become familiar with Camp layout and lifestyles, and visited a few shelters belonging to non-beneficiaries. The original aim was to cover all 80 shelters constructed by UNRWA, shelters built by other agencies for comparison of design and quality, and refugee households named at the top of the Shelters List who had not been chosen for the Project (as questions arose about the selection process). However, that would have entailed another two or three days in the Camp.

15. Therefore, UNRWA architect Noor Tom, upon the request of the Team Leader, made visits to shelters built by the DPA (with Italian funds) and al Orwa al Wothqa (NGO with Saudi funds) for comparison.

**project implementation**

**shelters**

16. This construction Project significantly improved the living conditions of the beneficiaries with a massive difference between the shelter condition before and afterwards, as beneficiaries attested. However, the average quality level for all shelters is not in alignment with the money spent. The selection process raises issues of relevance as to whether the neediest were included. The poor use of Project and construction management and supervision tools by the Project team resulted in design issues, and low-quality finishing work in some cases.

**selection process**

17. Since the shelter Project was meant to assist the most vulnerable, the selection of beneficiaries was based on a combination of poverty ranking and severity of the housing condition. The poorest family may not have the means to improve their shelter but neither may they have the greatest shelter needs, which is why a ranked list exists—to balance shelter quality and means.

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5 An email sent to the Social Worker Lina Algahwi went unanswered  
6 Although UNRWA has no definition of vulnerable, it seems that the term means “poor”.
18. UNRWA’s Shelter list gives names and poverty ranking under the Social Safety Net (SSN) of Abject Poor levels and Absolute Poor levels, personal details such as age and gender, and the shelter assessment, which is not a ranking of need but an indication of the recommended repairs. However, amongst the top hundred names on the list, one finds at least fifty names of people listed as abject poor who need for their shelter to be reconstructed. As this Project aimed to target the most vulnerable, it appears the chosen beneficiaries should have come from that Shelters List.

19. The shelter needs are not defined by categories of urgency: safety (structural defects risking collapse), health (asbestos, damp and mold), and crowding. Engineer assessments vary and there are a variety of shelter lists, the original one listing a dozen shelters with the damage assessment of “Severe, collapsing” or “Collapsed”. The collapsed building would have been evacuated and therefore rejected by the Project as abandoned, although the owner presumably would be living in it had it been reconstructed. Indeed, as Project staff tried to explain how and why the 80 beneficiaries were chosen, three different lists and a committee method were mentioned. None of them, however, clarifies the process.

20. Therefore, there is a degree of subjectivity over whom to assist first, which leads to a lack of transparency in the selection process. The first 40 shelter beneficiaries were revealed in October 2013. They scored “Shelters’ Final List” has 456 names, but fourteen of them were already housed in DPA shelters, six were housed by the 2007 EU shelter project, and several on the list are in applicants sharing the same shelter.

21. Forty-three of the eighty families chosen for a new shelter were not amongst the 456 names of the Shelters’ List at all. It seems that list—compiled on poverty ranking and shelter needs—was not considered as the best source of beneficiary selection, although no one challenged its veracity or general accuracy. When Project staff were asked how the beneficiaries were selected, the reply given by the former head of Camp Improvement said the Shelters’ List was only a point of departure for selection.

22. "The final list for the 80 or so shelters were chosen from the (i) verified November 2012 tabulated score from said list, (ii) additional applications by individual refugees in Jerash in person-to be verified, and (iii) recommendation of volunteers and local leaders to include candidate of shelter profile to ultimately be assessed by the professional

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7 Shelters’ Final List scoring, Nov. 19, 2012.
8 On the original shelter assessment lists, that indicates damage, these were described as “severe, collapsing.”
9 No mention was made of the List being discarded as inaccurate or outdated.
10 On one list they are ranked as priority 1 or 2.
11 And only one of those was included in the Project.
12 There were two shelters highlighted in red on the Shelters’ Final List as not being lived in due to damage. No explanation was given as to where they had found refuge. It should be verified.
13 Five of them ended up not receiving shelters.
14 Indeed, the first 40 beneficiaries had been selected early in the Project, before the other methods and lists were employed. Had the initial selection process been validated, no other methods would have been needed.
team. Finally, the chosen family of the final rehabilitated shelters of this Project is a shade of the “abject poor”.15

23. The last sentence seems to confirm the aim was to include the abject poor, but those names should have been on the Shelters’ List with need for a rebuilt shelter. The Shelters’ List needs to be verified, revised and updated, scrubbed of inaccurate and duplicate data, with a revised shelter assessment. The Evaluation team found no existence of a file submitted to UNRWA to justify the need and selection of those 43 beneficiaries who were not on the Shelters’ List, or a clear indication as to why the names at the top of the list in need of a new shelter were not chosen.

24. The Project Manager stated that the Shelters’ List was “revised” by the Site Engineer and Social Worker, who saw 350 shelters (beginning with the first 100 named on the Shelters’ List), and made weighted assessments based 75 percent on physical condition and 25 percent on social and economic factors.16 They also recommended shelters based on what they noticed as they walked around the Camp, took applications from residents, and recommendations from various camp leaders. They aimed to reach people not on the Shelters’ List, without demonstrating that those people were not most deserving.

25. Moreover, the Project list of improvements for the 80 shelters renovated does not necessarily correspond with the assessment needs on the Shelters’ List, perhaps indicating a further deterioration (or increase in need) since that list was adopted in November 2012.17

26. The final selection of shelter beneficiaries seems to have been made by a committee, who according to the Camp Improvement Officer, were: "community elders (mukhtar), volunteer elders (organizations), religious leaders, DPA representative, UNRWA camp officer representatives, and the Programme Office. This committee ranged from 7 members.18 The objective is to establish transparency throughout. The process included additional local community to insure fairness and expose "self dealing."

27. There were discussions, as some proposed beneficiaries had ties to members of the Committee. The vote was public, not written, so everyone present knew how the others voted.19 It seems that the Committee proffered names without reference to the UNRWA assessment of poverty and shelter condition. Camp residents had a two-week period to

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15 by email to Evaluation Team Leader 24 November from Boshnak Khattab.
16 Second Progress Report. Using the same survey form as before, supposedly. In the same report it is mentioned that the Social Worker did not have enough to do, and therefore was also given the role of the Social Mobilizer.
17 It is not clear when the case data was actually compiled or verified. The names highlighted in yellow were helped in the previous EU project so it seems this list could have been revalidated in 2007.
18 The number of Committee members was higher in other camps. Programme Office could mean Camp Improvement Programme or the Project office—it was not clear. Personal email to Evaluation Team Leader, Nov. 2016.
19 Perhaps a ballot would have been a more objective means of selection, if some feared having the public know how they voted.
challenge the beneficiaries chosen, although it was not clear how the names were made public. There were a couple of challenges that were dismissed.\textsuperscript{20}

28. It seems hard to demonstrate that all of those chosen were the neediest or most vulnerable. The last six were chosen because their shelters only needed structural repairs, which was not a need of the greatest urgency.\textsuperscript{21} At the time, the Project Manager thought they were short on funds, but that proved not to be the case.

29. According to the Guidelines for the construction of shelters, appeals on selection and prioritization should be made to a Camp committee composed of community representatives, RSSD staff, the Camp Services Officer, or Area Officer formed to follow up with the Project teams. Terms of Reference for this committee were to be developed in the Field on a project by project basis.\textsuperscript{22} By adopting an unauthorized system, the Project Manager and the Field Staff cast serious doubts on the coherence and objectivity of the selection process.

30. The Team encountered at least one beneficiary family who was not living in their renovated shelter, but renting it out, and three beneficiaries who were trying to sell their shelter. UNRWA should undertake a fresh survey of empty lots, collapsed/condemned shelters, abandoned shelters, shelters being rented out, and shelters for sale, and update the list of Shelters in need of repairs and renovation in a more strategic manner.

31. Construction of the 80 shelters enhanced the reputation of UNRWA and the EU donor despite the limited dissatisfaction expressed by some beneficiaries and other refugees in the Camp. A more transparent selection process and a construction process assuring quality work would enhance UNRWA’s credibility.

design

32. The design responded to the needs of the target beneficiaries to a great degree, but some of the rooms were built off of a central corridor instead of a common space or courtyard, and many rooms were deemed as too small.\textsuperscript{23} This style of shelter did not meet the needs of the beneficiaries and it was unfortunate to see recipients of new shelters unhappy with the result.

33. The design took into account special needs relating to gender and disability, but lacked safety measures to protect children.\textsuperscript{24} A ramp provided over the bathroom door frame was difficult to manoeuvre; the other door frames were still raised metal, but not difficult for a wheelchair to cross.\textsuperscript{25} Installation of a Western toilet was most helpful for both

\textsuperscript{20} After submission of the draft report, Architect Noor Tom suggested that later beneficiaries had been chosen after submitting a complaint about the selection process, and produced their letters.

\textsuperscript{21} The Evaluation Engineer said they needed more than simple repairs and the work done was of poor quality, perhaps rushed (such a gaps around a replaced window).

\textsuperscript{22} Guidelines (11.2) p. 18 “Where no Camp Improvement structures have been created”.

\textsuperscript{23} This came to be called “bunker-style” and was a disjointed string of rooms. A survey conducted by UNRWA after the first shelters were built confirmed the primary complaint of rooms being too small.

\textsuperscript{24} Some stairs have no railings, and roofs are accessible only by wooden or steel ladders instead of proper stairs. However, UNRWA did not state child safety as a concern.

\textsuperscript{25} Ramps tend to replace stairs for wheelchair access, not doorframes.
the disabled and elderly, but the bathroom should be wide enough to allow for a wheelchair to be placed next to the toilet. Instead, the bathroom was either narrow or the shower stall was placed next to the toilet. The raised edge of the shower stall inhibited access to the toilet and the shower stall. Gender rooms, intended to separate adolescent girls and boys, are used according to family needs for space, which change. If having them makes other rooms too small, they are not desired.

34. Shelter design commenced and was completed within the timeframe outlined in the work plan. However, the design process appears to have been developed in only two stages: the initial design and then finalization of the design following consultation with beneficiaries. This process does not indicate that a design review was carried out. In some cases the design was changed during the finalization stage, but without a second consultation with beneficiaries.

35. While this Project proved that UNRWA is capable of developing designs without the intervention of external design consultants, the process needs to be improved significantly in order to deliver a design of high quality that encompasses existing structural and safety issues, and satisfies needs.

36. A prime concern was addressing the structural integrity of the building, removing asbestos, along with replacing the zinc roof, and resolving issues of damp and mold.26

37. Not all beneficiary needs and preferences were met, in part due to miscommunication and the inability of beneficiaries to grasp what the result would look like, and in part due to a rigid imposition of the Guidelines. Beneficiaries did not understand that many of their rooms would be smaller.27 They felt compelled to sign off on the design, or lose the opportunity to obtain a renovated shelter.

38. A lengthy checklist of design issues to be addressed in future projects is in Annex 7.

construction

39. Eighty shelters were rehabilitated, according to the following classifications:

- Reconstruction of 1 room, kitchen & bathroom for 8 shelters
- Reconstruction of 1 room, kitchen & bathroom and 1 room repair for 5 shelters
- Reconstruction of 2 rooms, kitchen & bathroom, and 1 room repair for 13 shelters
- Reconstruction of 2 rooms, kitchen & bathroom for 29 shelters
- Reconstruction of 3 rooms, kitchen & bathroom for 19 shelters
- Major repair for 6 shelters

40. The activities and outcomes were consistent with the objective of improving the living conditions of refugees, but did not succeed with the piloting of rainwater

26 Unfortunately, the replacement was with sandwich panels that routinely leaked. Beneficiaries were told they only would last five years.
27 Urban Planner Dina Dabbash said that concrete walls cost more than asbestos ones, so of course they did not have the funds to replace rooms of the same size.
harvesting. Construction responded to the needs of the target group of beneficiaries significantly, despite the limited level of dissatisfaction reported by some beneficiaries primarily over design, ongoing damp, and faulty bathroom fixtures. Hazardous material such as asbestos was removed and substandard and unstable elements were addressed properly.

41. It appears that UNRWA site-based engineers managed to resolve some discrepancies between design and consultation outcomes with beneficiaries during construction, such as enlarging one room at the expense of a second or third room to meet the needs of that particular family. In doing so, they were meant to follow the shelter Guidelines adopted by UNRWA in 2011 to unify construction of shelters across all five of their Fields of operations.

42. In Jerash Camp, people preferred having a large central room to receive visitors, and smaller satellite rooms as bedrooms, kitchen and WC. According to the Guidelines, shelters were meant to follow these terms:

- For 1-2 persons, 1 room with kitchen and WC, total size 32.2 m²
- For 3-5 persons, 2 rooms with kitchen and WC, total size 46 m²
- For 6 or more persons, 3 rooms with kitchen and WC, total size 59.8 m²

43. Total space requirements were based on the following norms for room size: 14 m² for the first main room, 12 m² for secondary rooms, kitchen 9 m², and WC 5 m² (6 m² in 3-room shelters).

44. There was a 15 percent allowance for circulation/corridor space, which might be used to enlarge rooms. “Individual rooms’ sizes and the number of rooms may vary at the request of the beneficiary subject to staying within the total net area for the individual shelter.”

45. In the case of a combined intervention such as expansion and partial reconstruction, the shelter space could be divided in odd ways, with no main reception room. Some of those beneficiaries insisted on keeping their courtyard, and covered it with zinc to be able to use it as a reception area. However, UNRWA’s aim had been to replace the zinc roof, and the shelter owner had to pay to tile the courtyard. Moreover, the replacement material for zinc was sandwich board, which consistently leaked, and which contractors said would only last for five years. The insulation or sloping of the new roof was not executed in a manner that resolved most issues of damp.

46. The DPA builds one-room shelters of 30 square meters, plus kitchen and WC, with the expectation that shelter owners will expand the shelter as needed, often through self-

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28 Although the project budget indicates 25 shelters had RWH units at 70JOD apiece, the study carried out indicated that rainwater harvesting in the camp context proved unfeasible.
29 This seems to have been as much an effort to satisfy donor expectations as to meet beneficiary needs. Best practice in development favors flexibility in adapting to the specific needs of the setting.
30 Minimum size of the main room was 12 m², secondary room 9 m², kitchen 7 m², WC 3 m².
31 Guidelines, p.15.
help. That constructed space costs about 8000JOD and seemed to rectify issues of damp through a roof sloped towards gutters. While UNRWA aims for shelters large enough to meet family needs, it did include one-room reconstructions, at a higher cost and with more issues of quality workmanship. There are some lessons to be learned from the contracting and oversight process of the DPA, and how they encourage self-help.

47. The Guidelines say a rent subsidy of $100/month will be paid during construction on a need basis. The budget indicated 39,000 euros were paid out, in 6-month subsidies, without providing the list of recipients, and the Project Manager later confirmed that the subsidies were not paid. Shelter owners met by the Evaluation Team said they paid between 30 and 70JOD per month to relocate while their shelter was under construction. Delays, therefore, entailed multiple costs.

48. Many project and construction management tools did not appear to be used, such as a Project execution plan, a programme of work indicating and monitoring progress, QA/QC plan or test and inspection plans, construction-related risk register, health and safety plan, communication plan, minutes of meeting with contractors and beneficiaries during construction, cost control and management plan, and scope and change control plan.

49. The duration of construction appeared to be sufficient; however, some factors, such as a shortage of funds and weather conditions were not taken into consideration during the planning stage and affected the construction schedule. A delay of payments to self-help beneficiaries affected the timely completion of their work, and made people wary of participating in the plan.

50. The quality of a number of shelters visited indicated poor workmanship and inadequate construction supervision despite the considerable amount of money that contractors were paid. There would have been better outcomes if the Project and construction management methodology had been more efficient. UNRWA engineers' design showed what to be built; contractor shop drawings would have shown how to build, and included the demolition plan.

51. There were many issues with the quality of contractors that a technical proposal during the tendering process could have guarded against, such as the contractor not having an engineer, or the qualifications of his staff. If construction staff qualifications were part of

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32 UNRWA one-room construction with kitchen and WC costs on average 12,000JOD. The UNRWA Project Manager suggested the increased cost was because their units were built to expand to four floors. It is not known if DPA shelters have the same standard—or verified that UNRWA contractors actually build with that degree of reinforcement since few additional stories are built. In any event, it would not account for a 50 percent higher cost.

33 At least one DPA shelter owner is still paying off the debt of his shelter expansion. It would be useful to examine the costs and debt incurred by owners who expand their shelters.

34 12.12 note. As this project was meant to include the abject poor, they should have qualified.

35 The donor approved the change, but it is not clear why it was made. Many aspects of the project were cut—perhaps to reallocate elsewhere. The alternative use was not clear.

36 There may also have been delays due to the SDC water and sewer project that was connecting every shelter to the system.

37 For instance a soil test to assure the proper foundation was laid, to prevent cracks. See Annex
the criteria for selection at the outset, UNRWA could then be notified if key staff such as Project Manager, engineer(s) and foreman were changed. The contractor’s key staff is the first line of quality assurance, control, and oversight. UNRWA’s supervision team then needs to assure that the technical proposal was fulfilled, and report non-conformance to the contractor’s key staff.

52. Because the construction process ranged from three to nine months, there were not enough Site Engineers or they lacked an adequate checklist to assure quality work and prevent and correct defects. At least one site engineer should have been available during the 12-month defects liability period to facilitate maintenance. Many shelter defects went unrepai red, and the Evaluation Engineer expects to see those markedly deteriorate over the next few years.

cost

53. The Project budget met the needs of targeted beneficiaries by 92.5 percent, as the last six shelters on the list were only repaired— not the intended aim of meeting the greatest housing needs of the most vulnerable.

54. A review of a number of tendered prices and Bills of Quantities (BOQs) reveals that the average construction rate per square meter was JOD 380. The market rate per square meter for a similar visually-inspected quality and structural state of the shelters is JOD 200.

55. However, the nature and context of the Camp differ from the market outside the Camp. Some considerations are narrow roads, logistics, potential of material waste, shortage of skilled workforce, contractors’ disinclination to work in refugee Camps, etc. If a contingency of 20 percent is added to the market rate per square meter, the cost then becomes JOD 240. Hence, in comparison with the modified market rate, the Project average tendered rate is higher than the market rate by 58 percent.\(^{38}\) In addition, contractors said they did not have to pay taxes for the UN Project.\(^ {39}\) Cost and quality are linked, and based on the visual observation of the quality of work, the value for money invested was low.

56. Additional shelters could have been reconstructed if the cost, budget, and cash flow management and scope/change control had been implemented efficiently in alignment with the progress of works by the Project team. The tendering process resulted in bids too high to be substantiated and requires examination by an independent Consultant Engineer. The budget could have been managed in a more effective manner if a risk register had been established during or before the budget estimate stage to help identify potential risks and deliver mitigations at earlier stage.

57. Design and procurement also had an impact on increasing cost, such as with the issue of insulation and double-glazed windows. In the tender documents, under specifications, one article says “where materials are not described in the specifications or other contract document they shall be of the best quality available in the local market”. This

\(^{38}\) See in Appendix F the attached excel sheet of the comparison between Contractors’ quoted prices and market unit prices.

\(^ {39}\) UNRWA says this is only true for UNRWA-owned buildings, not for shelters, but perhaps the contractors still avoid the tax.
statement could encourage contractors to increase their prices, and should be stipulated to be in alignment with the budget constraints. It was not possible to assess the cost estimate level of efficiency due to the unavailability of the quantity surveyor who did the cost estimate and also the unavailability of the breakdown of quantities/BOQs and their budgeted cost.

58. The self-help approach was attempted in two cases, with the unit prices of the finishing work higher than the market unit price, but slightly lower than the unit prices quoted by the Contractors for the same finishing activities. The quality level of finishing work was equal to that of other shelters.40

self-help

59. Although the concept of self-help is common in shelter projects, and usually consists of giving the beneficiary the materials to construct his own shelter, the aim of self-help in this Project was limited to finishing works, usually painting and tiling.41

60. There are Camp residents who work in construction and some of them may have been chosen as beneficiaries, but none of the beneficiaries ended up constructing their own shelter.42 Five beneficiaries of this Project were meant to engage in self-help, but then did not. Two agreed to do what came to be known as semi-self-help—finishing work inside the house. In those cases, they did some of the work and hired others to help them.43

61. According to the Guidelines, the aim of self help is not to save money, but to let refugees be partners in the process instead of recipients. It defines use of self-help as “a system by which refugees on a voluntary basis...contribute directly or indirectly with skilled or unskilled labour, management, building materials or funds in the rehabilitation process”44 and differentiates two categories: Direct self-help, funded or contributed by the family, and Aided self-help, with contributions of money, materials, or labour from others. There was some idea that this could be “empowering”, but that was not the case. Most people paint, fix and upgrade their homes without the need for a project. If you need someone to pay you to do it, it indicates a higher level of dependence.

62. In general, UNRWA does structural work to ensure safety45 and self-help in this Project was intended for repairs and finishing.46 As self-help would affect the contracting process and alter the cost structure, (as contribution of materials, labour, or funds would affect the amount committed by the contractor) and require engineering oversight, an alternative modality would need to be developed.

63. Payment for materials was meant to be upon completion of a phase of work and submission of a technical report (presumably by an UNRWA engineer), meaning supplies may have to be purchased by the beneficiary, who may lack the funds. One of the

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40 And the beneficiary was able to keep the 500JOD in savings.
41 Often referred to as semi-self-help.
42 Perhaps people with those skills build their shelters without assistance, when they can afford the materials.
43 With tiling of floors and walls.
44 Guidelines 12.3 p.18.
45 But there is a process by which qualified builders can gain UNRWA approval to construct their shelter.
46 According to the MoU for Self-Help.
beneficiaries reported a delay in reimbursement as a deterrent from engaging in the process. In addition, a major renovation is a lot of work and most refugees might prefer to let professional contractors take on the responsibility.

64. However, because of the large number of refugees in need of a new shelter, the high costs associated with contractors, and the varied quality of work, self-help could stretch shelter funds to reach more beneficiaries. Someone who can work on his own shelter or enjoin his friends and relatives to help, or even hire labour at the Camp rate, eliminates the middle-man profit of the contractor.

65. As Camp residents were hired by contractors to build shelters, it seems that, with adequate training and oversight, more shelters could be constructed with self-help. Current issues with design satisfaction and contractor overcharging could be reduced.

**livelihoods**

66. Although this Project should have been able to offer several months of employment to perhaps a hundred Camp residents qualified in construction, that did not happen. The Project could have reduced vulnerability with improved training of Camp residents experienced in construction, thereby increasing their income and skills and opportunities for future employment. UNRWA says there was no direct livelihoods aim, but there could have been, without much effort.

67. The details of the employment process are undocumented, so it would take a closer examination to discover exactly who was employed, how they were recruited, what skills were sought, whether workers increased and diversified their skills on the job, how much they earned, for how long they worked, and to conduct a quality assessment of their work as a "Camp construction labour pool" to be contacted in future, including for self-help projects.

68. There is a list of 96 names of Camp workers, with the type of work they did, the amount they were paid and the contractor for whom they worked, but the details could not be verified. Apart from the five or six family members of Camp contractor Al Nadi, who say they continue to work for him around 10 days per month (on a commercial project near the Camp), no other contractor verified the names of workers, the amount of time they worked, or indicated they are still employed with the company.

69. The original intention was for contractors to employ a certain percentage of Camp residents, but it was not specified for how long. The Evaluation Team called a few names given by the Jerash Field Office and were told they worked for a month or two and were paid 20 to 35 JOD per day, depending on their skill. They were not employed for the full duration of the Project.

70. Perhaps their work was unsatisfactory. Some blamed the inaccurate application of roof screed, which led to poor drainage and damp inside the house, on unskilled Camp workers. Therefore, a roster should have been compiled of the demonstrated skills level of the workers. Ultimately, it was a failing of contractor judgement and oversight.
71. Some contractors and labourers said workers from the Camp were not serious about working and made excuses for their frequent absences. Others said they would work for a week and then take time off to spend what they had earned. They painted a disturbing image of a careless work ethic--that even when there was an option of work, it was not seen as a path to increase skills and self-betterment.

72. Camp contractors won some of the initial tenders in the first phase of the Project, but served as sub-contractors in the second phase. They said that big contractors in Amman could outbid them, since they could use the Project as a way to keep their staff working or just earn enough to pay some taxes.

73. Since lack of income is a factor contributing to vulnerability, examining the skills and attitudes towards work of various age groups in the Camp would be helpful in preparing for the next shelter project. Were the workers discouraged because they felt their skills were inadequately honed due to their limited experience? Have they seen generations of their male relatives sit idle and therefore have no expectation of a professional life? Do they have access to enough resources to get by, and perceive the effort of occasional work brings too few rewards?

donor visibility

74. The shelter recipients met during the evaluation knew that the EC was the donor and were grateful to have been included in the Project. Some discussion was made by UNRWA as to whether they should purchase plaques according to EC specifications and mount them on the houses. However, previous attempts to do so were quickly dismantled by the shelter owner, resulting in waste.

75. While it would be useful for UNRWA to stencil a lot and shelter number on the upper right corner of the shelter, for easy identification for maintenance, painting a similar 6 cm. x 6 cm. EC logo might not satisfy EC aims for visibility.

76. Whether plaques will increase goodwill is questionable. Some of the shelters refurbished in the Project have rather shabby exteriors. To place a plaque on that will not convey the extent of the renovations elsewhere in the shelter and would not deliver the intended aim. However, UNRWA could paint a small EU logo on the front of the shelter, if the donor so requests.

urban improvement plan

77. The Urban Improvement Plan (UIP), also known as the Camp Improvement Plan (CIP), identified the basic needs of the community at the Camp level, defined a set of priorities, and aimed to secure funds to implement the proposed interventions. Clearly, the community's first priority is the rehabilitation of their shelters. However, the

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47 Donors are now referring to this generically as a Camp Improvement Plan, the presence of which qualifies it to receive funds. In this Project, it was called the Urban Improvement Plan by the Urban Planner, but it covers a modest area, not an urban setting.

48 They next mention the need to grant civil rights to ex-Gazans and solve their unemployment problems.
inadequate infrastructure also has a negative impact on living conditions. Therefore, urban solutions are needed to improve the living conditions of the Camp as a whole.

78. The Infrastructure Development and Camp Improvement Programme (ICIP), founded by UNRWA in 2007, led the movement to improve the built environment of the camps in addition to shelters, schools, clinics, and other facilities. It engaged the local community as a major partner in a participatory process to identify and address needs through an interactive course of action.

79. The Urban Improvement Plan aimed to assist the refugees of Jerash Camp, who are particularly vulnerable due to the limited opportunities conferred by their status of citizenship. Environmental and sanitary conditions in the Camp are sub-standard and community participation is weak. The UIP is a comprehensive document that includes strategies and principles prioritizing the needs of the community, and includes a set of action plans of urban improvement issues that can be implemented in the Camp.

**participatory process**

80. The Project embarked on an extensive seven-month participatory process that involved Camp residents and local stakeholders such as the DPA, CDO, WPC and international agencies, such as Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC). The intervention gave special attention to participatory approaches and community engagement. The process was inclusive and cohesive, as it involved various stakeholders such as women, men, the elderly, youth, government authorities, and others. A major reason for adopting participatory approach was to develop a consensus among the local community and engage them through the process to maximize the outcomes. However, it is uncertain whether this objective was achieved.

81. The participatory approach did create the Participatory Planning Platform (PPP), which encompassed fourteen focus groups that convened six different age groups and one group of people with disabilities, divided by gender. All participants had the opportunity to identify their needs through a Common Needs List that were fed into the UIP. The UIP team grouped the stated needs into eight thematic topics: Streets, Market, Bus Stop, Environment, Health, Education, Recreational and Open Space, and Institutions that were converted into action plans. That led to a proposal for potential projects within a well-structured sustainable plan, based on the direct involvement of the community, various stakeholders, and ICIP-HQ support.

82. Then the UIP proposed another eight strategic interventions structured within four spatial frames as a guiding vision for the Camp—spine, ridge, edge and fabric. Finally the PPP members excerpted from the UIP a list of ten urgent projects to be implemented in the short term. In interviews conducted with the community and stakeholders, it was clear that all parties were informed about the shelter component of the Project, but did not necessarily understand the UIP aims and goals. After the lengthy participatory process that

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49 The UIP integrated the existing 2007-2011 community improvement plan within its organizational structure, but the role of CDO as a youth team was not defined well and seems to have ended.
took place, they came to understand the aim was to upgrade the services and facilities of the Camp site as well as to enhance livelihoods.

83. Collaboration with KU Leuven University student volunteers included mapping and technical verification of urban potential and challenges. Spatial maps were developed and presented to discuss the Camp’s needs and priorities with the community. A draft of the Urban Development Plan was shared again with the community, DPA and other stakeholders for finalization, and included the following issues:

- infrastructure and accessibility
  i. Street network and conditions: During site inspection it was clearly noticed the poor conditions of the streets that basically developed informally as ‘left-over’ spaces resulting from the separation and setbacks between the blocks. Water tanks, stairways, and shelter extensions obstruct the narrow streets.
  ii. Jerash Camp is the last camp to get a sewage network and still suffers from a major flooding issue due to the absence of a storm water drainage network. In 2016, the SDC installed the water and sewage system and closed the exposed contaminated canals between shelters. Connection to the system was the responsibility of the shelter owner. The storm water drainage system was not implemented due to a shortage of funds. The SDC Project is still addressing ensuing problems from inadequate design, sabotage, and poor household maintenance, which has led to clogging and leakage from manhole covers in the street.
  iii. Bus stop and Pedestrian links: Based on the community consultation process, three locations were proposed in the UIP for relocating the bus stop, which is now a four-meter recess at the top of the main road, in front of shops the bus companies bought. Congestion on the main road, meeting at a T-junction with UNRWA Street led to the proposal for a proper bus stop. The most viable option proposed to demolish the current shops to offer more space for buses, as well as a sheltered area for waiting passengers with elevated floors of shops on top. This area may come to be seen as a node of activity, with pedestrian links and sidewalks to and from the station, greenery and shading, and street lighting.
  iv. The UNRWA Compound road is a congested road that suffers from narrow right of way and lack of pedestrian safety. The UIP proposes to shift the wall along the schools by 4 meters, but the DPA thinks it can only be moved by about 2 meters, which will not significantly improve vehicular and pedestrian mobility on the street.

- land use and zoning
  v. The market is the active focal point of the Camp that attracts the community on a daily basis and is located in a prime area near the UNRWA compound, the main road, and the shelters in Block A. However, the market clearly suffers from poor hygiene standards, with muddy ground and piles of waste, as well as serious infrastructural problems, with its alleys barely paved or shaded.
  vi. The commercial strip on the main road is violating the right of way.

- block and shelter
vii. Evolution of the block unit began with a tent, then asbestos units, and then zinc roof units. The courtyard functions as a socializing space (especially for women), facilitating internal circulation and other domestic activities. In many cases, portions in the courtyard are either planted or filled with flower pots or fully tiled to convert them into a room.

viii. The shelter rehabilitation projects could conduct a structural assessment for the entire block, in addition to evaluating the overall circulation and accessibility system, and rehabilitate blocks rather than individual shelters.

- urban fabric
  ix. Few houses have expanded vertically due to limited economic sources and structural limitations. While half of the Camp’s refugees live outside the formal boundaries of the Camp, it seems vertical expansion will address the limited availability of land. UNRWA shelter projects only consider structural and socio-economic criteria for individual shelters to be rebuilt on the same plot, without envisioning neighboring structures and more sustainable land use options.

- natural and built environment
  x. It was observed during site visits that the Camp suffers from deteriorated environmental and sanitary conditions. The current waste collection system is not efficient and a new system is under discussion for funding in 2017.

  xi. The market generates a considerable amount of waste and the dedicated plot for garbage near the market has been fenced and taken over by a private shelter.

- environmental infrastructure
  xii. The uneven, small cluttered roofs and lack of space to store water make rainwater harvesting at the individual household level unfeasible. Storm water drainage shall be implemented as part of upgrading the main road.

- health and education
  xiii. The community clearly asked for more specialized health services, expanding and upgrading the existing clinic. Schools suffer from a shortage of classrooms, resulting in shifts and floating classes. Some private investors have shown an interest in funding school expansion but these offers do not always materialize.

- public institutions
  xiv. Facilitating accessibility and investing in open spaces and cultural infrastructure face challenges. The proposal for two playing fields has been resisted by parents, who do not want a place where young people might go at night for illicit activity or where boys and girls might meet up to socialize. Acquiring land is not UNRWA’s mandate, but within the authority of the DPA.

- urban sprawl
  xv. The Camp’s boundaries have not been changed since 1967, but refugees moved outside the official boundaries towards the city of Jerash. Vertical expansion on the solid foundation of a renovated shelter should address the need for land.

prioritization and funding
84. Multiple strategies and conclusions in the UIP report created some confusion and ambiguity, as well as duplication of information. There seems to be a deviation in the UIP from the Common Need List to the thematic issues and then the action plans.

85. Based on the interviews and meetings conducted during the evaluation, the list excerpted by the UIP team drifted away from the original stated needs of the beneficiaries. The priority list from the action plans should be:
   - Improve solid waste management
   - Upgrade Camp infrastructure for storm water; pave road network
   - Redesign bus stop
   - Improve existing infrastructure and cultural life: the schools, clinic, green spaces, youth club, vocational center
   - Improve Camp entrance

86. Since an Urban Improvement Plan has already been developed for the Camp and the needs are identified and prioritized together with the community, a German-funded project named REPAC VII, will give USD1,905,000 to fund a major infrastructure project that will relocate the bus stop, improve the Camp entrance, upgrade and reinstate the surrounding roads and pathways. Another project involves a major scheme for region solid waste collection and disposal.

87. UNRWA has proposed that renovating the Camp's main road, bus stop, and main entrance by enhancing the Camp's internal and external connectivity and accessibility can further the strategic goal of generating investment in the Camp. Rehabilitation of the Camp's main road, with extensions to Jerash town and the Dibbeen forest, will include implementing a storm water network in the Camp, with the main road as the run-off path for rainfall outside the Camp. However, this will not necessarily improve economic activity, as there is no evidence people avoided the Camp due to the quality of the road or the occasional traffic congestion. The theory of change linking the improved road to increased economic growth is unclear.

88. The plan proposed by UNRWA for implantation near the Camp entrance that will seek to create a safe open space for women, youth, and children to use, seems questionable and will require maintenance. Women are not very present on the main road. More areas for youth to gather were dismissed by Camp residents, who fear they will engage in mischief.

89. The proposal to "encourage" mixed-use buildings along the main road for more commercial activities has not naturally happened and the commercial life on the main road is very limited and shabby. Whose investment might alter that? Many of those commercial buildings are illegal structures that the DPA does not want to challenge.

90. Relocating the bus stop should solve the congestion of vehicles at the T-junction at the top of the main road, but it is hard to assert that more job opportunities would emerge in that area. The variety of commercial activities in the Camp is quite limited, and mostly located inside the Camp where women have more privacy; quite specific enterprises are on the main road (ironworks, chicken vendors, a couple of small shops and food vendors).
91. Improving the Camp entrance by relocating the garbage collection points should fit in well with the proposed waste management plan. Transforming the existing points at the intersection of the Camp and al Manshiyeh roads to create a shaded waiting area for the students and building stairs along the exceedingly steep south-eastern edge of the Camp are practical proposals that will address specific needs.

92. This infrastructure Project has many merits that will improve the life of Camp residents, but elaborate claims of economic improvement are unlikely to materialize without more considered approaches.

management and strategy

93. Following the review of the documents received from UNRWA and interviews with a number of different internal stakeholders, it appears that the Project- based team led by the Project Manager had significant authority to deliver the following:

- Approval of beneficiary selection
- Shelter dilapidation survey
- Consultation with beneficiaries
- Design
- Selection of the tender winners, based on the lowest price
- Construction

94. The Project team received support from the UNRWA Jordan Field Office and UNRWA Headquarters in Amman, but it is difficult to tell which office supplied specific technical advice or oversight and who from the JFO was providing general oversight on management of the Project. From the contracting/costing process, to the design stage, to quality assurance of materials and workmanship, there were management issues that affected the Project outcome.

95. According to the Guidelines and evidence from the field, oversight was inadequate. For a shelter project of that size, there should have been more Site Engineers and Social Workers. The proposed Self-Help Consultant was replaced with unspecified volunteers from the Camp, with no indication of who they were or what they did in preparation for the self-help component—which mostly did not exist. In general, documentation was inadequate and the documents that exist are not compiled in a coherent way for tracking specific information.

96. This example suggests that not enough consideration was given in the planning stage as to how each component of the Project would be realized, and staffed accordingly. It appears that a perpetual fear over costs hindered many aspects of execution—and even led to planned staff positions being cut—thereby affecting the efficient and optimal use of funds for the realization of some Project goals.

findings and recommendations

finding 1
The selection process for shelters should have included the most vulnerable refugees, but it was not transparent, and was compromised and confusing.

**recommendation 1.a**

The Shelters’ List needs to be verified, revised, and updated, scrubbed of inaccurate data, with a revised shelter assessment by an independent Consultant Engineer.

**recommendation 1.b**

It should be used by the next shelter project as the priority list, not compromised by personal input from staff and notables, or confused by the introduction of alternative lists midway through the process. Selections should be justified in a file that is clearly marked.

**finding 2**

For the overall Camp Urban Improvement Plan, more clarity is needed on use of Camp space.

**recommendation 2**

UNRWA should undertake a fresh survey of empty lots, collapsed or condemned shelters, abandoned shelters, shelters being rented out and for sale, and update the list of Shelters and other buildings in need of repairs and renovation in a more strategic manner.

**finding 3**

This Project could have reduced vulnerability – poverty -- by emphasizing the role of camp workers.

**recommendation 3.a**

UNRWA should use shelter projects to apprentice Camp residents in quality construction techniques to qualify them for further work.

**recommendation 3.b**

Likewise, many shelters just need upgrades that residents can do on their own or with the help of Camp labour, if a small fund is made available for supplies.

**finding 4**

Some dissatisfaction stemmed from design and quality control issues that beneficiaries did not challenge.

**recommendation 4.a**

Acceptance of the design of the shelter should be a consultative process and not coerced under threat of exclusion.
recommendation 4.b
Contracts should be conveyed in terms beneficiaries can understand.

recommendation 4.c
A formal grievance procedure is needed to allow for proper complaints and redress for all stages of the process.

finding 5
Contractor costs were more than 50 percent above market rates and low quality work coupled with costly supplies lead to poor value for money.

recommendation 5.a
The quality of work could be improved if the selection of contractors were based on a submission of both technical and financial proposals.

recommendation 5.b
The selection of contractors based on the lowest price is not necessarily the most cost-effective approach.

recommendation 5.c
Bids should be for groups of shelters in the same vicinity.

finding 6
UNRWA's desire to have uniform rules for shelters in all their fields does not serve the best needs of the beneficiaries, leading to dissatisfaction.

recommendation 6
The Guidelines should be seen as a guide that indicates practice in the field, to serve the aim of satisfying the needs of the beneficiary. Appropriate interventions should be adapted to the particular needs of the setting, which can vary between camps.

finding 7
There was inadequate professional input and oversight of construction.

recommendation 7.a
During construction, there should be one Site Engineer per ten shelters built.

recommendation 7.b
At least one Site Engineer should have been available in the defects liability period to assure faults were repaired.
recommendation 7. c
In order to take control of the construction process, UNRWA needs to implement a more efficient process of oversight, including JFO Management monitoring of the Project Team.

finding 8
The extent of contractor overcharging and lack of quality work suggests a more systemic problem within UNRWA management.

recommendation 8.a
A construction audit is needed to examine the cost differentials discovered by the Evaluation Engineer and devise a more efficient use of scarce resources.

recommendation 8.b
The UNRWA Procurement and Logistics Office suggested the use of a Consultant Engineer to assess tenders. The Procurement process should assure that costs in the tenders match the price-for-quality of those of a validated independent supplier or not accept the bids.

finding 9
Alternative frameworks exist for conducting more cost-efficient and quality construction projects.

recommendation 9.a
An examination should be made of the DPA shelter construction process, as well as self-help efforts (many built onto the core DPA one-room shelter) to assess how their tendering and construction process leads to lower costs.

recommendation 9.b
Assess how residents manage to fund the expansion of their shelter.

finding 10
Many shelters need repair, which could be done at a lower cost through the self-help of owner upgrades.

recommendation 10.a
Self-help should be redefined to indicate real construction by Camp residents (not only finishing), done at lower cost, with UNRWA oversight.

recommendation 10.b
Social workers can advise shelter owners on how to clean and maintain their homes, and provide light and ventilation to assurance maintenance.
finding 11

UNRWA tries to cut costs, but in the process cuts effectiveness, efficiency and quality, with the ultimate cost to the detriment of UNRWA’s reputation. Ad-hoc cutting of proposed staff altered the Project scope, reduced the potential use of Camp residents in the construction process, and resulted in fewer vulnerable households receiving a new shelter.

recommendation 11.a

Savings can be made through more controls on the contracting process.

recommendation 11.b

More efficient consultations on the coherence of the Project.

finding 12

Poor documentation, inadequate communication, and lack of institutional memory for improved shelter projects means the same mistakes are likely to recur unless concerted action is taken by UNRWA management.

recommendation 12.a

In line with the objectives in its Strategic Plans, UNRWA Management should undertake a functional review to assess where current systems are failing to provide adequate checks and oversight on the contracting, design, and construction process, and devise remedies.

recommendation 12.b

Better documentation and reporting procedures are needed to assure projects can be tracked and evaluated for optimal results.
conclusion

97. The selection of shelters for this evaluation serves as an indicator of issues for further examination to determine scope and cause. When large assets are being conferred—shelters—every assurance must be made to develop a justified list of beneficiaries and adhere to it. If the selection process is not transparent and thought to be based on connections, or too much is paid for shelters, it undermines confidence in UNRWA management. For future shelter projects, the list of needy should be revised, along with a shelter assessment with clear prioritization and no confusion or surprises.

98. This Project aimed to give more than shelters and improved urban infrastructure, by offering the opportunity to work, develop skills, earn some income, and take pride in contributing to the construction of one’s home. In piecing together beneficiary and contractor accounts, as well as observations from Project staff, there is the nagging realization that beneficiary participation was less than optimal in the shelter project.

99. There are several issues that require further analysis, such as the livelihoods profile of Camp residents, improving their skills base, and other options for livelihoods within the Camp. When asked about their priority needs, Jerash Camp residents replied “shelters”. However, if Camp residents have income they can afford to upgrade their own shelters.

100. There are many ways UNRWA staff can maximize the input of residents to transform their Camp to meet evolving needs. The UIP helped to lay the foundation for more promising efforts that should be maximized in the coming years, and more shelter projects are planned. However, the tendency seen in this Project to try to save money, to look for ways to cut planned staff positions and elements mid-project, and to rely on a reduced number of expert managers, affected the quality of the outcome, leading to waste. More efficient contracting, the use of skilled Camp labour, and proper planning and oversight for quality workmanship from the outset will be more cost effective, with improved results.

******

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50 SDC plans to construct shelters for 100 disabled persons. UNRWA has funds committed from the UAE for 108 shelters.
final evaluation of PQ122B21

annexes
annex 1  management response

management response

final evaluation of project PQ12B21, improvement of living conditions of vulnerable Palestine refugees in Jerash camp

general response:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>date of management Response</th>
<th>11 April 2017</th>
<th>reference number:</th>
<th>PQ12B21 Final Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Office and person coordinating the management response / recommendation follow up:

Field Programme Support Office

How has this evaluation influenced the Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme (ICIP):

UNRWA Jordan Field Office (JFO) appreciates the evaluation recommendations. This is the first comprehensive external evaluation of a camp improvement project in the past 6 years in JFO. It was planned at the time of project design with an aim to serve dual objectives of accountability and learning. The evaluation has validated delivery of Project outputs, and highlighted a number of issues and procedures that need to be improved or introduced for efficient and effective planning and execution of shelter improvement projects in the future. UNRWA JFO is committed to implement most of the recommendations, and in this regard management has already started to take action to improve the delivery of services for the benefit of the refugees.

UNRWA JFO management has formalized establishment of Project Steering Committee, chaired by the Director or the Deputy Director, to strengthen governance of projects with a value of USD1.0 million or above, as well as projects with smaller value but of a complex nature. The establishment supports the evaluation recommendation to strengthen Project oversight.

In early 2016, JFO merged Camp Improvement, Engineering and Construction, and Environmental Health Units into one holistic Programme; the Field Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme with an aim to enhance management and quality of work. Moreover, in the last quarter of 2016 an audit of JFO construction and maintenance contracts was carried out by UNRWA’s Department of Internal Oversight Services. Some of the recommendations of the evaluation will be addressed while responding to the internal audit recommendations.

Implementation of the management responses will enable UNRWA to strengthen its shelter rehabilitation projects, upgrade the social mobilization, and improve the quality control of the works undertaken by the contractors. Further enhancement is related to the overall Project management and documentation of the Project processes and outputs. Stronger community participation in the Camp improvement projects for greater community ownership, transparency and sustainability is one of the key areas that will be reinforced.

To sum up, the evaluation is going to have significant positive effects on quality of outputs, outcomes, and the level of sustainability of future shelter rehabilitation and other camp
improvement projects. Moreover, some of the changes will also positively impact other infrastructure development works.

**response to specific recommendations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>recommendation</th>
<th>management response (agree, partially agree, disagree):</th>
<th>action planned / taken / reason for partially agreeing or disagreeing</th>
<th>planned date for implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>recommendation 1: (a) The Shelters' List needs to be verified, revised, and updated, scrubbed of inaccurate data, with a revised shelter assessment by an independent Consultant Engineer. It should be used by the next shelter project as the priority list, (b) not compromised by personal input from staff and notables, or confused by the introduction of alternative lists midway through the process. Selections should be justified in a file that is clearly marked.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>1.a.1 Camp shelter verification exercise will be made an integral part of future shelter improvement project. 1.a.2 In line with the Guidelines for Individual Shelter Rehabilitation on Grant Basis, a rapid shelter survey exercise will be included in the Project design and budget, if the last survey report was older than 5 years. The team leader will be hired for the shelter needs verification. Community will be invited to nominate their representative to participate as an Observer in the survey team and shelter prioritization process. The shelters identified by the survey team will be reviewed by a team of senior staff from ICIP and RSSP ensuring that prioritization is based on structural vulnerabilities, needs and the SSN status of the potential beneficiary in line with the Guidelines. After successfully...</td>
<td>At the time of planning for new projects At the time of planning for new projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
completing the appeal process, the list will be submitted by ICIP for endorsement by the Project Steering Committee (PSC), or by the Front Office.

1.a.3 For already approved projects, if the verification of the entire shelters in the camps is not possible due to resource constraints, a list of SSN households will be obtained from RSSP to identify hazardous and structurally un-safe SSN shelters using the existing survey data, reports from beneficiaries, information from the Area Office Staff and Camp Service Offices.

The shelters identified for possible assistance will be verified in detail by a team comprised of ICIP and RSSP staff, and reviewed and approved by the PSC.

1.b.1 The criteria and selection process will be documented both electronically and in print form, and the electronic versions will be posted on the JFO server and the Intranet.

1.b.2 Town hall meetings will be held to share information about Project plans and criteria for Project assistance. In addition, a brochure will be developed and

At the time of planning for new projects

Agree

June 2017

June 2017
<p>| Recommendation 2: UNRWA should undertake a fresh survey of empty lots, collapsed or condemned shelters, abandoned shelters, shelters being rented out and for sale, and update the list of Shelters and other buildings in need of repairs and renovation in a more strategic manner. | Agree | 2.a The design of future projects will include a camp level fresh survey to be carried out in conjunction with Action 1.a.1 above, to identify empty lots, collapsed or condemned shelters, abandoned shelters, shelters being rented out and for sale. A new survey will be done in case the last survey was 5 years old. | At the time of planning for new projects |
| Recommendation 3: (a) UNRWA should use shelter Projects to apprentice Camp residents in quality construction techniques to qualify them for further work. (b) Likewise, many shelters just need upgrades that residents can do on their own or with the help of Camp labour, if a small fund is made available for supplies. | Disagree | 3.a Apprenticeship training in construction techniques is not an area of UNRWA expertise. In view of numerous priorities and resource constraints, UNRWA would not be able to plan and implement this recommendation. Moreover, there is no incentive for the contractors to undertake this initiative, and last but not least it will have an adverse effect on cost and competition in the bidding process because the contractors will transfer the associated cost to UNRWA. | - |
| | Agree | 3.b UNRWA guidelines for shelter rehabilitation | December 2017 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>4a Shelter design and/or rehabilitation work will be presented and discussed with the beneficiaries in the presence of a community representative, preferably the same person who was nominated for shelter verification and prioritization, and Area Relief and Social Service Officer. The design/scope of work will be signed off by the shelter owner and the representative after establishing a clear understanding of the scope and limitations of the contract, and the responsibilities of UNRWA and shelter owner.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>4b A Standard Operating Procedure will be developed to ensure that shelter size and scale are clearly understood by the shelter owner.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>4c Shelter selection related appeal/grievance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>As soon as it becomes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>December 2017</td>
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promote self-help approach in addition to contractual approach. However, a strategy is needed to raise the awareness and interest of refugees in the self-help approach. In this regard, ICIP and RSSP will develop a JFO specific strategy in collaboration with HQ ICID to promote self-help approach.

recommendation 4: (a) Acceptance of the design of the shelter should be a consultative process and not coerced under threat of exclusion. (b) Contracts should be conveyed in terms beneficiaries can understand, and (c) a formal grievance procedure is needed to allow for proper complaints and redress for all stages of the process.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 5: (a)</th>
<th>a. &amp; b. Partially agree</th>
<th>5.a &amp; b.</th>
<th>September 2017 for REPAC VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The quality of work could be improved if the selection of contractors were based on a submission of both technical and financial proposals. (b) The selection of contractors based on the lowest price is not necessarily the most cost-effective approach. (c) Bids should be for groups of shelters in the same vicinity.</td>
<td></td>
<td>It should be noted that in JFO the correlation between bid solicitation system and quality of selection and works is minimal because the construction companies are already pre-selected through the Agency and Ministry of Public Works pre-qualification and registration screening. Therefore, all bidders invited to participate in tendering process already meet the criteria. However, the qualified bidders will be required to submit the composition, size and assignment duration of the technical team in their bids. JFO audit of construction and maintenance contracts carried out in 2016 examines the effectiveness of processes and controls over the procurement and contract administration, including contractor pre-qualification, tendering, selection and contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Guidelines for ‘Individual Shelter Rehabilitation on Grant Basis’ will be translated into Arabic, and will be issued and clearly explained to all existing and new project staff on interpretation and application to ensure that legitimate shelter related needs of refugees are covered by the project. However, due to the resource constraints, it may not be possible to interpret the guidelines with optimum flexibility to meet all the needs.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>May 2017 and onwards</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7a. JFO will assign one site engineer to supervise 10 to 15 shelters.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>At the time of planning for new projects; November 2017 for REPAC VII</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**c. Agree**

Future projects will be designed following the principle of zoning to the extent it is practical for the purpose of poverty based targeting. The aim would be to lower the logistical cost to the contractor, thus reducing the construction cost.

**At the time of planning for new projects**

**recommendation 6:** The Guidelines should be seen as a guide that indicates practice in the field, to serve the aim of satisfying the needs of the beneficiary. Appropriate interventions should be adapted to the particular needs of the setting, which can vary between camps.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Partially Agree</th>
<th>Already in place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At the time of planning for new projects; November 2017 for REPAC VII</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.b It is not possible to hire an engineer for the one-year liability defects period. However, prior to releasing the liability and defects guarantee, the work done by the contractors will be inspected by the ICIP team. Such inspections will be done one month before the expiry of the guarantee period. The inspecting engineer’s written report, which will be based on field observations as well as discussion with shelter occupants (Male and Female), on the condition of each shelter, will form the basis for the contractor to undertake corrective measures at his/her own expenses.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>7.c To improve management of infrastructure projects, Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme was established in early 2016 by merging 3 separate units, namely Camp improvement, engineering and construction and environmental health. In addition, Project Steering Committees chaired by the Front Office are now in place for all projects with a value of USD1 million or above, as well as projects with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation 8: (a)</td>
<td>A construction audit is needed to examine the cost differentials discovered by the Evaluation Engineer and devise a more efficient use of scarce resources. (b) The UNRWA Procurement and Logistics Office suggested the use of a Consultant Engineer to assess tenders. The Procurement process should assure that costs in the tenders match the price-for-quality of those of a validated independent supplier or not accept the bids.</td>
<td>a. &amp; b. Agree</td>
<td>8.a &amp; b. Completed. In Q4 of 2016, UNRWA JFO commissioned an internal audit of 238 construction and maintenance contracts totaling to US$12.589 million. The scope of the audit covers various processes and addresses the evaluation recommendations (a and b). Findings from the audit and the evaluation recommendations will be taken on board by JFO to enhance its ability to deliver cost-efficient construction projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Recommendation 9: (a) | An examination should be made of the DPA shelter construction process, as well as self-help efforts (many built onto the core DPA one-room shelter) to assess how their tendering and construction process leads to lower costs, and (b) how residents manage to fund the expansion of their | Agree | 9.a Although the scope of UNRWA and DPA shelter rehabilitation interventions are significantly different, JFO will explore possibilities with DPA to learn from their approach to shelter rehabilitation. Discuss the matter with DPA noting that the scope of work significantly varies between DPA and UNRWA shelter rehabilitation work. 9.b UNRWA will examine how beneficiaries in Jerash | September 2017 |
shelter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 10:</th>
<th>Partially agree</th>
<th>10.a Depending on the interest and ability of the shelter owner, the total self-help approach will be implemented by following the guidelines for shelter rehabilitation. See 3.b also.</th>
<th>At the time of planning for new projects; November 2017 for REPAC VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Self-help should be redefined to indicate real construction by Camp residents (not only finishing), done at lower cost, with UNRWA oversight.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>10.b ICIP will collaborate with RSSP to engage Social Workers in promotion of cleanliness, maintenance, and ownership of shelters during their shelter visits and meetings with the beneficiaries. They will be required to report on the coverage as well as impact.</td>
<td>At the time of planning for new projects; November 2017 for REPAC VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Social workers can advise shelter owners on how to clean and maintain their homes, and provide light and ventilation to assurance maintenance.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 11:</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>11.a.1 Covered under the management response # 8 above.</th>
<th>September 2017 for REPAC VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Savings can be made through more controls on the contracting process and (b) more efficient consultations on the coherence of the Project.</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>11.b Ad-hoc cutting of proposed inputs such as staff, size of shelter project and other inputs which are likely to impact Project scope and refugees adversely, will be avoided through improved Project design, planning and monitoring.</td>
<td>At the time of planning for new projects; June 2017 for REPAC VII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 12:</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>12.a UNRWA will undertake a functional review of JFO ICIP with an aim to ensure adequate checks and oversight on contracting, design, and</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In line with the objectives in its Strategic Plans, (a) UNRWA Management should undertake a</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>construction process. The Annexes C: Soil Test, D: Design Checklist and F: Cost Comparison of the evaluation report will be used as some of the key references. 12.b JFO ICIP will ensure that the key documents such as meeting records, workshop programmes, participant lists, progress reports, inspection reports, site supervision reports, work plans and updates, etc., of future projects are prepared and kept up-to-date.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

June 2017 for REPAC VII |
TERMS OF REFERENCE

Final Evaluation

Region: Middle East

Beneficiary Country: Jordan

Sector: The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

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1. Evaluation Mandate

This evaluation is a contractual obligation of UNRWA with The European Commission therefore is an integral element of the original work plan and budget of the Project (Project Agreement: Project Budget Item 1.a and 6 – to be provided to successful candidates).

Systematic and timely evaluation of UNRWA projects/programmes and activities is an established priority of the European Commission (EC) and UNRWA. The focus of the evaluation is to assess achievements, quality and results of interventions in the context of an evolving cooperation policy with an increasing emphasis on result-oriented approaches. Evaluations should provide an understanding of the cause and effects links between activities and results, and should serve decision-making, learning and management purposes.

2. Background

UNRWA is a United Nations agency established by the General Assembly in 1949 and is mandated to provide assistance and protection to a population of over 5 million registered Palestine refugees. Its mission is to help Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to achieve their full potential in human development, pending a just solution to their plight. UNRWA’s services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and emergency assistance. UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions.

For the last six decades, UNRWA has provided humanitarian assistance to Palestine refugees contributing to their well-being through camp infrastructure and improvement in its five fields of operation in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and West Bank. Since 1950, it has been improving the built environment of camps in general and in the provision of housing for refugees in particular since it commenced its operations. It realizes that its mandate to provide basic and essential services to the Palestine refugee community – with a focus on their human development – cannot be carried out when the most vulnerable segments of refugees lack access to adequate housing and core infrastructural services. In this context, the Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme operates on the premise that the spatial and environmental conditions in which refugees live cannot be divorced from their livelihood or wellbeing, and the quality of the built environment has a direct influence on the quality of everyday life of refugees.

The Jerash Camp, known locally as Gaza Camp, was set up as an “emergency” Camp in 1968 to accommodate 11,500 ex-Gazan refugees (Palestine refugees who fled to Gaza in 1948

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52 SEC(2007)213 "Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation"
53 COM (2011) 637 final "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change"
and were displaced from Gaza in 1967) and "displaced persons" from Gaza (Gaza residents who were displaced in 1967 for the first time) who fled from the Gaza Strip as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Currently, there are 26,785 refugees in the Camp that are registered with UNRWA, out of which; approximately 14,000 live within the official borders of the Camp.

A substantially higher proportion of households in the Camp fall within the lowest income quintile compared to other Palestine refugee camps in Jordan. Housing conditions in the Camp are substandard for most of the ex-Gazan refugee families. The majority of the shelters in Jerash Camp were built in 1967 and the poor economic conditions of most families restrict their ability to rehabilitate their homes and extend the shelters to accommodate family growth. Large families often reside in single or two-room shelters, with limited access to daylight or proper ventilation. A survey conducted in 2007 found 65 percent of the shelters to have roofs of zinc or asbestos sheeting which are considered inappropriate as per UNRWA norms. Almost 80 percent of the households reported encountering severe problems in winter, including leaking roofs, water seepage through walls, and shelter flooding. Poor living conditions are even worse for vulnerable groups within the refugee community: youth, women, the physically and mentally disabled and the unemployed. Additionally, environmental conditions in the Camp are substandard. Lack of proper (underground) sewage and automated waste removal has resulted in poor sanitation conditions in the Camp, contributing to the spread of diseases.

In response to the above stated living conditions, the EU approved funding of a project developed by UNRWA aiming at improving the living conditions of vulnerable Palestine refugees residing in Jerash Camp, Jordan in December 2012. Funded under the European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the Euro 2 million project has an implementation period of 48 months, including 36 months of implementation and 12 months of Project closure period.

The Project’s overall objective of the Project is to support the refugees, particularly those identified as abject poor, living in the Jerash Camp in achieving a decent standard of living by:

a. Improving the living conditions of the most vulnerable refugee families, including persons with disabilities, residing in Jerash Camp (Project Outcome 1.1), and

b. Piloting of potenial for rain water harvesting to reduce dependency on Municipal piped water system, which is irregular and expected to become expensive due to reduction of subsidies (Project Outcome 1.2).

The Project’s planned outputs include:

a. Reduced number of substandard shelters of abject poor refugees (Output 3.1);

b. Produced Jerash Camp Urban Improvement Plan outlining vision, mission, strategic objectives and activities together with an organizational structure for the integrated and holistic improvement of the built environment (Output 3.2); and

c. Reduction in utility costs (electricity and water) of abject poor families (Output 3.3).
Project Agreement, log frame and other relevant documents (10.1: Annex 1) are attached and other documents will be provided to the successful candidates.

It was planned that the Project will span three years. The Project used the Shelter Database developed under a previously funded EU project (USD3.4 million) for the "Assistance to Palestine ex-Gaza refugees in Jerash Camp" implemented between 2007 and 2011 to identify the physical rehabilitation needs of the shelters. The Database was created on the basis of physical rehabilitation needs assessed by using comprehensive door to door mapping, rapid needs and poverty assessments of the 2722 shelters in Jerash Camp. The list was verified by the Project team and the first batch of 40 beneficiaries was announced in 2013. In Oct 2014, the Project team identified the remaining 40 beneficiaries and announced the second half of the beneficiary list.

Based on literature showing tremendous potential for rainwater harvesting in Jordan, wide use of the rainwater in Irbid City, and favourable data on hydrological features of Jerash, the Project aimed to pilot rainwater harvesting system. Noting the average shelter plot size, i.e. 70 m², the fact that the roof surface will vary as per the type of the shelter, the open spaces in the plots are not large enough to build individual collection tanks, the Project made an interim planning assumption that a shared system rainwater reservoir would be a practical option in the Camp environment. This assumption was to be updated upon completion of a feasibility study.

With an aim to promote local employment and sustainability, through creation of capacity from on-the job learning opportunities, the Project was to engage local contractors as much as possible. Savings, if any, generated from this approach and other measures were to be invested in increasing the number of shelters rehabilitated.

Since the Project team recruitment took longer than expected, the Project commenced in May 2013 with a Project Manager on board. The remaining recruitment was completed by October 2013. Consequently, the Project’s initial framework was amended and a revised budget, log frame and work plan were adopted in December 2013. The revised plan was to construct 35 shelters in 2014 and 45 in 2015. A total of 9 shelters were completed in May 2014, 66 in 2015 and remaining 2 were completed in Feb 2016. The last 5 shelters were to be constructed following a semi-self-help approach – the main structure is built by the contractor and finishing work carried out by the beneficiary with financial assistance from the Project. But, only two beneficiaries implemented the semi self-help approach. The original Project plan was to build/rehabilitate a majority of the shelters using a semi-self-help approach to promote participation of and empowerment of refugees through capacity building to take greater control of their lives.

The Project team consists of a Project manager, one structural engineer, one social worker, a site engineer, an urban planner, an administrative assistant and two draftspersons.
The first draft of the development of Jerash Camp Urban Improvement Plan (UIP) is complete. The UIP has been developed in a participatory approach with the community and in collaboration with Leuven University, Belgium. Eleven students from the Leuven University assisted the UIP team.

Feasibility study of Rain Water Harvesting System has been completed. The study implementation of pilot Rain Water Harvesting System has proved unfeasible on an individual shelter basis.

The Project is also addressing some of the cross cutting themes like gender, youth and disability. It has ensured male and female youth participation through community meetings and focus group discussions at the planning stage. In addition, the youth from the Camp are being encouraged to participate in the Project through volunteerism. Women’s participation has been encouraged in the design of their shelters. Focus group meetings for UIP include people from all age groups as well as people with disability to ensure their needs are taken into consideration and that they are part of the decision making process. The design of shelters has taken into consideration the needs of persons with disabilities such as the provision of wider corridors, doors, ramps, etc.

3. Evaluation Objectives and Main Users

This evaluation is a contractual obligation with The European Commission therefore was an integral element of the original work plan of the Project. The main objectives of the evaluation are:

a. To carry out an overall independent assessment of Project performance, paying particular focus on the results and impacts of the Project as stated in the European Union Contribution Agreement ENPI/2012/309-208, Annex I: Description of the Operation;

b. To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of semi-self-help component and the intervention to employ Camp contractors and residents in shelter rehabilitation work in comparison with UNRWA’s traditional approach; and

c. To determine the reasons for the observed performance and results, and draw lessons for future design and implementation of similar projects.

The evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning, and the key users of the evaluation are UNRWA and the EC.


4.1 Scope

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54 The Urban Development Plan mentioned in the Project Document is replaced by Urban Improvement Plan.
The geographic coverage of the evaluation is Jerash Camp and will require interactions with UNRWA Jordan Field Office staff. The direct beneficiaries of the projects are 80 of the most vulnerable refugee families classified as "absolutely poor", including those families who are on UNRWA’s Social Safety Net Programme as well as persons with disabilities, in Jerash Camp.

The evaluation will cover the period from December 2012 until June 2016. The evaluation will assess whether the Project has achieved the stated objectives, outcomes and outputs within the Project time frame and identify the lessons for future. In addition, it will cover how well the Project promoted community participation, community ownership, sustainability and key cross-cutting issues.

A mid-term review of the Project was conducted during May-June 2015 focusing on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, results, impact, sustainability, cross cutting issues. The purpose of the review was to assess the Project implementation, draw lessons learned and recommendations for UNRWA to improve planning, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation of the Projectand similar interventions in the future. The review scope covered the whole Project and the Project duration of December 2012 to June 2015.

The review concluded that the intervention appears to be an important and essential Camp improvement initiative, though there are areas that require further consideration and development; efficiency is one of the limitations of this intervention, but Project resources have been efficiently managed and delivered; the Project needs 6 months no-cost extension to attain outcomes and specific objectives; and indications of high levels of impact. The overall conclusion was that the Project was a significant and valuable Camp improvement initiative; however there are issues that need refinement and development, specifically for future programming.

4.2 Criteria

The following five criteria will be applied for the purpose of the evaluation.

1. **Relevance** of the Project from the point of view of its objective and beneficiaries; and UNRWA Mid Term Strategy and Field Implementation Plan.

2. **Efficiency** of the implementation process in terms of resource utilization and timely delivery of outputs and work plan implementation.

3. **Effectiveness** of the implementation process to achieve its planned outputs and outcomes.

4. **Results** on beneficiaries and indirect beneficiaries.

5. **Likely sustainability** in terms of ownership and maintenance of shelters, energy efficiency measures and replication/up scaling of engagement of Camp contractors/labourer and semi-self-help approach to shelter construction.

6. **Gender and human rights principles** were considered adequately in the Project.
4.3 Evaluation Questions

The following five evaluation criteria and some of the key questions below are provided for guidance. The Evaluation Team is expected to expand on them, as necessary and discuss with UNRWA.

1. For relevance:
   a. Did the Project respond to the needs of the target groups/beneficiaries?
   b. Have practical and strategic gender, youth and persons with disability interests been adequately considered by the Project?
   c. Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
   d. Is the Urban Improvement Plan relevant to the built environment in the Camp and will it contribute to the improvement of urban built environment.
   e. Was the semi-self-help component of shelter rehabilitation designed and planned adequately to achieve the intended objectives\(^{55}\) of the interventions?
   f. Did the Camp contractor and Camp resident employment interventions contribute to livelihood improvements?
   g. How did the Project contribute towards the strategic priorities of UNRWA: Mid Term Strategy 2010-2015, Field Implementation Plan 2014-2015, and Mid Term Strategy 2016-2021?
   h. What effects, if any, did it have on the reputation of UNRWA?
   i. Were cross cutting issues given due consideration?

2. For efficiency:
   a. Were outputs and objectives achieved on time?
   b. How efficient was the semi-self-help approach in comparison with the traditional approach in terms of cost and time required until individual Projects related to the built environment are completed?
   c. Did the change in implementation of semi-self-help shelters produce efficiency gains?
   d. Were the survey, design, estimate and tendering processes efficient?
   e. How efficient was the unit cost of shelter construction/rehabilitation in comparison with the market price?
   f. Did the Project invest time and money efficiently on development of Urban Improvement Plan?

3. For effectiveness:
   a. To what extent were the outputs and objectives achieved?

\(^{55}\) Please see Annexes 10.1.A.a and 10.1.A.b.
b. What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

c. How prepared and responsive was UNRWA in the management of these factors?

d. Were the Project set-up and the duration appropriate for achievement of Project outcomes?

e. To what extent the Project adapted to changing external conditions (risks and assumptions) to ensure the achievement of the outcomes?

f. Did the Project target the neediest refugees?

g. To what extent did the Project contribute in enhancing the refugees’ household income during the Project period through creation of short term employment in shelter rehabilitation intervention? To what extent the Urban Improvement Plan is usable by UNRWA, Government and Donors? What factors contributed to quality and attainment of outputs?

4. For results:
   a. Did the beneficiaries’ level of satisfaction reach the target set for the Project?
   b. Is there any tangible impact or likely impact of the Project interventions, including semi-self-help approach and Urban Development Plan on the beneficiaries and on their household level budget?
   c. To what extent are Palestine refugee communities empowered as a result of the Project processes, activities, and the outputs?
   d. What benefits for Jerash Camp residents are likely to derive from the Urban Improvement Plan?
   e. What were the unintended results of the Project?
   f. What were the effects on indirect beneficiaries?
   g. What lessons can be learned from the manner Project interventions were designed and implemented?

5. For likely sustainability:
   a. To what extent the community participated in the Project processes?
   b. Did the semi self-help approach enhance shelter ownership?
   c. What is the replicability of semi-self-help approach, and Camp contractor and resident engagement, and what are the minimum requirements, necessary for replication?
   d. Are the Project outputs and outcomes sustainable?
   e. What are the factors that affect sustainability?

6. For gender and human rights:
a. Has the Project respected gender and human rights principles, namely inclusion, participation and fair power relations as outlined in UN Evaluation Group Guidance Document: Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations.

5. **Methodology, Tools and main Deliverables**

5.1 **Methodology and Tools**

The methodology to be used is based on the DEVCO Evaluation Methodology for projects/programmes as set out on the website:  

Applicants are expected to elaborate or propose amendments to methodology to strengthen fulfilment of the objectives of evaluation.

In particular, the methodology for the evaluation will include, but not limited to, the following:


b. Interviews (structured and semi-structured, in person) with key stakeholders, including beneficiaries (of shelter and Urban Improvement Plan) and non-beneficiaries (of shelter component) in Jerash Camp.

c. Visit minimum 15 shelters, including all 5 semi-self-help shelters.

d. Focus Group Discussions (beneficiaries, active community groups in the Camp, Camp committee, and non-beneficiaries.)

e. Case studies.

f. Review and analysis of design and cost-estimates of various shelter reconstruction and rehabilitation work, including unit cost comparison based on design and costing of construction/rehabilitate including alternative on work to determine value for money.

5.2 **Deliverables:**

1. Inception report: The report will detail evaluation focus, organization, management and quality assurance and what and when deliverables will be submitted, and how the stakeholder will participate in the process. In addition, it will include reasoned description and justifications of what will be done, why, when and by whom during the evaluation.
2. Preliminary findings: The team will present the preliminary findings to key stakeholders including the EU, for discussion of the findings and formulation of recommendations.

3. Draft Evaluation report will be shared with key stakeholders for comments in writing. This will contain the following elements:
   a. Executive Summary
   b. Project description
      i. Context of the intervention related to policy, development, and stakeholders
      ii. Logic of the intervention, including assumptions and theory
   c. Evaluation purpose and scope
   d. Evaluation methodology
      i. Sources of information and their validity
      ii. Techniques used for data gathering and analysis
      iii. Limitations, if any
   e. Analysis and major findings and conclusion within the evaluation criteria; relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.
   f. Findings
   g. Annexes: Interview list; data collection instruments, including the list of final questions; key documents consulted; Terms of Reference, etc.

4. Final Evaluation report and matrix showing the acceptance or rejection of comments.

5. All deliverables will be written in English.

The evaluation process will be carried out in three phases: Preparation Phase, Field Mission Phase and Reporting Phase. Deliverables in the form of reports and/or slide presentations should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stages.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>phases of the evaluation</th>
<th>methodological stages</th>
<th>deliverables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Preparation Phase 4 person days -- 3 for team leader and 1 person day for members. Total 5 person days.\(^{56}\) | Structuring the evaluation:  
  - Desk evaluation of existing documents, including Camp profile, work plan, progress reports etc.  
  - Drafting of the evaluation plan, methodology, and interview questions.  
  - Development and finalization of interview/FG tools and data analysis arrangement.  
  - Comments of the evaluator on the scope and terms or reference highlighting challenges.  
  - Limitations and difficulties foreseen, and options taken. | ➤ Inception Report and Discussion |
| 2. Field Mission Phase --18 person days -- 8 for Team Leader and 6 for Building Expert and 4 for Urban Planning Expert. Total 19 person days. | Data collection, analysis, verification of hypothesis/ preliminary findings:  
  - Courtesy meeting with the Front Office  
  - Meeting with Programme Support Office, Project Manager and EU  
  - Visit to 10 randomly selected shelters and 5 semi-self-help shelters to see the shelters and meet with beneficiaries  
  - Visit to Jerash Camp for interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries, individual discussions with residents, women’s groups, youths and contractors employed by the Project, etc. and other relevant stakeholders  
  - Presentation of preliminary findings with opportunity for feedback from UNRWA and EU | ➤ Intermediary report / Note ➤ Slide Presentation |
| 3. Reporting Phase -- 8 person days -- 7 for draft (4 for TL, 2 for Building Expert and 1 for Urban Planning Expert) -- and 1 person days for TL for finalization | Analysis and judgements, and drafting and finalisation of the report:  
  - Drafting of report  
  - Circulation of draft report for evaluation by key stakeholders for comments and feedback  
  - Incorporation of comments and finalization of report | ➤ Final report 15 working days gap for feedback from the date of submission of the final draft report |

\(^{56}\) The texts in red will be removed from the final draft and kept them as a reference point by evaluation manager for contract negotiation/preparation.
5.2.1 Preparation phase

The process will start with a briefing session in Jordan Field Office in Amman, Jordan. In the preparation phase, the relevant documents will be reviewed (see 10. Annexes). The Evaluation Team will then analyse the intervention logic, conduct desk review of existing documents, including Camp profile, work plan, progress reports etc. On the basis of the information collected the Team will prepare Evaluation Inception Report with the following elements:

a. Describe the development co-operation context.
b. Comment on /analyse the intervention logic / theory of change.
c. Comment on the evaluation questions proposed or, when relevant, propose an alternative or complementary set of evaluation questions justifying their relevance.
d. Check the consistency and validity of the evaluation questions, propose judgement criteria and identify provisional indicators and their means of verification.
e. Present an indicative methodology for the overall assessment of the Project.
f. Describe the approach for answering each evaluation questions.
g. Propose the work plan.
h. Confirm the final schedule for the evaluation exercise.

The Team Leader will ensure that the quality of the Inception Report complies with Quality Assurance Checklist for UNRAW Evaluation Inception Reports (to be provided later). The evaluation focal point will review the compliance and advise the Team Leader accordingly.

5.2.2 Field Mission phase

Before going to the field, the Team must submit a detailed work plan, including the list of people to be interviewed, and other data collection tools to be used, dates of visit, itinerary, and name of team members in charge. If any significant deviation from the agreed work plan or schedule is perceived as creating a risk for the quality of the evaluation, these should be immediately discussed with the evaluation focal person. In the Field Mission Phase, the Team shall carry out the following tasks:

a. Analyse systematically the relevant available document.
b. Courtesy meetings with the Front Office, Meeting with Programme Support Office, Project Manager, and EC; and technical meeting with Evaluation Division, Department of Internal Oversight Services and HQ Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Department.

c. Visit to Jerash Camp to observe work in progress and for interviews with Project staff, beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders.

d. Provide preliminary responses to each evaluation question stating the information already gathered and their limitations, identify the issues still to be covered and the assumptions to be tested, and describe a full method to address the question.

e. Identify and present the list of tools to be applied in the Field Phase.

f. List all preparatory steps already taken/to be taken for the Field Phase.

During the field phase, the Team shall ensure adequate contact and consultation with different stakeholders, especially the shelter owners and other members of community as well as the Department of Palestinian Authority and the European Union.

At the end of the field phase, the Team Leader shall summarize its work, discuss the reliability and coverage of data collection, and present preliminary findings in writing in a meeting with UNRWA and the EC.

5.2.3 Reporting phase

This phase is mainly devoted to the preparation of the draft final report. The Evaluation Team Leader will present in a single document their findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The Team Leader will make sure that:

a. Their assessments are objective and balanced, statements accurate and verifiable, and recommendations realistic.

b. When drafting the report, they will acknowledge clearly where changes in the desired direction are known to be already taking place.

The Team Leader will present the draft final report to the evaluation focal person to discuss the findings, conclusions and recommendations. On the basis of comments expressed by the evaluation focal person in consultation with other UNRWA stakeholders and the EC, the Team Leader will amend and revise the draft report. While potential quality issues, factual errors or methodological problems should be corrected, comments linked to diverging judgements may be either accepted or rejected. In the latter instance, the Team Leader should explain the reasons in writing.

5.3 Quality of the Final Report
a. UNRWA’s Evaluation Division of Department of Internal Oversight follows the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community. The evaluation manager, Field Programme Support Officer will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the DIOS Evaluation Division will conduct the second level quality assurance using UNRWA Quality Assurance Checklist for UNRWA Evaluation Final Reports (to be provided later). This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation, but ensures that the findings are backed up by evidence and form the basis of the conclusions and recommendations.

b. The Team Leader is responsible to ensure data validity, consistency and accuracy and to submit reports written in good Standard English. If these standards are not met, the Team Leader will, at his/her own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the reports to the required standards.

6. Reporting Requirements

The reports must match quality standards. The text of the report should be illustrated, as appropriate, with maps, graphs, case studies, and tables; a map of the Project’s area(s) of intervention is required (to be attached as annex).

The Evaluation Team will prepare and submit the following outputs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type</th>
<th>number of pages (excluding annexes)</th>
<th>main content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception report</td>
<td>Approximately 2.5 pages</td>
<td>• Full description of the methodology used to answer the questions&lt;br&gt;• Field phase detailed plan&lt;br&gt;• Reflection of scope (questions and data) of evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of preliminary findings and recommendation</td>
<td>As appropriate covering all domains of evaluation using - PowerPoint Presentation</td>
<td>• Preliminary answer to each evaluation questions stating the information already gathered and their limitations&lt;br&gt;• Issues still to be covered and the assumptions to be tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft report</td>
<td>No more than 14 pages excluding executive summary and annexes</td>
<td>• Answer to the evaluation questions&lt;br&gt;• Synthesis of all findings, conclusions and recommendations into an overall assessment&lt;br&gt;• Detailed structure of the Report is provided in Annex II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments matrix</td>
<td>As needed</td>
<td>• Highlight the rational for not accepting comments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final report</td>
<td>No more than 14 pages excluding executive summary and annexes</td>
<td>• Same specifications as above, incorporating any comments received from the evaluation focal person on the draft report that have been accepted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the Inception Report, the Evaluation Manager will submit comments within 1 calendar day. The Evaluation Manager will compile and submit to the Team Leader the comments on draft evaluation report.

The revised reports/outputs incorporating comments received from the concerned parties shall be submitted by the Team Leader within the time stipulated above. The Team Leader should provide a Comments Matrix explaining how and where comments have been integrated or the reason for non-integration of certain comments.

7. The Evaluation Team

The evaluation will be carried out by a team made of three persons: a Team Leader, a Building Design and Construction Specialist, and an Urban Planner.

The Team Leader is required to have the following qualifications: 16 person days

1. A Master’s degree in a related field, preferably in urban planning;
2. Minimum of 5 years of work experience in conducting evaluations/evaluations preferably in the field of low cost housing;
3. Knowledge of participatory processes in socio-economic development;
4. Understanding of rainwater harvesting Projects in settlements in dry areas;
5. Experience and/or methodological/technical knowledge, including some specific data collection and analytical skills on human rights-based approaches to programming, understanding of gender considerations, and understanding of participatory approaches
6. Lead and managed at least 3 evaluations involving 2 or more members;
7. Extensive experience in applying qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods;
8. Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions and produce reports on time;
9. Excellent written and oral communication skills in English;
10. Ability to communicate in Arabic is desirable; and
11. Experience with EU funded Projects is desirable.

The Building Design and Construction Expert is required to possess the following qualifications: 9 person days

1. A Bachelor’s degree in civil/architectural engineering with at least 5 years’ experience in housing sector;
2. Experienced in cost estimation and cost analysis;
3. Familiar with construction practices in MENA region, preferably in Jordan;
4. Excellent written and oral communication skills in English;
5. Evaluation related work experience is highly desirable; and
6. Ability to communicate in Arabic.

The Urban Planning Expert is required to possess the following qualifications: 6 person days

1. A Bachelor's degree in urban planning or design with at least 5 years experience in urban planning and design;
2. At least 2 years experience in participatory planning processes and community mobilization;
3. Familiar with formal/informal settlements up-grading and low cost housing Projects;
4. Evaluation related work experience is highly desirable; and
5. Ability to communicate in Arabic.

The Team will be assisted by an external interpreter for meetings/interviews with beneficiaries and community members.

8. **The Indicative Work Plan & Time Table**

Provisional start of the assignment: 7 July 2016 (after Ramadan).

Maximum duration of the assignment: 16 person days staggered for Team Leader, 9 person days for Building Design and Construction Specialist and 6 person days for Urban Planner, as stated in Evaluation Phases in Deliverables Section above. Fifteen working days will be needed for the review of the draft report by EC and UNRWA from the date of receipt of the draft final report.

9. **Administrative Aspects**

9.1 **Conflict of Interest**

The Evaluators must not have had a direct role in the planning or implementation of the Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Jerash Camp (Donor Project reference: ENPI/2012/309-238; UNRWA Project code: PQB21). In case of doubt in the course of the assignment, the evaluators must inform UNRWA as soon as possible of any risk of conflict of interest.

9.2 **Application Process**

Applicants should submit an up-to-date CV or UN Personal History Form (P11) clearly demonstrating their knowledge and experience required to meet the consultancy requirements, together with a cover letter which states expected remuneration and highlights the relevant expertise via an email sent to consultancy@unrwa.org, clearly indicating the title of the position, e.g. “Urban Planning Expert” in the subject line of the
message. The deadline for the submission of applications 20 July 2016 (late applications will not be considered).

UNRWA is an equal opportunity employer and welcomes applications from both women and men. UNRWA encourages applications from qualified and experienced female candidates. Only those applicants short-listed for interview will be contacted. UNRWA is a non-smoking environment.

Annexes

Annex I: Information that will be provided to the Evaluation Team

All relevant documents will be given to the evaluators in soft copy upon arrival, including:

A. Project related documents:
   a. EU Contribution Agreement together with original work plan and approved budget (attached)
   b. Log frame (embedded) and Theory of Change Diagram
   c. Project Organogram with Name, Designation, Gender and assignment duration of staff, volunteers and interns engaged in the Project
   d. Project Progress Reports
   e. Jerash Camp map with Project shelters marked as per the type of intervention
   f. List of shelters with information on the size, cost, shelter owner and family size, etc.
   g. TOR’s of Project staff
   h. Addendum to the agreement, revised work plan and log frame
   i. List of Camp resident employed
   j. List of Camp contractors and contract amount
   k. Mid Term Review Report

B. UNRWA Documents:
   a. Jerash Camp Profile
   b. Jerash Camp Urban Improvement Plan

C. Other relevant documents:
   a. Agreement with Leuven University, Belgium
   b. List and duration of Leuven University students attached to the Project
   c. Others

57 Draft as at April 2016
Note: The Team Leader has to identify requirement for any other document in Inception Report.

Annex II: Structure of the Executive Summary & Final Report

The final report should not be longer than the number of pages indicated. Additional information on overall context, programme or aspects of methodology and analysis should be confined to annexes.

The cover page of the report shall carry the following text:

“This evaluation is supported and guided by UNRWA and the European Commission and presented by [name of consulting firm]. The report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of UNRWA or the European Commission”.

The main sections of the evaluation report are as follows:

1. Executive Summary:
A tightly-drafted, to-the-point and free-standing Executive Summary is a critical component. It should be short, no more than three pages. It should focus on the key purpose or issues of the evaluation, outline the main analytical points, and clearly indicate the main conclusions, lessons to be learned and specific recommendations.

2. Introduction:
A description of the Project and the evaluation, providing the reader with sufficient methodological explanations to gauge the credibility of the conclusions and to acknowledge limitations or weaknesses, where relevant.

3. Findings/Conclusions:
A chapter presenting the evaluation questions and conclusive answers, together with evidence and reasoning. The conclusions should be organized in clusters in the chapter in order to provide an overview of the assessed subject. A sub-chapter should present the 3 or 4 major conclusions organized by order of importance, while avoiding being repetitive.

4. Lessons Learned:
This chapter presents the lessons for future design and implementation of shelter improvement programmes/Projects.

5. Annexes:
The report should include the following annexes:

a. The Terms of Reference of the evaluation.

b. The names of the evaluators (CVs should be shown, but summarized and limited to one page per person).
c. Detailed evaluation method including: options taken, difficulties encountered and limitations, and, detail of tools and analyses.

d. Intervention Logic / Theory of Change (updated).

e. Map of Project area.

f. List of persons/organizations consulted/interviewed.

g. Literature and documentation consulted.

h. Other technical annexes (e.g. data analyses, tables of contents and figures).

Annex III: Quality Assessment Checklist

The quality of the Inception Report and the Final Report will be assessed by the Evaluation Focal Person, UNRWA DIOS and the EC using the Quality Assurance Checklists of UNRWA. The Checklists will be provided to the successful candidates together with contract.
annex 3 bibliography

1. UNRWA Project documents: (partial list of over 100 files accessed; also photos).
   a. Annex I Logframe
   b. Annex II Revised EC Jerash Workplan, Nov 2013
   c. Annex III Assessment scoring system-revised July 2013
   d. Annex IV 1st 40 names Announced 14 Oct 2013
   e. Annex V List of Workmanship, updated.
   f. Annex VII Budget Revision
   g. Annex IX Monitoring Report
   h. Strategic Plan
   i. Shelters’ Final List scored
   j. Stakeholders Shelter Rehabilitation
   k. Annex II Assessment Scoring System, Final
   l. Second Progress Report
   m. Third Progress Report
   n. PQB21 Mid-Term Review Final Report with Management Response
   o. Jerash Camp Rapid Assessment Results, 24 April 2012
   p. C.3.5.22 Up-to-date list of shelters
   q. C.4 List of Camp residents employed and their contacts and employer
   r. UNRWA Jerash Evaluation Terms of Reference
   s. Camp Improvement Plan.
   u. Guidelines for Individual Shelter Rehabilitation on Grant Basis. UNRWA HQ (A)
      ICIP. August, 2011. 25p
   v. Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestinian Refugees in Jerash
   x. UNRWA Medium Term Strategy 2010-2015. 64p.

2. Almanaseer, Dr. Naser. Feasibility Study: Rainwater Harvesting System (RWHS) in

3. Dhollander, Charlottee. Gaza@Jordan: Between Suq and Wadi. KU Leuven. Masters’
   thesis.147p


5. Erts, Jasper, et.al. Gaza©Jordan: Reshaping the Border as a central space for

6. EU Delegation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Contribution Agreement for
   Contribution to UNRWA for Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable

7. EU Delegation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Contribution Agreement for
   Contribution to UNRWA for Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable
9. Pinxten, Tina, Machiel Van Niewenhove, et.al. Towards a Territorial and Urban Integration of Gaza Camp (Jordan): The Main Road as a Mediating Figure. KU Leuven. 2015. 532p.
annex 4  list of interviews and focus group discussions

unrwa jordan field office:
1. Dorothee Klaus, Deputy Director of UNRWA Operations, JFO
2. Vickram Chhetri, Programme Support Officer, JFO
3. Robert Stryke, Head of Evaluation Unit, UNRWA HQ
4. Khalil Hassan, Donor Relations Officer, JFO
5. Francesco Coronaro, Chief of Procurement and Logistics, JFO
6. Osama Al-Toubeh, Procurement Office, JFO
7. Manal Ibrahim, Procurement Office, JFO
8. Muna Budeiri, Deputy Director, Infrastructure and Camp Improvement
9. Vijay Neekhra, Senior Urban Planning Officer
10. Ahmad Dabash, Chief, Field Infrastructure and Camp Improvement
11. Ayat Younes, UNRWA former Project Site Engineer
12. Amin Dabbas, UNRWA Structure Design Engineer, former Project Site Engineer
13. Farah Shouli, former Project Manager
14. Dina Dabash, former Urban Planning Officer, CIP/UID
15. Noor Tom, Shelter Designer, JFO
17. Salah Ismael, Measurement and Cost Engineer, UNRWA HQ
18. Ibrahim Hijoj, UNRWA Social Safety Net, JFO
19. Rahma Abdul-Rahman, FSSO, Relief Services
20. Machiel VanNiewenhove, UNRWA Urban Planning volunteer

other agencies:
1. Patrice Moix, Sewage Project Manager, SDC
2. Gudrun Kramer, GiZ, (by Skype)
3. Inga Mueller, Kfw, (by Skype)
4. Engineer Yassin Abu Awwad, DPA

contractors:
1. Ali Al Nadi, Contractor (Camp)
2. Eng. Radhwan Abu Saif, Garasia Contracting (Camp)
3. Al Mada Contracting
4. Musa Looh, Contractor
5. Wajeeh and Zuhair Kanaan, Kanaan Contracting

camp workers:
for al nadi contractor:
1. Hani still working with Al Nadi, 10 days per month
2. Majed

for grasia contractor:
1. Salem Abu Rafa
2. Hassan Salameh
3. Ahmad Radwan—still with Grasia
4. Salem Muasseseh
5. Radwan Abu Seif

jerash camp:
1. Samaher Fakhouri, Assistant Operation Support Office, UNRWA
2. Rania Sabbah, former Manager, CDO
3. Rajah Abu Zuhri, Principal, UNRWA Girls’ School; CIC member
4. Youssef Sulaiman Abu Amra, Member, Camp Service Committee
5. Firas Arar, Engineer, DPA
6. Ahmed Audeh Suleiman, Principal, UNRWA Boys’ School; CIC member, CBRC
7. Inaam Abujdaa, Director, Community-Based Rehabilitation Center
8. Odeh Abu Sosain, Director, Camp Services Committee
9. Mohammed Abu Steyeh, Director of Office, DPA
10. Nidal Abdullah, Women’s Programme Center
11. Muna Abu Reesh, Women’s Programme Center
12. Jundiyeh Dheini, Women’s Programme Center
13. Mohammed Abu Walid Nadi, former director, Youth Club
14. Basheer Abu Sirdeneh, volunteer from 2009

focus group meetings:
1. With 11 female beneficiaries
2. With 13 non-beneficiaries
evaluation inception report

contribution to UNRWA for improvement of living conditions of vulnerable palestine refugees in jerash camp

Evaluation Team: Kerry Abbott (Team Leader), Dana Halassa (Urban Planner), Raed Qawasmeh (Engineer)

background and rationale for the evaluation

Of the approximately five million refugees registered with UNRWA, the largest number—nearly two million—reside in Jordan.

This evaluation aims to assess an intervention by UNRWA that focused on improving shelters for the most vulnerable residents of Jerash Camp. "Gaza Camp" in Jerash houses 1948 refugees displaced from Gaza in 1967. It was established as an emergency Camp in 1968 to accommodate 11,500 refugees who fled to Gaza in 1948 and then were displaced from Gaza in 1967, as well as Gaza residents who were displaced for the first time by war in 1967. Currently there are 26,785 refugees in Jerash Camp registered with UNRWA, with about 14,000 of them living within the official borders of the Camp.

This EU-funded Project used a needs-based criteria to identify 80 of the most vulnerable households whose shelters needed to be upgraded or rebuilt. It was designed to address the multiple needs of a human settlement, including solar energy to heat water, rainwater harvesting, short-term livelihoods in the construction phase, and self-help construction to add the improvements favoured by the household and to save money.

There was also an Urban Improvement Plan to address community infrastructure needs, which used participatory consultations to develop community priorities and identify future Projects for the improvement of core Camp facilities, including roads and solid waste management.

methodology

The Team Leader will focus on key informant interviews with stakeholders involved in the planning and implementation of the Project (including UNRWA staff, Camp residents, donors), focus group interviews with certain beneficiaries (disaggregated into women, disabled, youth, unemployed), field visits to observe the shelters and Camp infrastructure needs identified in the urban plan, and discussions with other sources working in the Camp and involved in community development. She will visit all the shelters (with the owners acceptance) to gain a sense of the types, quality, and any issues they may raise. She will also
assess certain specific shelter issues, such as access for the disabled homeowners and the self-help cases.

She will help other Team members analyze their role and methods and help to consolidate information-sharing, helping to assure the most useful data is collected for analysis of the evaluation questions. She will outline and draft the report, with input from the Team members, and revise the Final Report once comments are received.

The Engineer will assess the contracting and procurement process, and meet with a selection of contractors, including local refugees who submitted bids. He will try to assess cost comparisons with private sector construction, including sources and costs of supplies and labour. Attention will also be given to the two major Project key performance indicators, namely cost and quality of what has been designed and built in order to identify and assess the value added to the beneficiaries.

He will conduct visits to 15 shelters to determine how the construction process was executed, consider quality assurance measures, and compare the materials, techniques, appearance, and resident comments/satisfaction with the result. He will also assess maintenance and sustainability issues to discover how the homeowner will address those needs. While most of the shelter selection was done randomly, the Engineer included shelters built for the disabled, to assess how special needs were met. This methodology of informed selection assures key questions about Project performance can be answered.

The Engineer will employ the following methods:

- On-site visit and survey the selected shelters, including specific technical inspections, in order to identify and document the current shelters’ state after Project completion;
- Observation and comparison between the pre-Project and post-Project shelter state to measure the impact;
- Interviews with the beneficiaries and different stakeholders to collect additional information and/or concerns. Technical questions shall be prepared and raised to technical stakeholders, who have been involved over the Project’s different stages;
- Identify livelihoods opportunities through the construction process, including skills development;
- Assessment of what new data are needed. This requires specifying the characteristics of the data to ensure what is collected is useful, measurable and comparable to the data collected before and/or during the Project implementation.
- Analysis of data, results and findings to identify and measure the Project impacts, including the measurement of impact on the cost of utilities for the selected shelters, comparing the costs before and after the Project implementation. He will include a reference to the potential or limits of rainwater harvesting and whether any related system has been built.
Photographs will be taken to illustrate the results/impact for comparison and also supporting documentation.

As this Project aimed to involve a lower-cost construction modality of self-help (built by home owner with training and assistance by UNRWA engineers) and semi self-help (interior finishing by owner), the Evaluation Engineer will visit the two shelters that included semi self help to assess the scale and quality of the work. He will also ask other shelter owners why they did not opt for the self-help model. This Project offered some employment opportunities for Camp residents and the Team will try to assess how that was conceptualized and executed in practice.

The **Urban Planner** will focus on the Camp Urban Improvement Plan designed for the Camp and the process of consultation with the various stakeholders. She will speak with the head of the Urban Planning design team and with UNRWA staff involved with the process, including the Project Manager and Social Worker to assess how the Camp community was prepared and mobilized for the exercise. As Camp residents may not be aware of the range of options for Camp renewal and infrastructure upgrading, understanding how residents were consulted, informed, or coached will be helpful in understanding their choices.

The viability of the Plan and funding needs will be considered during consultations with the Programme Support Office, Project Management and other stakeholders.

The field visit and site inspection phase will aim to complete the data collected in the structuring phase and to gather new information in support of the conclusions and recommendations of the study. A range of urban elements through site investigation and observation will be reviewed, as follows:

- Infrastructure and Accessibility
- Land Use and Zoning
- Block and Shelter
- Urban Fabric
- Natural and Built Environment
- Environmental Infrastructure
- Health and Education
- Public Institutions
- Urban Sprawl

Data collection tools used by the Urban Planning Expert will include document analysis, portfolio review, interviews with key informants and beneficiaries, Focus Group Discussions, observations, group assessment with the field staff, and documentation (including photographs).

The priorities identified were consolidated into several themes for future execution and some of those are now slated for funding. Problems impeding the implementation of some
suggestions will be discussed, as an illustration of how participatory, design-centered Projects depend upon an informed community of users.

**workplan**

The team will spend eleven days on field work, with the first two days (November 13-14) in key informant meetings in Amman and three days (November 15-17) in Jerash Camp. Over the weekend (November 18-19), the Team Leader will continue document review, hold consultations with the Team, and outline the report.

The Team will then return to Jerash Camp on November 20 and 21 to follow up on identified issues and conclude meetings in Amman. The Evaluation Team will give a briefing to stakeholders selected by UNRWA on 22 November, to present highlights of the findings, and to listen to comments raised, The Team Leader will remain two further days in the country to follow-up on issues that may require further research, analysis, or verification for inclusion in the report.

With this methodology, the Evaluation questions specified in the Terms of Reference should be answered, with those relating to indirect beneficiaries and unintended consequences answered only as observed on field visits or reported in interviews.

Each Team member will write a section of the Draft Report to document the methods, process, and findings in the field and offer a consideration of the significance of the intervention and prospective options. The Report will be submitted by the end of November and circulated by UNRWA for comments. The Team will review the comments submitted in the Evaluation Matrix and respond within two days with the Final Report.

This Inception report was written with input from all Team members, and edited by the Team Leader for coherence of style and content.
annex 6 soil test

Neither the contract Document ECS Procedure No. 14 nor the bill of quantities stipulates anything regarding the verification of foundation depths/dimensions by contractors! This is another risk. Since the contract was a re-measurement contract, i.e. contractors get paid based on the actual work quantity executed, contractors could have excavated more and claimed more money because the rate of excavation is multiplied by the volume excavated to provide the final price.

This exercise indicates a flaw in design, tender documentation, and specification and construction. Above all, there was a big gap in the integration of the above-mentioned phases.

Usually, the soil testing is done by a geotechnical company/specialist hired by the Project owner during or before the design stage. Nonetheless, the owner could transfer this risk to contractors by requesting contractors carry out this investigation at the pre-construction stage. This should be thoroughly stipulated and clarified in the tender documents for the contractor to be able to price his work accordingly. That did not happen in this Project.

1. There was no evidence received as the basis for selecting the 2kg/cm² in the design;
2. If the actual soil-bearing capacity was lower than this indicated 2kg/cm², there would be a potential risk for settlement and cracks in the structure;
3. However, if the bearing capacity was higher than 2kg/cm² there would be an opportunity to save in the foundation dimension (which would be smaller) and also to save in the reinforcement/steel quantities;
4. The foundation plans show foundation dimensions, however the note on the right side of the same drawings states: "Depth of foundation level and dimension of the footings are to be decided on site according to soil condition." First, this statement contradicts/conflicts with the dimension plan itself. If dimensions are to be decided according to soil conditions, then the drawing should have not indicated any dimensions because the contractor had priced according to these dimensions. Also did the Project do any soil testing to identify the soil condition? There was no evidence of this!
5. In view of the above point/comment, the word "decided" in the above statement should have been replaced with "verified". Was this statement in alignment with the contract conditions and terms? Did contractors verify these dimensions? There is no evidence of that, and no evidence that as-built drawings were executed;
6. There is a discrepancy between this document and the design drawings. This document stipulates that the proposed foundation should be indicated in drawings as provision. Drawings did not comply with this statement!
7. The Document implies that in case of shelter re-building/building Project, the proposed depth of foundations should be based on local knowledge, trial pits or on soil tests available for other buildings in the vicinity. This can be an assumption, but there was no evidence of this assumption in the design document. The design document should have included not only this assumption but also the supporting
documents/substantiation such as the soil tests and trial pits results. No evidence of any of these was available.

8. This Document needs to be revisited because several boreholes can be done to gain knowledge about the site in general—it’s not necessary to do boreholes for each shelter. For example 10 boreholes (10m deep) and trial pits will cost around JOD 3000-5000 including mobilization of machines. This amount is not huge for a Euro 2 million project. The knowledge of soil conditions can help reduce cost; for instance, foundation dimensions could be smaller and steel work could be less.

9. The above 10 boreholes could give an indication about the consistency of the soil in the area;

10. It appears that the design was not in full alignment with this Document. A design review is highly recommended to be implemented to identify such gaps and deliver cost effective solutions.

11. Trial pits need to be carried out and soil needs to be tested in terms of its chemical characteristics, for example chloride and sulfate elements can affect the steel and concrete respectively, therefore such tests would help select/design the best type of steel and concrete, such as sulfate-resistant concrete.

12. Where did the shelter septic effluent go before the sewer system was built? into the soil? since the permeability of soil had not been identified because soil testing was not done, it is impossible to determine how deep and horizontally spread the sewage effluent is underground, which could create erosion of soil under foundations in the long run, etc.
annex 7 design checklist

1. Beneficiary satisfaction would have been higher if the design had been implemented in accordance with international practice, in stages: concept design, consultation with shelter owner, preliminary design, second consultation, and then the detailed design, with beneficiary approval. It also should have been reviewed, checked and audited by design quality and objective and guidelines compliance checkers.

2. In some cases, the design should have been customized to address the needs of the shelter shape and plot configuration in order to optimize the area.

3. The design didn’t indicate the design life of the shelter.

4. The design was carried out by the engineers who had been involved in the pre-design shelter surveys, and who had an understanding of the needs of the beneficiaries, but the QA/QC procedure was inadequate and adversely affected the design quality. The design management plan, including the QA/QC plan should have been established by design expert/managers and implemented by designers.

5. A design risk register should have been established to inform the design process.

6. There was no evidence of a soil test to identify soil conditions, which is an essential element for foundation design, and there was no inclusion of pertinent assumptions.

7. The electrical and mechanical designs were carried out by architects instead of specialist electrical and mechanical design engineers. Energy-saving electrical fixtures could have been introduced.

8. Beneficiaries were provided with solar water heating systems, helping them reduce gas consumption, particularly in the summer time. However, it appears many if not most of these expensive units were sold.

9. The design was not consistent in terms of the thermal and weather insulation. Shelter windows were designed and procured as double-glazed when external shelter walls were designed as one 15cm block wall without insulation. Since windows and block walls work as one system in terms of insulation, windows either should have been single-glazed or walls designed as double 10cm block walls with a 5cm gap in between. As storms come from the west, that wall could have been insulated.

10. The design installed windows for ventilation, but the space left between the house boundary and room wall could allow for the entry of rodents.
11. The structural design was meant to support the load of four stories, in anticipation of vertical shelter expansion. However, the structural calculations should have been documented as a reference.

12. Typical reinforcement details for ribbed slab were introduced for all shelters when the reinforcement design should have been shelter-specific for each and every shelter.

13. Since the Camp is wet during the rainy season, the design should have considered damp-proof and waterproof solutions for all sub-structures lying directly on grade and under backfilling materials, and should have assured the shelter and doorframe were above street level.

14. A slight discrepancy between the foundation plan dimension and dimensions plan was observed. Example: for shelter A.3.2, room 2, the wall on right hand side didn’t show where the load of this wall is supported. The design does not include a roof plan showing the roof screed slope direction or the locations of drain gutters.

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58 According to the Guidelines 10.3.2. Design calculations/analysis is for 3 floors plus one contingency floor. Usually the design is submitted together with a design report and appendices showing all the relevant calculations, reference to guidelines, assumptions with supporting documents, reference to codes/standards, etc. but not in this Project, where the design was only a number of drawings.
annex 8 selected shelters for site visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. N</th>
<th>Shelter ID</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Intervention Type</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>Visible Finished Work Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A18.35</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Semi Self Help Approach</td>
<td>Zuhdi Kanaan</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A3.2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2 rooms reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Ali Al Nadi</td>
<td>Ranges from poor to average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A22.9</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1 room reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Ali Al Nadi</td>
<td>Less than average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A21.5a</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2 rooms reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Ali Al Nadi</td>
<td>Average with surface defects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A21.15b</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2 rooms reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Ali Al Nadi</td>
<td>Average with surface defects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>D3.8a</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2 rooms reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Al Mardini</td>
<td>Average with surface defects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>D3.8b</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1 room reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Al Mardini</td>
<td>Average with surface defects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>D21.3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2 rooms reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Al Mardini</td>
<td>Ranges from poor to average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>B22.7</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Semi Self Help Approach</td>
<td>Zuhdi Kanaan</td>
<td>Poor to average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>B4.1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 rooms reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Al Mardini</td>
<td>Ranges from average to good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>B7.8</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2 rooms reconstruction + 1 room repair + facilities</td>
<td>Al Mardini</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>C6.1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 rooms reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Al Mardini</td>
<td>Average to good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>C8.14</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1 room reconstruction + facilities</td>
<td>Al Loooh</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>C32.18</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2 rooms reconstruction + 1 room repair + facilities</td>
<td>Al Loooh</td>
<td>Poor to average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>C33.9</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2 rooms reconstruction + 1 room repair + facilities</td>
<td>Al Loooh</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above 15 shelters, the evaluation team visited the following 32 shelters:
- B.15.11; B.15.12.a; B.15.12.b; B.17.15.a; B.17.15.b; B.22.7; B.28.18
- C.6.1; C.6.4; C.8.14; C.10.13; C.15.3; C.15.4; C.15.15; C.35.7.a; C.35.7.b
- D.3.8.a; D.3.8.b; D.25.22

68
annex 9  cost comparison

1. Comparison between quoted unit prices of a sample of randomly selected five (5) contracts and market unit prices of first quarter of November, 2016. I randomly selected 5 contracts/BOQs, and calculated the rate of JOD per m2 for each tender, i.e. total contract price divided by the roof area (m2) taking into consideration also the other repair work value.

2. The average rate of JOD/m2 was calculated for the above selected 5 contract, which resulted in JOD 380 per m2.

3. According to the market for such work outside the Camp, taking into consideration the contractor does not pay tax on UNRWA Projects, the rate was JOD 200.

4. Now, since the Camp has a different context and nature from the areas outside the Camp, I have added a contingency of 20 percent, i.e. JOD 40 per m2. The market rate became JOD 240 per m2.

5. Now the comparison between JOD 380 and JOD 240 shows that the 380 is 58 percent higher than the 240.

This is just to give an indication, NOT necessarily an accurate percentage. It could be a bit higher or lower. We give this percentage to inform UNRWA that there is something wrong in their tendering system. UNRWA now is advised to do a thorough investigation.

In order to obtain an accurate percentage/rate, the following needs to be done:

1. The nature of Camp needs to be thoroughly studied to identify the risks and assess their impacts. Accordingly an accurate contingency can be estimated.

2. This accurate contingency will be added to the market price in order to form a benchmark for future tendering and estimation. Market prices fluctuate depending on other market factors, and this can be considered as well in the contingency calculation, taking into consideration for example the escalation of material values, etc.

3. One all contract prices for all the 80 shelters have been calculated an average rate/JOD per m2 should be derived from this exercise;

4. Then the actual and accurate comparison can be done for the tender prices of 80 shelters and the market price with accurate contingency.

| Schedule of rates that indicates a comparison between major prices quoted by contractors and market price of early November 2016. |
| The below contractors’ quoted prices were selected on a random basis from the Project different contracts and BOOs |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOOH</th>
<th>A. Almadic</th>
<th>Mardi ni</th>
<th>Zuhdi &amp; Kanaan</th>
<th>Almadic</th>
<th>Semiself hel</th>
<th>Marke t price today</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

69
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>L.S.</th>
<th>450</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>300</th>
<th>350</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Demolition of the existing walls &amp; ceiling in any type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Excavation work for foundations</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Crushed stone sub-base filling materials below slab on grade. Backfilling on</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>layers basis and each layer is 150mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Steel work</td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Plain concrete binding of 50mm thick 150 kg/cm²</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Concrete for isolated footings 250kg/cm²</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Concrete for tie beams 250kg/cm²</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Concrete for column necks 250kg/m²</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Concrete for slab on grade 200kg/cm²</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Concrete for columns 250kg/cm²</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Concrete for slabs of 25cm thick 250kg/cm²</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Concrete for main entrance steps 250kg/cm²</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Concrete masonry unit, block work of 100mm thick</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Concrete masonry unit, block work of 150mm thick</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ribs Blocks of 180mm thick</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Painted steel protection to windows</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Roof insulation bitumen membrane</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Plain concrete screed of the roof 2 percent slope</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Steel door of 90-100cm width and 210 cm high</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Wood door of 80-90cm width and 210cm high</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Double glazed window</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Plaster work</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Terrazzo floor tiling 25*25cm</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Terrazzo skirting 10*25cm</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Anti slip porcelain floor tiling</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ceramic skirting</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Bathroom wall ceramic tiling</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Kitchen wall ceramic tiling</td>
<td>M2</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Emulsion paint 3 coats including all necessary surface preparation</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Shabreem paint</td>
<td>M2</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Drainage UPVC pipes dia 50mm</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Drainage UPVC pipes dia 110mm</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Floor drain</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>External manhole 600mm dia</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>WC Toilet with hand spray</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Hand wash basin porcelain</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Shower</td>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Kitchen sink of one basin</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>PVC domestic water pipes of 20mm dia</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Galvanized steel pipes of 15mm dia</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Galvanized steel pipes of 20mm dia</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Supply, install and test solar system</td>
<td>L.S.</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>450</td>
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<td>350</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Supply, install and test 2m3 size</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>120</td>
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Note (1): The rate of JOD 380 per square meter was derived as an average of the above selected five (5) rates per m2. The rate JOD/M2 for each of the above selected contracts/Bill of Quantities was estimated based on total price (sum of all unit prices) divided by the area (m2) of the reconstructed shelter roof, taking into consideration the other repair work of the same shelter. In view of this, it is recommended that UNRWA JFO’s Procurement and Engineering Departments to carry out an average rate of JOD/M2 for all the 80 shelters’ BoQs/contracts.

Note (2): An accurate contingency should be added to the market rate (JOD/M2) in order to establish an efficient construction rate (JOD/M2) for future similar projects in the Camp. The Camp’s special nature and context, including all types of risks are the rationale for estimating this contingency.

However, to estimate an accurate contingency, a risk register is to be established. This register shall:

1. Identify all areas of concern and their risks;
2. Assess all the risks;
3. Deliver treatments/mitigation measures for all the risks;
4. Identify likelihood levels;
5. Identify impacts if such risks occur;
6. Contingency for each risk = risk likelihood to occur * impact if occurs;
7. Total contingency, which should be added to the market rate = sum of all contingencies.
final evaluation of PQ12B21